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Abstract 
 
Over the last half-century, the development of physical distribution 
management has led to the establishment of logistics, which itself has 
developed into one of the key components of supply chain management. As 
different models of competition have developed in parallel, so the concept of 
competition between supply chains, as opposed to between firms, has been 
described. These two trends are striking in the context of UK grocery retailing. 
This market sector is described as at the leading edge of innovation and is 
arguably among the most efficient in the one world. The speed and efficiency 
of these retail supply chains has underpinned customer offerings of range and 
freshness and has contributed to the growth of supermarket chains and thus 
the concentration of retail power in the UK grocery market. 
 
These trends then raise two issues. Innovation in logistics and distribution 
management appears to be easy to copy and thus goods ideas tend to be 
adopted by competitors and best practise is quickly and uniformly applied. 
Competitive advantage is, therefore, short term only. Secondly, new 
organisational paradigms, such as the extended or virtual enterprise, support 
the concept of competition between vertically integrated supply chains. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that all elements of the supply chain 
must be in competition. Whilst range, branding and procurement policies may 
continue to offer competitive advantage over time, the logistics elements of 
the supply chain might afford an opportunity for collaboration between 
competing supply chains, as these elements contribute no long term 
advantage to individual firms. 
 
New models for corporate strategy argue that collaboration between 
competitors is not only possible but desirable in certain areas of operations 
and under certain circumstances. Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) offers 
a set of tools for exploring potential areas of collaboration in the retail and 
grocery markets. However, in spite of collaboration in other areas and 
 xi
predictions by authors of collaboration in logistics operations, there is little 
evidence of applications in practise. This research set out to explore why this 
might be so. Research in the UK grocery market led to the proposition of a 
series of enablers and inhibitors for horizontal logistics collaborations, which 
were then tested in two other UK retail contexts. 
 1
1 Collaboration in logistics 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In separate recent statements, senior managers from two major UK food 
retailers offered different perspectives on the competitive nature of physical 
distribution. Whilst accepting that, in the short term at least, developments in 
distribution would provide “real competitive edge”, Paul Mason of Asda 
(Logistics and Transport Focus, July / August 2000) went on to speculate that 
“supply-chains will be pretty equal and then you are into the real value for the 
customer which is store service and price”. He noted that, through 
collaboration with competitors, “there is an awful lot we can do collectively as 
an industry”.  This view accorded with that of Garth Thorne of Marks & 
Spencer (Motor Transport, 4.3.99), who said “Why shouldn’t the big retailers 
work together to pool their resources?  The competitive edge is on the sales 
floor, not in the truck. “Clearly, although they are both engaged in food 
retailing, Asda and M &S are very different businesses. Yet, at the highest 
level, there seems to be an almost surprising level of convergence on the 
opportunities which might be unlocked through collaboration between 
competing retailers. However, in spite of this convergence and the apparent 
good sense implicit in co-operating to reduce costs and increase efficiency in 
areas of shared opportunity, there was very little evidence of such 
collaborations at the time and, indeed, there has been little since. Other 
writers (Fernie, 1998; Whiteoak, 1999) have noted specific opportunities 
available in the field of physical distribution, particularly transport, but 
examples of actual application are thin on the ground. This indicates that the 
advantages alluded to by Paul Mason of Asda have yet to materialise and that 
there are inhibitors and / or the absence of enablers which would explain the 
lack of collaboration or which, at some point, might facilitate it. 
 
The contribution of distribution to competitiveness appears to be at odds with 
current thinking about the contribution of supply chain management, in that it 
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is not companies which compete, but supply chains (Christopher, 1996). 
However, this is because supply chains by their very nature tend to be thought 
of vertically, or end-to-end. As such, distribution is just one element of a 
package which competes. However, this is not to say that every single 
element of each supply chain has to compete with every element of every 
other supply chain: distribution can form a vital link in one competitive chain 
whilst collaborating with the distribution element of another chain.  
 
Secondly, conventional wisdom (in some quarters) also tends to view the 
terms “distribution”, “logistics” and “supply chain management” as 
interchangeable and almost synonymous. From this perspective, if supply 
chains compete then distribution systems must, de facto, compete as well. 
The three terms are, of course, neither synonymous nor interchangeable. A 
review of the literature spanning more than four decades reveals an 
evolutionary process in which the bounds of the discipline have expanded as 
the nomenclature has developed.  
 
As this evolutionary process of the expansion of the bounds of influence has 
progressed, so too has there been constant innovation within each of the 
component parts. Thus physical distribution has become a sub-set of logistics, 
which is, in turn, a sub-set of supply chain management. At the same time, 
physical distribution has itself evolved through innovations such as 
centralisation of stocks leading to reduction and even removal of inventory, 
continuous replenishment and so on. The enabling technologies (vehicle 
design, warehouse design, communications and information technologies) 
have also evolved and developed over the same period. The two parallel 
evolutions can be represented visually, as in figure one below. 
 
History also shows us, however, that innovations in distribution, once they 
have been seen to work and to offer competitive advantage, are readily 
copied, thus removing the advantage. Each of the waves of innovation that 
has been occurred over the last four decades has thus been almost 
universally adopted as best practice within a few years of its introduction. This 
can be seen in the rapid adoption of inventory centralisation, reduction and 
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elimination, temperature consolidation and transport integration. Thus, within 
the physical distribution component, competitive advantage is, at best, 
temporary and transient. Proponents of supply chain thinking would suggest 
that the real competitive gains are to be made at the leading edge of the 
expansion of the overall discipline, as shown in figure two. 
Figure 1: The expanding boundaries of supply chain management and parallel 
innovations in physical distribution. 
Figure 2: Competition advantage at the Leading Edge 
 
Distribution is generally regarded as an enabler of efficiency rather than as 
adding value and is therefore a “hygiene factor” rather than a differentiator or, 
after the Kano Model, a “basic” factor, rather than an “excitement” factor 
(Bicheno, 1998). As the retailer, rather than the product, has become the 
brand (Walters & White, 1987), distribution has played an enabling role in 
underpinning service developments (Smith & Sparks, 1993; Quarmby, 1990) 
although innovations in this respect are easy for competitors to copy (Savitt, 
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1987). UK retailers such as Asda, Tesco, Sainsbury and Marks & Spencer 
have all attributed at least part of their recent success or difficulties to 
innovations in Physical Distribution Management.  
 
An alternative depiction of the short-term advantage to be gained from 
logistics innovation shows how the rate of reduction in unit costs has levelled 
off over time, as shown in figure three: 
 
Figure 3: Diminishing returns in supply chain innovation 
 
However, as individual retailers adopt these innovations at different times, 
they will exhibit some variations in unit costs over time until they have all fully 
implemented the latest best practice, as shown in figure four. 
 
According to this representation, then if further significant cost improvements 
are to be made over time, then these will need to be pursued in a different 
direction from the general trend. 
 
Figure 4: Relative gains to be made over time by competing firms 
 
This “time-based” interpretation is further complicated by the fact that not only 
do physical distribution operations form one part of the total supply chains, but 
Time 
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Time 
Cost 
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the relationships between parties in the vertical supply chain also have, to 
some extent, horizontal relationships with other parties in a network of parallel 
chains.  
 
Traditionally, supply chain integration and the joining of enterprises into an 
extended or “virtual” enterprise has tended to be vertical and contained within 
a single chain. Arguably, the required step change to facilitate a move in the 
curves shown in figures three and four above might be driven by integration 
horizontally, as shown in figure five: 
Figure 5: Horizontal integration across competing supply chains 
 
The extended enterprise (Miles & Snow, 1986; Johnstone & Lawrence, 1988; 
Borys & Jemison, 1989) has emerged as an alternative to traditional forms of 
economic exchange (Ellram, 1991). Such extension is most easily and visibly 
applied in the logistics arena (McKinnon, 1989; Bowersox, 1990; 
Schonberger, 1990; Christopher, 1996; Zinn & Parasuraman, 1997; Hines, 
1998; Cavinato, 1999). This has given rise to the notion of competing supply 
chains (Christopher, 1998). However, supply chain architecture in specific 
industries may make this concept unworkable (Buzzell & Ortmeyer, 1995; 
Christopher, 1996) and there has been some debate as to whether vertical or 
horizontal integration within supply chains is more effective (Richardson, 
1998; Whitehead, 1999). 
 
To summarise the ideas which will be developed into hypotheses, therefore: 
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- there appears to be prima facie case to suggest that distribution is 
no longer a core element of the differentiation strategies of major 
UK food retailers. 
- the physical distribution element, since it offers only transient 
competitiveness through innovation in the short or medium term, 
can be treated as a discrete element within supply chain 
management and, as such, can be treated in a non-competitive way 
in order to achieve greater efficiency. 
- cross-functional co-ordination will be shown to address issues of 
variance in channel infrastructures, channel density and 
fragmentation which, it is suggested, cannot be addressed through 
vertical integration of the physical distribution function. 
 
This raises the following important issues: 
 
- The evolutionary process through “logistics” to “supply chain 
management” has been holistic in the sense that it assumes that all 
of the component parts of the supply chain, including physical 
distribution, must be treated collectively in their contribution to 
competitiveness 
- The supply chain models offered are increasingly irrelevant in an 
environment of concentrated retail power with an increasingly 
complex and fragmented supply base. 
 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that, driven by initiatives under the 
banner of Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), even in the highly competitive 
UK food retail market, competitors are starting to work together in the area of 
distribution. To date, however, little research appears to have been carried out 
into the rationale or implications of such activity for overall supply chain 
strategy. This paper attempts to address this gap. 
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1.2 Scoping the Research: The UK Food Retailing 
Market 
 
The UK food retail market is often held up as a paragon of logistics efficiency, 
with unit costs and inventory levels significantly lower than most of the rest of 
the world (Fernie, 1995). Logistics developments as described above have 
taken place against the background of market concentration, creating an 
environment of intense competition. Arguably, the pace of change and 
intensity of competition should give rise to a research frame in which it is 
possible to isolate competition through physical distribution efficiency from 
total supply chain-based competitive strategies. 
 
Since 1960, the major multiples' share of the UK grocery market has grown 
from around a quarter to nearer three-quarters, at the expense of the 
independent and co-operative sectors. Within this three-quarters, the top six 
companies account for over 70% of all sales. However, this top six contains 
some very different companies (Seth & Randall, 1999): 
 
1.2.1.1 Sainsbury and Marks & Spencer 
are both over 100 years old and have developed (almost) entirely through 
organic growth. Both companies continued to be run by the families of their 
founders until recently. Both place a strong emphasis on their own brand 
goods (100% of the range in M & S) and both acquired reputations as 
“national institutions”. After spectacular financial results in the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, however, both businesses have run into trouble, both in market 
share and financial performance, in the last few years. Sainsbury in particular 
has largely attributed its woes to logistics and supply issues, with a substantial 
investment in a new generation of automated distribution depots going 
seriously wrong, leading to gaps on shelves and disenchanted customers. 
This was one logistics innovation which was not rapidly taken up by the 
competition and former Safeway Logistics Director, Lawrence Christensen, 
was drafted in to undo the automation and return the network to more 
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conventional and stable working practices. Within months of these actions, the 
customers started to return (Seth & Randall, 1999; Pendrous, 2004) 
 
1.2.1.2 Morrisons / Safeway and Somerfield 
are both the result of the acquisition strategies of holding companies, with 
Safeway and Somerfield appearing in something like their present form in the 
1970’s, and the former being acquired by Morrisons in 2003. James Gulliver’s 
Argyll changed its name when it acquired 133 Safeway stores in 1987. When 
Isoceles acquired The Dee Corporation, the Somerfield fascia emerged. 
Neither company, therefore, has a single identity which can be traced back 
much more than two decades. Both have, at times, fallen from grace with both 
the public and investors. Safeway enjoyed a brief flare of glory under the 
leadership of Carlos Criado-Perez in the late 1990’s, driven by promotional 
“guerilla” tactics. The 1998 union of Somerfield and Kwik Save has been 
described as two companies “huddling together for warmth” (Seth & Randall, 
1999), rather than a merger. Morrisons had been a low profile, but 
commercially successful family business, strong in its regional base in the 
North and controlled from Bradford, until it won the battle for Safeway, beating 
off challenges from all the other majors. Arguably, the acquisition has given 
Morrisons indigestion and, three years on, the company is still struggling to 
integrate the systems, fascias and networks of the two brands and its financial 
performance has been badly hit. (Seth & Randall, 1999; Jardine, 2000; Conley 
& Benady, 1998) 
 
1.2.1.3 Tesco and Asda 
Compared with Safeway and Somerfield, Tesco and Asda have a history 
(1932 and 1965, respectively). Both companies’ names include acronyms of 
the founders and their key partners (T.E. Stockwell + Cohen, Asquith + 
Dairies) and both went through financially difficult periods in the 1970’s or 
1980’s, which were famously brought to an end by charismatic leaders (Ian 
McLaurin, Archie Norman) and marketing campaigns (Operation Checkout, 
Breakout). Both have combined acquisition with organic growth and both have 
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strong international agendas (Seth & Randall, 1998), albeit Asda’s determined 
from the USA following its acquisition by the global giant Wal-Mart. 
 
The key trends in the retail distribution environment, and the reasons which 
explain them, have been well documented in the logistics literature: 
 
- centralisation of distribution (Carter, 1986; Bowring, 1988; 
McKinnon, 1989; McKinnon, 1990; Moore, 1990 and 1991; Cullis, 
1992). Latterly, this has been described as having grown from 60% 
of total volume in the late 1960’s (Pettit, 1967) to around 95% in the 
late 1990’s (Sheldon, 1998). 
- concentration of retail power in the hands of a few major multiples 
(Akehurst, 1983; Fernie, 1992 and 1997; Bourlakis, 1998) to the 
extent that the top 6 UK food retailers now hold over 70% of the 
total market. This phenomenon has been so pronounced and 
continuous as to provoke Government interest, in the form of a 
Competition Commission investigation, which concluded that, 
although the industry was found to be broadly competitive, a type of 
complex monopoly did indeed exist, which might have implications 
for planning and other policy decisions in the future (Competition 
Commission, 2000).  
- use of third-party providers of distribution services (McKinnon, 
1986; Fernie, 1990; Buck, 1990, Jaafar and Rafiq, 2005), with third 
party transport penetration having grown from 40% in 1984 to 47% 
in 1998, and warehousing penetration from 14% to 34% in the same 
period (Buck, 1990 and Sheldon, 1998). 
 
Against the background of retail concentration, the arguments for the 
centralisation of distribution are so compelling that, whilst there have been 
differences in the rate of uptake, all major UK retailers had implemented these 
techniques almost universally by the 1990’s. Having achieved parity in this 
respect, the next key trend has been the optimisation of physical distribution 
resources through operational tools including: 
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- integration of primary and secondary distribution 
- increased asset utilisation through multi-cycling and new handling 
techniques and technologies 
- reduction in inventory through rapid replenishment, improved 
forecasting and co-managed or vendor-managed stocks. 
 
These issues conspire to create a climate of further change, in which many of 
the traditional assumptions about the way in which firms compete are being 
challenged. Among these is the notion that competitive advantage is created 
by supply chain excellence, and thus by implication, by physical distribution 
excellence. However, as already discussed, competitive advantage in physical 
distribution is gained in the short term only, with any emergent best practices 
easily copied and adopted by competitors.  
 
Having taken more or less complete control of deliveries into stores, a further 
trend in the last five years has been for retailers to become involved in the 
supply chain from factory to RDC. Initiatives such as ex-factory buying (or 
factory gate pricing, also known as FGP), intermediate stock-holding and 
retailer-controlled Primary transport (that is, transport from manufacturing 
sites to the retailers’ regional or national distribution centres, as opposed to 
the “secondary” leg from distribution centre to store) have been some of the 
manifestations of this trend and appear to demonstrate a willingness to 
examine every opportunity to drive costs out of the supply chain.  
 
Finegan (2002) suggests that retailers have been slower to look at some of 
these areas of opportunity due to a lack of understanding of costs, a 
preoccupation with service to stores, perceived complexity and the 
fragmented nature of the transport market. However, he concludes, pressure 
on margins and highly evolved central operations and supporting technologies 
have facilitated initiatives across the entire supply chain. 
 
Having sought to extricate more value through such extended influence and 
control, it is reasonable to assume that the retailers would regard further 
innovation in new areas and directions as being fair game.  
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Distribution of fresh foods to major UK retailers is thus highly integrated and 
centralised. Typically, a major retailer will operate around 10 - 15 regional 
distribution centres (RDC's), each collating the individual store orders for 50 - 
70 stores and handling around 1 million cases per week. Some RDC's 
operate across a range of temperature regimes ("composite" RDC's), others 
are dedicated to a single product group (e.g. frozen or produce). Most retailers 
operate at least some of their RDC's themselves, with the balance contracted 
out to third party operators. Many RDC's have their own depot-base transport 
fleets for store deliveries, either operated in-house or by third parties. The 
RDC network was first established in the late 1960's and is now more or less 
complete and handles over 95% of fresh foods for major retailers.  
 
In terms of specific retailer networks, JS’s core depot network dates back to 
the 1960’s, although £900 million was invested by former Chairman Peter 
Davies in the late 1990’s with, as discussed above, disappointing results. The 
automated “fulfillment centres” have largely reverted to more traditional 
technologies and many of the old 1960’s sites remain. M & S’s depots were 
established in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s as a dedicated business set up 
by the distribution arm of the BOC gases company. Safeway essentially 
inherited Presto’s distribution systems from the 1980’s, and Morrisons is now 
part way through the programme of integrating these within its own network or 
rationalising, albeit with some high profile resistance from the Trade Unions. 
Asda and Tesco composite depots were all established in the late 1980’s, with 
Somerfield being the last player to move fully to the central distribution model 
in the 1990’s.  
 
The argument that logistics developments offer only short-term advantage 
before contributing to general best practice is supported by a comparison of 
the key trends in retail logistics and retail marketing strategy over the last 
thirty years. Just as two parallel evolutions in the development of supply chain 
management and innovations in physical distribution are described above, so 
too can two evolutionary processes can be seen to have occurred in parallel 
in retailing, with moves to centralization and integration facilitating changes in 
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strategic offering, such as emphasis on quality, range and freshness. These 
two parallel sets of developments are shown in figure six. 
 
Figure 6: Trends in distribution innovation (McKinnon, 1989) and strategic retail 
offering (Beaumont, 1987), after Greiner, 1972. 
 
1.2.2 A new paradigm: Co-operation between Competing 
Retailers 
 
Although the history of their respective corporate developments varies, all of 
the major UK food retailers have adopted similar physical distribution models. 
This raises the question as to whether such differing companies can achieve a 
degree of commonality in their distribution systems and, if so, whether this 
commonality can override other areas of competitive difference. As seen 
above, the last forty years have been marked by a series of step changes in 
retail supply chain operations: writers commenting on the implications of 
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), as discussed below, suggest that the a 
change in orientation from vertical to horizontal integration will be the next 
logical step change.  
 
Having considered the similarities between the physical distribution systems 
of the major retailers, what form might collaboration take? Collaboration of 
some sort between competitors in the retail environment is not entirely new: 
there are limited examples of collaborative working under the umbrella now 
known as ECR. Latterly, Fernie (1999) and Whiteoak (1999) have suggested 
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that the ECR model should logically be extended to embrace pooled 
distribution activities.  
 
1.2.3 Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) 
ECR was first described in 1993 by Kurt Salmon Associates, working with 
Wal-Mart and Proctor & Gamble. Their initial report on the subject, 
commissioned by the Efficient Consumer Response Working Group in the 
USA (Kurt Salmon, 1993), described the four pillars of ECR: 
 
- efficient replenishment 
- efficient assortments 
- efficient promotions 
- efficient introductions 
 
all supported by "efficient alignment" between suppliers and customers (Kurt 
Salmon, 1993). The work was based on a piece of self-analysis by the grocery 
industry which was unusual, but not without precedent. An earlier initiative 
known as Quick Response (QR) focused on joint efforts to shorten the retail 
order cycle. 
 
Bowersox and Closs (1996) describe the emergence of ECR from an alliance 
between two major American trade associations, the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association (GMA) and the Food Marketing Institute (FMI), as well as a 
number of other interested parties. They describe a climate in which traditional 
and conventional food companies found themselves coming under increasing 
market pressure from new trading formats, such as mass merchandisers, 
warehouse club stores (such as Costco) and convenience stores. This is 
slightly problematic insofar as the Kurt Salmon work was based on the Wal-
Mart experience, whereas Bowersox and Closs seem to describe ECR as a 
defensive response by other manufacturers and retailers to the path being 
pursued by Wal-Mart and Proctor & Gamble. Whichever scenario is correct, 
ECR was not conceived as a closely guarded secret. Its basic tools and 
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philosophies were promoted as being of interest and value to all parties 
involved in the supply chain, both on the demand and supply sides. 
 
The concept migrated from the US to Europe and the ECR Europe Group 
targeted the introduction of best practices by the end of 1994 with full ECR 
implementation by the end of 1996. Their objectives were ambitious, with a 
target of 7.3% consumer spending, equivalent to £42 billion across European 
markets, made up of 10% on the supply side and 30% on the demand side, 
mainly in category management. Transport-related initiatives proposed 
include greater use of backhauling, consolidation centres (particularly for slow 
moving goods), data sharing and efficient unit loads (Potter, Brown, Patel & 
Comes, 2004). Average logistics costs are estimated at £102m for a large 
business, £10.2m for a medium business and £1.02m for a small business. 
Average retail logistics costs were 3.4% of turnover in 2002, with a range of 2 
to 6.4%. Within these figures, typical transport costs are 35% total costs and 
are estimated to be 25% impactable (Potter, Brown, Patel & Comes, 2004). 
These figures are broadly supported by other survey data collected and 
published by the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD). For example, their 
2004 survey concluded that average distribution costs were 3.6% of total 
turnover, with the gap between highest and lowest is now 3.9%. Cost has 
averaged around 3.5% since 1998, and can now be split 45% warehouse, 
32% transport, 22.4% other and 0.5% systems.  
These figures were derived from a survey which indicated that the total UK 
market was £111.3bn, of which £83.5bn was through supermarkets and 
superstores. Within this, £79.4bn was multiple chains, £3.2bn co-operatives 
and £0.9bn independents (Aujla, Patel & Walton, 2004). 
 
Other studies have shown order lead times down by as much as 80%, 
working capital requirements down 60% and service levels up from 97.5% to 
99.5%. Coopers & Lybrand describe ECR as driving 4 phases of change: 
 
- process alignment (doing things more effectively leads to cost 
reduction). 
- new systems in place (doing things differently and better). 
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- changed processes (transfer of responsibilities leads to cost 
reduction). 
- reduced manpower resources. 
 
Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) describe 3 stages: 
 
- operational (control of finished goods, transport and warehousing). 
- integration of finished goods and control of inbound freight. 
- integration of entire process. 
 
Thus the trend is seen as being away from viewing supply from a purely intra-
company standpoint and towards a total value-chain. A number of key 
enablers, both physical and attitudinal, are identified to facilitate the process, 
one of the most critical of which is open access to shared I.T. systems. "The 
glue of shared I.T. means that companies resisting that process will be stuck 
within the relationships by their I.T. systems". (Dalzell-Payne, 1998) 
 
In Europe, the approach to ECR was very much collaborative, with competing 
retailers and competing manufacturers sitting together on the council to 
discuss and develop ideas of mutual interest. Part of these discussions has 
revolved around developing a shared model of the ways in which ECR can be 
applied to competing supply chains, but there has also been collaborative 
work in areas such as “enabling technologies” (Coopers & Lybrand, 1996), the 
results of which have been shared by competitors. Jointly shared standards 
on, for example, item coding and database maintenance, electronic data 
interchange and message formats were viewed as key to the implementation 
of ECR in Europe. Competitors worked together to develop initiatives such as 
the balanced scorecard (of supply chain performance indicators) and 
standards for activity-based costing. Latterly, there has been work on the 
development and implementation of a shared standard for unitisation 
equipment, the including the E-crate to replace individual retailers pools of 
plastic distribution trays. 
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Thus ECR can be seen to have been viewed in two dimensions. On the one 
hand, it was developed as a tool which would allow for efficiency gains along 
the supply chain, allowing chain partners to compete more efficiently with 
other companies in other supply chains. On the other hand, there is a 
perspective that ECR allows for collaboration across supply chains, where it is 
perceived that the potential gains to all parties, from sharing in enabling 
technologies for example, are greater than any perceived loss of competitive 
advantage between chains. These possibly opposing views can be 
summarised: 
 
- “The motive behind the formation of supply chain arrangements is 
to increase channel competitiveness” (Bowersox and Closs, 1996). 
- The fundamental principle of ECR is that through partnership within 
the supply chain, significant cost reduction can be achieved” 
(Christopher, 1996). 
- There are likely to be as many opportunities for consolidation 
across many supply chains as there are along single ones” 
(Whiteoak, 1999). 
 
This then, raises two issues of interest: 
 
- Given that Europe appears to be already ahead of the US in terms 
of the application of the basic principles of ECR (Coopers & 
Lybrand), do the greatest opportunities for further efficiency and 
cost reduction in Europe and, specifically, the UK, lie in 
collaboration within individual channels or in cross-chain 
collaboration to develop what Whiteoak (1999) refers to as 
“opportunity technologies”? 
- What defines the boundaries between those items which can 
legitimately be discussed across channels (crates, bar-codes, EDI) 
and those items for which the focus still remains resolutely within 
individual supply chains (for example, physical distribution)? Two 
ways of addressing this issue are through the concept of “distance” 
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of the supply chain component from the end consumer and by the 
visibility of the component to the consumer. 
 
These two questions are explored below. 
 
1.3 Cross Chain Collaboration through Opportunity 
Technologies? 
 
There is an interesting conflict between the concepts of inter-chain 
competition, as described by Christopher and cross-chain collaboration, as 
inferred by Whiteoak’s and Fernie’s  interpretation of the true potential of 
ECR. Not least, Whiteoak is even critical of the notion of the validity of 
considering the market as a series of chains in the first place. Most 
manufacturers, he points out, supply a large number of competing retailers 
and all retailers certainly get their products from a wide range of suppliers. 
There is, therefore, no such thing as a series of discrete chains, but rather a 
complex network of inter-relationships, and that to optimise one apparent 
chain within this network may well sub-optimise another part.  
 
Whiteoak’s (1994) paper suggests that the principle focus of ECR-based 
activity to this point has been about achieving integration along chains, 
ultimately to give control to the end party, the retailer. This is flawed in the 
sense that it creates upstream costs for manufacturers who are involved in a 
number of apparently competing supply chains. To illustrate the point, he 
attempts to represent the evolutionary development of retail logistics in the UK 
over the past three decades. Direct delivery to stores in the 1970’s gave way 
to centralisation of stocks in retailer RDCs in the 1980’s. Thus the locus of 
control shifted from stores to depots. As new information and communications 
technologies arrived to enable the application of new techniques such as 
quick response, so, in the late 1980’s, control of logistics switched from retail 
depots to head offices. The fourth and latest phase is the implementation of 
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just-in-time replenishment. Each of these four phases has been marked by an 
increase in speed with which goods flow through the supply system. 
 
Just as progress from each phase to the next has been enabled by 
technological developments (warehouse management systems, central stock 
control, bar-code tracking and EDI), so each phase has also given rise to an 
“opportunity” technology. The development of both retail depots and central 
stock control created the environment in which suppliers and manufacturers 
could jointly manage inventories and plan replenishments, through initiatives 
such as co-managed inventory (CMI), vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and 
collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR). Whiteoak 
argues that just-in-time techniques and improved communications now permit 
the application of two further “opportunity” technologies: transport pooling and 
auto goods-in scheduling. Both of these activities can be considered, like 
standardization of unitization and product coding, as being sufficiently far 
upstream from the end consumer as to be non-contentious areas for co-
operation, as shown in figure seven. 
 
Figure 7: Remoteness from the consumer in the supply chain 
 
Transport pooling has been a specific subject of developments and proposals 
by ECR Europe (Potter et al, 2004). Driven by retailer initiatives such as 
factory-gate pricing, ECR Europe set out a “decision engine”, to assist firms in 
deciding not only which combinations of backhauling, contractors and 
consolidation centres to use, but also where it might be appropriate to take a 
collaborative approach to transport with both retailers and other suppliers.  A 
further European forum has been established by logistics users and providers 
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under the acronym ELUPEG (European Logistics Users, Providers and 
Enablers Group). Their mission statement (http://www.elupeg.com/) refers to 
the need to address the 75 billion empty truck kilometres covered in Europe 
each year (alleged to be 30% of all kilometres travelled) before legislative or 
environmental issues force the hand of supply chain managers. 
 
However, whilst there is evidence that the ECR Europe Council has been able 
to achieve collaborative results on some of the enabling technologies, such as 
item numbering and unitisation equipment, the view appears to persist that 
collaboration on initiatives such as transport pooling runs counter to 
conventional views of supply chain competitiveness. In other words, the 
physical distribution function is perceived as contributing to competitiveness 
within an individual chain to a greater extent than it might contribute to 
efficiency gains across competing supply chains. A possible explanation for 
this demarcation between those items upon which there may be collaboration 
and those which may not could be that, as the Coopers & Lybrand survey 
showed, Europe was already some way ahead of the US in terms of supply 
chain efficiency as the ECR model was first being promoted and applied.  
 
Fernie (1999) offers a possible solution, in that greater use could be made of 
third party logistics providers to overcome organisational resistance to pooling 
of distribution assets. A brief consideration of the development of the role of 
contractors in retail distribution and their possible contribution to the 
enhancement of ECR is of value at this point.  
 
1.3.1 The contribution of PD Contractors to ECR 
 
The UK retail market differs from that of its nearest European neighbours in a 
number of respects. Apart from its high levels of centralisation (McKinnon, 
1989) and concentration of power (Fernie, 1992), the extent of the presence 
of third party service providers, or contractors is significantly greater in the UK 
than in Europe. Whilst some of these grew out of the operations of food 
manufacturers, who reacted opportunistically to the threats and opportunities 
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of the implementation of the central distribution model in the 1970’s and 
1980’s (for example Wincanton, Express and NFT), others have built their 
success on the availability of capital and management expertise during a 
period where retailers chose to concentrate their own capital and skills 
elsewhere. However, some authors have argued that the pre-existence of 
contractors in the market-place now affords an opportunity for a further step-
change in the way in which the supply chain is configured within UK retailing. 
 
Fernie (1999) describes third party logistics providers as the “missing piece in 
the ECR jigsaw”. He observes that although a great deal has been written on 
the development of relationships within the supply chain, particularly in the 
contexts of ECR and supply chain management, but there has been little 
consideration of the physical processes of getting goods from manufacturers 
to stores. Fernie concludes that, as companies move to become “virtual 
organisations”, defined by a series of relationships (such as those described 
within the ECR framework), then those companies will tend to concentrate on 
their core competencies and outsource those functions which lie beyond those 
competencies. This, he predicts, will have the further outcome of enabling 
further co-operation between competing firms in fully implementing the 
principles of ECR, as contractors can be used to facilitate transport pooling 
(as described by Whiteoak, 1999) in a “hands off” manner. 
 
The use of distribution contractors, or “third party logistics providers”, has a 
longer history than that of ECR. Buck (1990) published the results of a survey 
carried out in the UK, which suggested that, against the background of 
declining overall expenditure on distribution, third party penetration was 
increasing. He suggests that the decline in expenditure (between 1980 and 
1985) was brought about by increases in efficiency and the introduction of 
new logistics systems in the UK. During this period, third party penetration had 
increased from 40% to 47% in transport operations and from 14% to 18% in 
warehousing. Of a total annual distribution expenditure estimated at £24 
billion at the time, some £6.5 billion was vested with third party providers. 
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McKinnon (1986) offers five reasons to explain the presence of contractors in 
the distribution market: 
 
- the development of parallel distribution systems. 
- the special handling requirements of particular types of products. 
- geographical extension of retailer operations. 
- seasonal peaks and troughs. 
- congestion in parts of the system can be overcome by the use of 
nominated carriers to increase vehicle fill and allow for better 
resource planning.. 
 
Buck (1990) adds a further six “environmental” reasons for the increasing 
prevalence of third party operators: 
 
- firms concentrating on their core activities. 
- changes in the market-place, brought about by rapid expansion and 
contraction and new product development. 
- changes in marketing ethos, which sought to ally distribution activity 
with areas of demand, rather than of supply. 
- industrial relations. 
- technology. 
- tax / other financial criteria. 
 
McKinnon (1989) notes that intermediaries, such as logistics service 
providers, can often carry out some of the functions of physical distribution, 
such as break bulk, consolidation, storage and local delivery) more cost 
effectively than individual suppliers, because they are able to secure larger 
economies of scale. In 1990, he cited the presence of contractors in the 
market as one of the enablers for the emergence of the central distribution 
model in retailing: this could perhaps be described either as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy or, from the point of view of the contractors, as a virtuous circle.  
 
Fernie noted that UK retailers have been “at the forefront of fostering 
partnerships with professional distribution companies” to the extent that, of 
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£1.9 billion spent on distribution services by retailers, some £1.3 billion was 
contracted out (Fernie, 1990). However, he also notes later that those retailers 
which are still carrying out their own distribution operations believe that they 
are providing a better service than contractors and that organisational history 
and inertia may play a role in defining which operations are contracted out and 
which are retained in-house (Fernie, 1995). 
 
1.3.2 Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction Cost Economics are often used to explain the presence of 
contractors in the market for physical distribution market (see below). Whilst 
this argument undoubtedly has merit, the factors listed by Buck and McKinnon 
are also of practical relevance in the UK retail market. 
 
Transaction Cost Analysis has been used to inform the debate about the 
outsourcing of physical distribution functions (Maltz 1993, 1994 among 
others), but this has largely been in the sense of vertical integration of 
functions within firms, rather than horizontal integration across markets. 
Outsourcing of PD functions lends itself well to the type of analysis proposed 
by Coase (1937 in Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) and developed by Williamson 
(1975), in that the concepts of asset specificity and environmental and 
behavioural uncertainty are relatively easy to operationalise (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Organisations, specifically in the UK retail context, can be 
mapped against these variables in an attempt to understand the different 
levels of outsourcing observed in the market place. Ellram (1991) argues that 
the philosophy of supply chain management facilitates the move from vertical 
integration to an environment governed by obligational contracts. Aertsen 
(1993) specifically points to the specific nature of assets and the importance 
of performance measurement as significant influences in the decision to 
outsource logistics.  
 
Transaction cost analysis supports this view in the sense that transactions are 
certainly recurrent, and supported by only moderately-specific assets. Having 
already discussed the homogeneous nature of retail physical networks, one 
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might wonder as to the extent to which these capital intensive systems are 
only moderately-specific to their function. However, the emergence of third-
party service providers and alternative methods of funding explain that this 
may well be the case. For example: 
 
Buildings 
High capital requirement and specific location and equipment 
requirements but can be converted to other industrial uses over time and 
a range of funding options is likely to be available (sale and leaseback, 
for example drive flexible designs and modular construction). It should 
also be noted that the transferability of distribution assets (including 
vehicles) means that they carry a lower financial risk to lenders, and 
therefore third party providers might attract a higher credit rating in this 
respect than the retailers. Third party providers may thus be able to 
borrow more cheaply than the retailers themselves. 
Vehicles 
Temperature-controlled equipment is highly specific, but otherwise 
vehicles can be put to many uses, and because residual value is a major 
cost driver an accessible market for disposal is required. Traditionally 
required investment and expertise for maintenance, but modern 
financing arrangements (contract rental) can include maintenance 
packages. 
Staff 
Management skills are highly specific, but the low on-take of 
technological applications in warehouses lead to a requirement for 
generally unskilled, or easily trained labour. Third party providers of 
short-term contract (agency) labour are entering the market. Systems 
which de-skill tasks can also contribute. 
 
The view that management skills are highly-specific concurs with the 
work of Maltz (1993, 1994), who concluded that the main factor 
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supporting integration of PD functions was highly specific human assets. 
In the context of the presence of third-party logistics providers in the 
marketplace, however, such assets are transferable and thus, as with 
buildings and vehicles, only of moderate overall specificity. 
 
Ellram’s argument appears persuasive, therefore: PD assets are only 
moderately specific and thus there is no compelling argument for vertical 
integration. 
 
This leaves the question of horizontal integration to be addressed. We would 
argue that the specific context of UK food retailing creates an environment 
which effectively resolves the three key problems underpinning transaction 
cost analysis (Williamson, 1975), those of safeguarding, adaptation and 
performance evaluation. The summary characteristics of the UK food context 
are retail concentration, a philosophy of upstream and downstream “chain” 
control, highly developed information systems and the presence of 
experienced and able third-party service providers. These characteristics 
apply as follows: 
 
The Safeguard Problem 
Opportunism by market partners is dealt with by the essential 
homogeneity of  
PD system and by the presence of “impartial” service providers, who can 
act  
as honest brokers between competing organisations 
 
The Adaptation Problem  
Environmental uncertainty is reduced by market concentration, with  
something like 75% of the market in the hands of just four players. 
Factors  
such as demographic change, legislation and new channels (e-
commerce)  
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are, to a large extent, predictable in the long-term. 
 
The Performance Evaluation Problem 
The power and application of information technology is now sufficiently 
advanced to allow for the development and monitoring of agreed key 
performance indicators in real time, with individual levels of performance 
buffered at the corporate level by service level agreements. 
 
These arguments can be extended in the sense that pooling of resources, 
facilitated by the homogeneity of PD channels, can actually remove from the 
calculation the cost elements associated with the resolution of these 
transactional problems. 
 
UK food retailer Sainsbury, for example, pursued a strategy of in-house 
investment in, and operation of, multi-temperature “composite” central 
warehouses throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The first was built at 
Buntingford, in Hertfordshire, in 1960 and this was complemented by three 
further sites during the following 10 years. However, a strike over meal-break 
payments in June 1977 rapidly spread throughout all of the Sainsbury depots, 
virtually bringing the supply of goods to stores to a stand-still. In the aftermath, 
Sainsbury changes its strategy for depot development, and although a further 
series of composite depots was built during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, all of 
these were developed and operated by contractors. IT was a further 
contributory factor in this development. David Quarmby of Sainsbury said in 
1990 that it was now possible for retailers to control distribution by 
information, rather than by “doing”. Information systems could be used to give 
control to the retailers and it is thus irrelevant who actually runs the operations 
(in Fernie, 1990). 
 
Buck (1990) suggested that tax and financial reasons explained, in part, the 
growing use of contractors. Two specific examples of these factors are the 
ability (for retailers) to compare their own costs with those of contractors in 
 26
“mixed” regimes, and the development of technologies to facilitate open book / 
management fee systems of operation. 
 
During the roll-out of its “composite” depot strategy in the 1990’s, Tesco 
sought to establish a balance between in-house operations and those 
allocated to contractors, in order to enable comparisons of performance and 
bench-marking of costs. Tesco is now serviced by nine composite centres, 
five of which are run by contractors (Smith, 1999). Similarly, Safeway puts 
39% of the total volume handled by its network through depots operated by 
third-parties. In these cases, the employees and managers tend to be 
employed by third parties, whilst the assets themselves are owned by 
Safeway (Christensen, 1999).  
 
Whereas Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway all operate with a mixture of in-
house and contractor facilities, Marks & Spencer have contracted out 100% of 
their distribution operations since the implementation of the central distribution 
model in the early 1960’s. Historically, technology was one of the prime 
drivers for this. BOC Distribution Services were able to offer new refrigeration 
technology, based on liquid nitrogen supplied by sister company BOC gases. 
The great attraction of this system was that it allowed for much quieter 
transport operations than “traditional” diesel-engined refrigerated vehicles, an 
important consideration with many of M & S’s stores being in town centre or 
residential locations. Technology has also been an issue more generally in the 
area of temperature-controlled distribution, which requires investment in 
highly-specialised sites and vehicles. Frozen foods typically represent less 
than 10% of the sales for most retailers and, for smaller firms in particular, 
there is insufficient critical mass for firms to operate on their own. Contractors 
are able to combine the volumes of competing firms in this sector in order to 
achieve scale of economy though shared-user operations. 
 
Another key financial factor influencing the use of contractors is the availability 
of capital to support in-house operations.  According to Fernie (1990), it was 
no coincidence that the retailers with the largest capital investment 
programmes at the time (for example Sainsbury, Tesco, Safeway and Marks 
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& Spencer) were the same firms which sought to contract out most of their 
distribution operations. Furthermore, although Asda funded its own investment 
in a network of central distribution depots in the late 1980’s, it is unlikely that it 
would have been able to carry out the process in the same way after the 
disastrous disposal of its furniture business (MFI) and the acquisition of a 
number of superstores from Gateway.  
 
The arguments put forward by Fernie (1999) and Whiteoak (1999) are clear. 
The principles of ECR dictate that relationships formed along the length of 
supply chain will yield efficiency gains and thus lower costs. However, there 
are further potential gains across competing supply chains which can be 
unlocked through the use of contractors to overcome inter-firm rivalries and 
suspicions. UK retailers have tended to use contractors within their own 
supply chains in isolation, in order to overcome specific financial, 
technological or industrial relations issues. Thus the mechanism for achieving 
cross-chain benefits exists in the form of contractors, but UK retailers appear 
to view physical distribution from the perspective of cross-chain competition. 
Christopher, quoted in an article in the Grocer (13.2.99) pointed out that “RDC 
operations are often run by third party distribution experts” and that “if rival 
manufacturers can share an RDC and transport, then why not rival multiple 
retailers?” Since Christopher is widely credited with describing the concept of 
competing supply chains, this question would indicate that he too views as at 
least debatable the idea that the physical distribution element might be 
removed from the competitive elements of the supply chain and might be 
devolved to contractor operations without compromise to competitiveness.  
 
1.3.3 Managed Primary Networks 
One of the most significant areas in which food retailers have sought to form 
relationships with logistics service providers in physical distribution is in 
primary distribution – the movement of goods from manufacturers or their 
warehouses into the retail DC’s. Historically, retailers bought their goods from 
manufacturers on a “delivered in” basis: that is, the manufacturer was 
responsible for organising transport to the retailer’s distribution centre and the 
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costs of this operation were included within the product price (Smith, 1999). 
During the 1990's, retailers identified three drawbacks to this method of 
supply: 
 
- there was no visibility of the transport element within the total 
product price. Thus two similar bought in prices for a particular 
product might hide variations in manufacturing efficiency offset by 
distribution efficiencies. Retailers would ideally seek to source the 
most efficiently produced product without costs being distorted by 
distribution costs, either through relative inefficiency or distance 
from the centres of demand. 
- smaller manufacturers, who might nonetheless be able to 
manufacture efficiently, were unable to buy distribution services 
economically, due to the absence of economies of scale. 
- increased volume pressure on the DC networks was leading to 
congestion by delivery vehicles, many of which were only delivering 
small quantities of products from a single supplier or small groups of 
suppliers. 
 
The perceived advantages arising from increased retailer intervention in 
primary distribution were thus: 
 
- visibility of relative manufacturing costs, allowing buyers to 
concentrate on sourcing products from the most efficient 
manufacturers. 
- lower transport costs, achieved by the retailer either acting on 
behalf of groups of manufacturers in the third party market-place or 
by directly placing distribution operations with a contractor on behalf 
of the retailer themselves. 
- managed intake profiles, allowing for better planning and allocation 
of resources at the DC and consequently improving capacity.. 
 
The conventional model of retailer centralised distribution (McKinnon, 1989) 
has the retailer in control of operations from the point of receipt of goods at 
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the distribution centre through to delivery to the store and return of empty 
transit equipment. Although retailer controlled, some of these operations have 
been contracted out to third-party logistics providers, albeit on a dedicated 
basis. The new model, which has emerged through the 1990’s, sees retailers 
controlling the flow of goods all the way from factory to store, although with 
some differences in application and methodology. The key differences are: 
 
- the nature of the commercial relationship between the retailer, the 
manufacturer and the provider of primary transport. Some retailers 
(for example Sainsbury) have experimented with “ex-factory” or 
“factory-gate” pricing. Under this methodology, the retailer pays for 
the goods excluding any transport elements and then engages a 
transport provider to work on its behalf. The retailer pays directly for 
the transport services. Other retailers have sought to encourage 
their suppliers to use certain nominated carriers on a “pool” basis, 
with transport costs still paid for directly by the manufacturer, but on 
a basis overseen by the retailer. 
- degree of integration with secondary (that is DC to store) 
operations. Some retailers (Tesco, Asda and Boots) have offered 
collection services to manufacturers, to individual DC’s by vehicles 
on the way back from making store deliveries. Others (Safeway) 
have put in place a network of inter-DC movements, allowing store 
delivery vehicles to collect products for a number of different DC’s. 
Safeway have even put product destined for competing retailers’ 
networks through this system on a commercial basis.. 
- the extent to which the operations are actively managed by the 
retailer from day to day, with direct intervention in the planning of 
booking times, management of contingencies (lateness) and the 
pursuit of further cost saving measures. Sainsbury operate a 
Primary Operations Team, based at their head office in London. 
Asda, on the other hand, leave the entire management process to 
their nominated contractors. 
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Each of the main UK food retailers has become involved in Primary operations 
during the last ten years, although to differing extents and at differing paces. 
In many cases, intervention in Primary has been gradual and incremental and 
it has been hard to discern exactly when each of the retailers has actually 
achieved a significant scale of operations. Furthermore, some of the 
differences in methodology make it difficult to define whether a specific retailer 
has achieved control of its primary operations or not. Some of the mile-stones 
in the development of primary initiatives have been: 
 
- Sainsbury established three “hubs” for primary chilled food 
operations in 1994 and 1995, followed by a number of ambient 
“intermediate” warehouses. 
- Tesco began encouraging manufacturers to pool volume on a 
regional basis and oversaw the allocation of this volume to regional 
nominated carriers in 1994. The first regional allocations were for 
chilled foods from Yorkshire / Humberside and from East Anglia. 
- Safeway has offered back-haul services to its manufacturers since 
the early 1990’s. The facility to “trunk” product between depots was 
available from the mid-1990’s. 
- Asda sought to appoint one or two nominated carriers in each 
temperature regime (chilled, ambient, produce and frozen) in 2004. 
 
Third party service providers (contractors) were obviously active in the primary 
market-place prior to the implementation of these primary initiatives. All but 
the very largest manufacturers had tended to dispose of their in-house 
transport assets at the time of the shift from direct store delivery to centralised 
distribution in the 1970’s and 1980’s. A number of primary contractors thus 
achieved critical mass by integrating the volumes of a large number of 
manufacturers and put in place the infrastructure to do this in a timely manner. 
Retailer intervention in primary operations was both threat and opportunity for 
these contractors. They could either work with the retailers and thus look to 
grow their volume, or resist and see volume transfer to other contractors. 
However, whilst the contractors had achieved cross-channel efficiency 
savings by integrating volumes for a number of retailers, the retailers 
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themselves generally approached primary initiatives on an intra-channel 
basis. Thus Sainsbury sought to bring all of its volumes together in order to 
reduce distribution costs, choosing to ignore the fact that the typical Sainsbury 
supplier also supplies many of the other retailers. Ultimately, this creates the 
possibility for goods from a single manufacturer being distributed by a number 
of parallel primary networks. Whilst this may provide a reduction in costs from 
the “free-market” operation of primary, it may also institutionalise further 
inefficiencies, such as, for example, a factory having to despatch its products 
on vehicles belonging to three different contractors with each vehicle rarely 
being full. 
 
Primary distribution initiatives, therefore, have so far been concerned with 
further vertical integration of discrete supply chains. The cross-channel 
efficiencies which had been established by contractors in open market 
arrangements prior to retailer intervention have, by and large, been 
superseded by other models. Although the retailers have undoubtedly made 
gains in terms of lower costs and operational controls, it is not clear whether 
these gains could have been made without subverting the cross-channel 
efficiencies which were already in existence, nor whether any clear gains have 
been made from concentrating on single-channel integration. Since all of the 
retailers who have involved themselves in primary distribution initiatives seem 
to have set out with broadly the same agenda and objectives, it is hard to see 
how these initiatives have made any significant contribution to competitive 
advantage.  
 
One of the reasons cited for not integrating operations across retailers is the 
potential for access to commercially sensitive information about suppliers and 
their volumes. Historically, of course, primary transport contractors had 
access to all of this information as they integrated volumes in the open 
market. Having made the initial efficiency gains through managed intake and 
cost visibility, it remains for the retailers to be persuaded that further gains are 
available through pooling with contractors, without compromise to sensitive 
information. The Fernie / Whiteoak vision of further cost savings through 
pooled transport is based on the assumption that the contractors could once 
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again, as they did prior to the primary initiatives, broker these operations and 
thus safeguard sensitive information. 
 
Whiteoak (1999) describes a scenario where a focus on efficient use of 
vehicles will create demands for customer collections (by store vehicles), use 
of consolidators for small volumes and pooling with third parties in 
intermediate warehouses. These factors will, in turn, lead to ex-factory buying, 
“cherry-picking” of routes and the potential for the creative use of shared fleets 
to overcome cost problems. Furthermore, different arrangements will be 
brought into play to deal with seasonal fluctuations and promotions. The 
complexity inherent in this ought to be more closely allied with the core 
competencies of specialist distribution contractors than with those of the 
retailers themselves. Whiteoak proposes six focus areas as the basis for the 
necessary collaboration between retailers and contractors in cross-channel 
initiatives, all of which have, to a large extent, been addressed during the 
retailer primary initiatives to date. These focus areas, together with examples 
of their application in retailer primary initiatives, are: 
 
- commercial principles (for example ex-factory arrangements, or 
nominated carriers). 
- network strategy (for example, integration between primary and 
secondary movements). 
- warehouse facilities (for example primary hubs and intermediate 
warehouses). 
- full vehicle trunking (to support, for example, store back-haul to 
local RDC). 
- store deliveries (either integrated with primary collections or carried 
out by supplier vehicles after delivery into DC). 
- IT support (for example, systems already in place for pre-advice of 
deliveries and tracking of product), 
 
Whiteoak also identifies a series of process steps for collaboration across 
competing chains: 
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- common mind-set 
- communications 
- development 
- planning 
- performance targets 
- performance evaluation 
- process effectiveness 
- continuous development 
 
It could be argues that the last six of these are all implicit in the intra-channel 
arrangements that have been established for primary collaboration with 
contractors and could thus be applied to cross-channel initiatives. The 
establishment of a common mind-set and an effective framework for 
communications between competitors are currently frustrated by a preference 
for cross-channel competition (the “Christopher” model) as opposed to cross-
channel co-operation. As Whiteoak (1999) concludes, this frustration can be 
overcome by third party involvement in two areas: 
 
- logistics service providers should be directly involved in new ECR 
initiatives, on the basis of the prevailing practice of using contract 
logistics, to drive opportunities for synergy and consolidation. 
- the providers of value-added (communications) network services, 
such as EDI, have major opportunities in offering the 
communications infrastructure and management software to 
facilitate shared-resource operations. 
 
1.4 Collaboration in Practice 
 
Ellram (1995) describes a partnership or strategic alliance as "an ongoing 
relationship between two organisations which involves a commitment over an 
extended time period and a mutual sharing of risks and rewards of the 
relationship". The main reasons for entering partnerships are obtaining a 
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better price and to secure a reliable source. The key factors establishing a 
successful partnership are: two-way information sharing, top management 
support, shared goals, early communication to suppliers and supplier adds 
distinctive value. Poor communication and lack of trust, up-front planning and 
shared goals are the most common reasons for the failure of partnerships 
(Ellram, 1995). 
 
Although traditional strategic models suggest that competitive advantage is 
driven either by the structure of an industry or the resource-based view. others 
argue that a firm's critical resources may span firm boundaries, rather than 
being focused within the firm. Firms who combine resources in unique ways 
may realise an advantage over competing firms who are unwilling or unable to 
do so. An "explosion in alliances" suggests that pairs of firms are an important 
unit of analysis. Competitive advantage can, therefore, be gained through 
sharing relationship specific assets, knowledge sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities and effective governance (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). 
 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) suggest that horizontal collaboration 
between competitors might give rise to so-called co-opetition. Noting that 
collaboration within vertical chains is rare, Bowersox et al (2003) use the word 
“horizontal” to describe a process-oriented view across a single supply chain 
rather than a slice across parallel competing supply chains. Once again, they 
point out that examples of successful collaboration are scarce and most are 
actually just examples of conventional contracting and outsourcing, even 
though the strategic focus of supply chain management has shifted from 
adversarial to collaborative. Nonetheless, many companies have "waved the 
collaborative banner while launching aggressive supplier cost-cutting 
initiatives". Cross-enterprise collaboration emerges when two or more firms 
voluntarily agree to integrate human, financial or technical resources in an 
effort to create a new, more efficient, effective or relevant business model. 
The participating firms voluntarily create joint policies and integrate processes, 
to create what has been referred to as an "extended enterprise". This might 
be based on the competencies and capabilities associated with the three 
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strands of leadership processes, planning and control processes, and 
integrated operations processes (Bowersox, Closs & Stank, 2003). 
 
Manufacturers and distributors are involved in fewer, but increasingly 
significant, working partnerships. Successful partnerships are based on three 
core concepts: relative dependence (which in turn defines relative influence), 
communication (which leads to trust and coopoeration) and outcomes given 
comparison levels (assessment of results against experience or expectation). 
Cooperation is an antecedent to, rather than a consequence of, trust and the 
relationship between cooperation and trust is iterative. Disagreements are 
inevitable: adroit firms develop mechanisms to manage these and settle 
differences. 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990) 
 
In 1993, Cooper and Gardner considered some of the factors which might 
influence logistics outsourcing partnerships: the range of possible 
relationships (from joint venture to arm’s length), the rationale for the 
partnership, the implementation method and the contextual situations likely to 
promote certain patterns of partnership behaviours (Cooper and Gardner, 
1993). 
 
Lambert et al (1999) describe a partnership as "a tailored business 
relationship based upon mutual trust, openness and shared risk, and shared 
rewards that yields a competitive advantage, resulting in business 
performance greater than would be achieved by the firms individually." There 
are four primary facilitators in every relationship: corporate compatibility, 
similar managerial philosophy and techniques, mutuality and symmetry. Five 
additional facilitators need not always be present, but strengthen the 
partnership when they are: exclusivity, shared competitors, physical proximity, 
a prior history of partnering and a shared end user. (Lambert, Emmelhainz & 
Garder, 1999). 
 
Boddy, Macbeth & Wagner (2000) note that implementing and managing an 
alliance is harder than deciding to collaborate. Seven contextual factors are 
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identified which can both help and hinder the content of partnerships: 
business processes, technology, people, structures, power, culture and 
resources. Prior context, as well as individuals’ propensity to reconstruct 
context, affect the degree and success of cooperative behaviour (Boddy, 
Macbeth & Wagner, 2000). 
 
Mentzer, Min and Zacharia (2000) consider the influence of antecedents on 
the choice and effectiveness of partnering orientations. Whilst many 
relationships in supply chains are simply transactional, partnerships are based 
on some degree of expected continuity and the focus of the relationship goes 
beyond price. Supply chain partnerships are driven by, amongst other things, 
environmental uncertainty, degree of competition and the level of time and 
quality based competition. The influencing antecedents are interdependence, 
absence of conflict, trust, commitment, organisational compatibility and top 
management vision (Mentzer, Min & Zacharia, 2000).  
 
However, in spite of the compelling arguments for the benefits of partnering 
and the identification of mechanisms to promote its facilitation and success, 
there is evidence of failure in implementation. This maybe due to the difficulty 
experienced in change management. The normal starting point for 
collaboration is the sharing of information, which leads to the emergence of 
new competitive structures based upon networks and inter-firm collaboration. 
However, this requires careful change management in the areas of partner 
selection and classification. training of boundary spanners, coordinating inter-
personal relationships, external support and relationship monitoring 
(Christopher & Juttner, 2000). 
 
Even with the context of single vertical supply chains, there have been 
problems in implementing partnerships, with some already suggesting that the 
writing is on the wall for supply chain collaboration. There has been an over-
reliance on technology, a failure to understand when and with whom to 
collaborate and a lack of trust between partners (Barratt, 2004). 
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ECR and the associated later developments VMI (vendor-managed inventory) 
and CPFR (collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment) provide a 
choice of strategies for collaborating amongst supply chain partners. Although 
collaborative efforts appear to be most developed in the grocery industry, 
implementations have not been as widespread as expected, because of lack 
of common understanding of the concepts. There is, for example, some 
cynicism about the actual benefits of information sharing: greater benefits can 
accrue by reducing delays and history is as good an indicator of demand as 
current shared data (Holweg, Disney, Holstrom & Smaros, 2005). Traditional 
views of ECR can be summarised as inter-firm co-operation “vertically”, that is 
along competing supply chains.  
 
“Value-adding partnerships” are formed between firms within a single supply 
chain (Johnston & Lawrence, 1988; Hines, 2000). This perspective is flawed 
in that supply chain relationships can be viewed as more of a web than as a 
series of chains, with individual suppliers selling to multiple customers and 
vice versa. There is, therefore, also a role for “horizontal” co-operation 
between firms in competing supply chains, or for firms to act in both 
competition and co-operation with other firms at the same time, in the model 
described as “co-opetition” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). At this level, a 
firm may be both a competitor with other firms at the same level, and a 
complementor. The complexities of this dual role are dealt with by defining 
areas of operations, or even individual roles, which can be treated with one or 
the other set of behaviours. There is a correlation between levels of co-
operation and the perceived “distance” of the operational activity from the end 
consumer. This has been seen in the Austrian grocery industry (Kotzab & 
Teller, 2003), the Swedish brewing industry (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), as 
well as in UK food retailing (Stephens & Wright, 2002). Bengtsson & Kock’s 
work was based on 21 semi-standardised personal interviews with business 
managers in three industries (lining, brewery and dairy) in Sweden and 
Finland. They note that the two activities of co-operation and competition have 
to separated, depending on the degree of proximity to the consumer and that 
individuals within an organisation cannot be engaged in both activities: they 
must either compete or co-operate, as summarized in figure 8. 
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Figure 8: The separation of co-operation from competition into input and output 
activities 
 
Bengtsson & Kock quote a Swedish manager from the lining (suppliers to 
mining) industry: “We have a very good cooperative atmosphere in the 
technical area. Competition and enmity exist only on the market side. We co-
finance development projects and have developed a program for our 
development work. We work with four academic organizations and we often 
present our results in international journals.” 
 
This supports the contention of Whiteoak that transport pooling is a logical 
extension of ECR principles. However, the “distance” argument may get in the 
way of this, particularly in deliveries to stores, for example, where the 
branding of an individual truck may be highly visible to consumers. It is also 
worth pointing out that ECR is not a panacea: there is evidence of the failure 
of ECR initiatives, particularly where the use of a 3PL has been integral. In 
such cases, failure to agree and set common goals and setting the correct 
processes for measurement of benefits and incentives have been identified as 
issues (Frankel, Goldsby & Whipple, 2002; Rokkan & Buvik, 2003). Indeed, 
although ECR initiatives continue to progress in many areas, there is evidence 
that it has not yet had much impact in the area of physical distribution (Fernie, 
Pfab & Marchant 2000). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
Previous research on supply chain-based strategies has tended to be framed 
in mature, vertically integrated markets (the motor and aerospace industries 
for example), where brand domination is achieved by the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM), rather than the seller. In UK food retailing, characterised 
by concentration and competition, the fascia, rather than individual products, 
is the brand. Product brands are subsumed within the brand of the store and 
thus retailing becomes a demographic solution to connecting supply and 
demand, rather than a true supply-chain strategy solution.  
 
These considerations can be distilled into three propositions: 
 
- The ubiquitous application of best practice means that the physical 
distribution function does not contribute to competitive advantage in 
the UK food retail market. 
- The importance of physical distribution in defining customer image 
and strategic positioning is both time and context specific. 
- Removal of physical distribution from the arena of competition might 
lead to further efficiency gains. 
 
However, if physical distribution does not contribute to competitive advantage 
and therefore resource pooling is a logical extension of the principles of ECR. 
it is surprising that there are few examples of the application of such 
collaboration between competitors. This apparent contradiction highlights the 
following gaps in knowledge: 
 
- 1. The factors that either facilitate or obstruct horizontal 
collaboration across supply chains. 
- 2. The prerequisites for successful horizontal collaboration across 
supply chains. 
- 3. Identification of the benefits of horizontal collaboration and how 
these might be apportioned. 
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- 4. Whether there are different types of horizontal collaboration: 
direct collaboration versus indirect participation in schemes 
administered and operated by third parties.  
 
In order to contribute to the further development of supply chain initiatives, 
these gaps in current knowledge are to be explored and, hopefully, explained 
through testing of the following hypotheses: 
 
1.  Logistics collaboration between competitors is influenced by factors that 
either facilitate or obstruct co-opetition. (First gap in knowledge) 
 
2. Collaboration is more likely in the presence of external factors, such as 
resource shortages, legislation or social and environmental pressures. 
(Second gap in knowledge) 
 
3. Collaboration is more likely once a firm has exhausted all opportunities for 
internal optimisation within its own logistics systems. (Second gap in 
knowledge) 
 
4. The inclination to collaboration is influenced by the extent to which firms 
perceive they are in competition with potential collaborators. (Second gap in 
knowledge) 
 
5. Collaboration is more likely where costs and benefits are clearly 
measurable and performance measures can be agreed. (Third gap in 
knowledge) 
 
6. Active and intentional collaboration is more likely to take place when 
brokered by a third party, either operationally or in order to apportion costs 
and benefits. (Fourth gap in knowledge) 
 
Although the detailed operationalisation of these hypotheses will be discussed 
later, they can be summarized in the contention that the actions of a firm in 
respect of collaboration are influenced by a series of factors relating to 
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perceptions of the firm’s own worth relative to other forms, combined with the 
influence of external factors. This summary is represented by the tentative 
“conceptual framework” (Miles & Huberman, 1994) shown in figure 9. Here, it 
is suggested that firms’ attitudes towards collaboration will be influenced by 
six sets of variables, four concerned with a firm’s perceptions of itself relative 
to competitors and two concerned with external influences. Seven tentative 
data codes are arranged into these six groups, which will be explored and 
explained in more detail. 
 
The exploration of this topic is set out in the following chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 is a brief description of the contexts chosen for the research. 
Chapter 3 describes the process and conclusions of a systematic review of 
the relevant bodies of literature, concluding that little has been written about 
horizontal collaboration specifically in the physical distribution area of supply 
chain management. 
Chapters 4 and 5 consider the philosophical and methodological 
underpinnings of the research, concluding with the proposition that case 
studies will be used to test the propositions. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 describe three cases in detail: UK supermarkets, an 
example of urban transhipment and UK brewery distribution. 
Chapter 9 considers the cross-case analysis and chapter 10 the overall 
summary and conclusions of the work.  
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Figure 9: Conceptual framework based on the research hypotheses 
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2 Research in retail logistics 
 
The first chapter described why the context of UK supermarket retailing was of 
interest for this research. A general review of the development of the market 
and major players therein was discussed before consideration of some of the 
key areas of theory which might inform further debate about the role of supply 
chains in retail strategy. This chapter moves on to consider the retail context 
in more detail, in order to share an understanding of some of the key 
operational characteristics, as a precursor to considering research design 
considerations and actually “entering the field”. 
 
The evolution of the physical distribution function as a major contributor to 
efficiency and cost reduction is evidenced in the UK grocery industry, where a 
common template for highly centralised systems has developed. However, 
such innovations are easily copied and thus competitive advantage is only 
possible at the leading edge. As logistics initiatives in grocery have broadened 
into the umbrella of Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), it has even been 
suggested that further efficiency gains will be made possible by cross-chain 
collaboration between competitors. This exploratory research seeks to 
understand the circumstances under which such “co-opetition” might be 
possible in UK grocery retailing. The apparent homogeneity in this setting, of 
highly developed distribution systems and evidence of significant vertical 
channel integration, ought to provide a context with rich potential for exploring 
opportunities for horizontal integration across supply chains. 
 
The basic hypothesis of the research – that physical distribution does not offer 
any competitive advantage to competing retailers – assumes that all retailers 
have managed to achieve parity in costs and service. A prerequisite to 
investigating attitudes to possible co-operation in this area is, therefore, to 
establish that this parity does indeed exist. However, the very competitiveness 
of this industry sector implies some challenges for the research process. 
Whilst there is some comparative performance data available in the public 
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domain, it is largely based on self-completed surveys (published annually by 
the Institute of Grocery Distribution) and therefore prone to bias or 
inconsistency and may also be incomplete. The first stage of the research, 
therefore, was to benchmark selected companies against each other using the 
secondary data, but then to get the target firms to confirm the benchmark 
data. The initial review of the secondary data brought the further advantages 
of immersion in the language and reference points of the industry, as well as a 
detailed level of operational knowledge, which allowed for greater “fluency” in 
conversation with respondents. 
 
The research process, therefore, was designed as a number of stages: 
 
- Using secondary quantitative data, establish and verify whether the 
target firms have all achieved a level of parity in terms of physical 
distribution excellence. 
- Validate the overall cost and performance measures implied by the 
review of the secondary data through contacts with a number of UK 
grocery retailing firms. As will be discussed later, this was not 
achievable in practise, due to considerations over the sensitivity of 
numerical data. 
- Using interviews, obtain qualitative data to explore the attitudes of 
firms towards the contribution made by the physical distribution 
function to competitive advantage; if possible, find practical 
examples of situations, which are believed to exist anecdotally, 
where physical distribution has been removed from the competitive 
arena. 
- From an initial pilot phase with a small number of retailers, construct 
a tentative explanation for the presence or absence of inter-firm 
horizontal collaboration. 
- Use case studies with single firms or contexts to explore the validity 
of the tentative model and refine accordingly. 
 
In practical terms this meant identifying a number of target firms for whom the 
available secondary data was complete and meaningful. Exploratory research 
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of this type might normally be expected to review the design, execution and 
results of a pilot study before considering the implications and validity of a full-
scale study. However, due to the nature of the industrial context chosen, the 
research aims at depth (with a small number of firms to be researched) rather 
than breadth. There is also a longitudinal element to the research.  
 
2.1 Exploratory phase – UK Food Retailers 
 
The key players in the UK food retail market and the basic characteristics of 
their distribution systems and networks have been discussed previously. In 
order to balance depth of exploration with breadth across the industry context, 
it was intended to establish contact with all the major national grocery chains. 
Target organisations were chosen on the basis of five qualifying parameters: 
 
- Geographical coverage: (national infrastructure required to facilitate 
inter-firm comparability). 
- Similar product ranges, predominantly foods across all temperature 
regimes, distributed through a formal multi-echelon system 
(McKinnon, 1989). 
- Established central control of distribution. 
- Scale of operations: arbitrarily, retailers with a turnover of less than 
£2 billion per annum will be excluded. 
- Maturity of systems: retailers who are still behind the main trends in 
terms of centralisation, implementation of information technologies 
and stock reduction will be excluded. 
 
The retailers selected on this basis were the (the) “Top 4” (Tesco, Sainsbury, 
Asda and Safeway) plus Marks and Spencer. At the time of the start of the 
research project, these five firms alone accounted for just under 50% of the 
UK grocery market (annual food sales for 1998).  
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Tesco £16.5 billion 17.4%  
Sainsbury £11.6 billion 12.2%  
Asda £7.6 billion 8.0%  
Safeway £7.0 billion 7.4%  
M & S £3.2 billion 3.4% (Cum 48.4%) 
    
Total market £94.7 billion 100.0%  
 
Table 1: UK grocery market shares, 1998 (Source: Annette et al, 1998).  
 
Note: M & S is actually the sixth largest retailer in terms of sales rankings. The 
decision to omit the fifth largest – Somerfield – was taken on the basis of 
“maturity of systems”, as described above. At the start of the project, 
Somerfield was still in the process of integrating the distribution systems of 
Kwik Save, which it acquired in July 1998. 
 
These shares, and the concentration of the marketplace generally, changed 
markedly as the research developed, and by 2004 were estimated to be: 
 
Tesco £28.7 billion 25.8%  
Sainsbury £19.3 billion 17.3%  
Asda £18.4 billion 16.5%  
Morrisons £17.7 billion 15.9%  
M & S £3.3 billion 3.0% (Cum 78.5%) 
    
Total market £111 billion 100.0%  
 
Table 2: UK grocery market shares, 2003 (Aujla et al, 2004).  
 
The IGD estimates that retailers’ physical distribution costs (from receipt of 
goods at DC) represent, on average, 3.46% of sales (Aujla et al, 2004). On 
this basis, the five retailers selected would have a total annual distribution cost 
of £1.6 billion in 1999, increasing to £3.1 billion five years later. 
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The key changes over this five-and-a-half year period can be summarised as:  
 
- At the start of the research Asda was still an independent UK 
company, although there were already rumours that the US global 
giant, Wal-Mart, was looking for acquisition opportunities in Europe 
generally and in the UK in particular. The takeover actually took 
place in 1999. 
- Sainsbury had lost its market lead to Tesco two years earlier, but it 
would be three more years before it fell to third place, overtaken by 
Asda whilst suffering serious supply and availability problems 
following changes to its distribution network. 
- Safeway was the fourth largest retailer, with its future predator 
Morrisons having less than half its turnover and being only viewed 
as a regional player in the North of England. 
- Profits at M & S were about to collapse, from £1.6 billion to £0.6 
billion in 1999, with a further halving over the next three years. Only 
in 2005 is there credible evidence of a recovery in performance.  
 
Because of the limited number of firms under consideration and the 
complexity of issues involved, the use of surveys is not appropriate. Instead, 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews have been selected as the 
principal research tool. Elements of a “delphi” approach are used, in the sense 
that an interative cycle of interviews is used to seek patterns and connections 
between respondents, although the exploratory nature of the research does 
not lend itself to questionnaires or other written tools, which would form 
elements of a normal delphi methodology. 
 
The question of access to the target companies was dealt with 
opportunistically. The issue of separating commercial interest from academic 
research appeared to be understood by all the respondents approached. 
There was also a high degree of interest in the research topic generally and 
some of the implied outcomes in particular. Therefore a series of interviews 
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was proposed to each firm, which would approach the topics in the following 
order and style: 
 
- Confirmation of base operating data for inter-firm comparison 
(structured questionnaire). 
- Investigation of current strategic role of physical distribution and 
identification of existing examples of non-competition, if any (semi-
structured interview). 
- Exploration of attitudes underpinning logistics strategies, in the 
context of competitive strategy or alternatives to competitive 
working (unstructured interviews). 
 
2.2 Secondary Research 
 
The principal source for secondary research was the two annual surveys 
published by the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) (“Retail Distribution”, 
formerly known as “Retailer Distribution Profiles”, and “Grocery Retailing”), for 
each year from 1986 to 1999. 
 
A review of other available secondary literature (market data, company 
reports, press articles and so) led to the development of a model to describe 
the environment and to a series of metrics which could be validated by each 
retailer and then used as the basis for inter-firm comparisons. 
 
The IGD carries out regular surveys of distribution practices and systems 
amongst UK retailers and, as well as publishing reports periodically, also 
maintains a library of the results and other published materials. This resource 
was used for the majority of the initial secondary research. 
 
Reliable information on the total size of the UK grocery market and retailer 
shares within it is notoriously hard to find as retailers increasingly extend their 
offerings to include non-grocery items (fuel, clothes etc) and as grocery is 
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increasingly available through non-traditional retail outlets (petrol forecourts, 
convenience stores etc). This is compounded by the fact that much of the 
existing secondary data is based on information supplied directly by the 
retailers risks being subject to a degree of manipulation and interpretation in 
order to exaggerate market shares. However, a longitudinal study of the 
secondary data shows a number of key characteristics of the market and 
approaching the current data from several differing perspectives allows a 
balanced view to be drawn.  
 
One of the subsidiary aims of the initial research is to try and identify a set of 
performance indicators which not only facilitate the evaluation of the relative 
efficiency of different systems, but which can also be used to identify areas for 
possible integration of resources. Many of the traditional distribution and 
logistics metrics (McGibbin, 1972) are not particularly helpful in the foods 
context (labour cost per ton, tons per customer) and a more subtle and 
complex set of productivity and utilisation measures are required (Caplice & 
Sheffi, 1994). Latterly, a commonly accepted set of transport key performance 
indicators (KPI’s) has been developed for and with the UK food transport 
industry, based on work originally commissioned by the Department for 
Transport. These include vehicle fill, time utilisation, empty running, fuel 
efficiency and deviations from schedule (DtF, 2003; McKinnon and Ge, 2004). 
Although not exhaustive, the initial measures discussed with respondents 
include: 
 
- Overall throughput measures, preferable in a common (non-cash) 
unit. These measures should relate to the drivers of activity, which 
is likely to be based on cases handled for warehouses, aggregated 
into some measure of load capacity (e.g. pallets) for transport. 
- Numbers of sites, product ranges handled and overall size, in terms 
of square footage and staff. It is hoped to refine this through activity 
sampling to determine measures for time phasing, including peaks 
and troughs of activity during the day and by periods. 
- Size of fleets, together with measures of both time and volume 
usage efficiency. 
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- Numbers of stores served by each location, together with any 
further sub-grouping of distribution volume, perhaps by product type 
or by order cycle, where this means that individual stores receive 
products more than once per day. This is to be developed to gain 
an understanding of the number of order consignments to be 
handled by the systems each working day. 
- Other numerical measures which reflect variations in working 
methodologies, for example numbers of days stock held in depots, 
order assembly methods (pick by store or pick by line) and types of 
load assembly equipment used (pallets, trays, crates etc) (See 
Christensen (1990) for an explanation of some of these terms). 
- The extent to which retailer control had been extended back up the 
distribution chain, for example, retailers’ own vehicles being used to 
make supplier collections or nominated hauliers being used to 
facilitate “factory gate pricing” arrangements. 
 
Research of the available secondary data, validated and updated through 
initial interviews, has led to the following summary description of the current 
retail distribution environment: 
 
- The five retailers selected (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda, Safeway and M 
& S) have an annual foods turnover of £44 billion, through almost 
2,000 stores. 
- Levels of centralisation of distribution are all above 92%. 
- Average case values are in the range £15.79 to £20.26, giving a 
good correlation between turnover and volume throughput. 
- There is some variation between the extent to which resources are 
worked, with M & S achieving a sales turnover per square foot of 
warehouse space almost 60% higher than that of Sainsbury. The 
other three retailers lie within this range. 
- Asda achieve the highest volume throughput per vehicle, almost 
three times that of Marks & Spencer. 
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Discussions with retailers have revealed that the ultimate benchmarks against 
which distribution operations are measured relate to cost and service, with 
cost being viewed as ultimately the more important. The most frequently 
discussed cost ratio is distribution cost as a percentage of sales. However, 
although this figure was universally recognised, no retailer was prepared to 
disclose their own number. The Institute of Grocery Distribution (Sheldon, 
1998) has attempted to survey this ratio “anonymously”, but although an 
industry average of 3.46% is given in their report, no individual retailer figures 
are disclosed and no explanation of methodology, treatment or analysis is 
given. 
 
2.2.1 Parity between Retailer Systems 
McKinnon (1989) discusses the difficulty of agreeing a range of KPI’s which 
are not commercially sensitive and identifies a series of measures based on 
utilisation, productivity and effectiveness (Caplice & Sheffi, 1994). The 
subsequently proposed list was regarded as sufficiently non-sensitive and 
non-contentious as to form the basis of a cross-industry benchmarking 
exercise. On the basis of this survey and published IGD data, the following 
types of data can be viewed as non-sensitive: numbers of depots and cases 
handled, numbers and types of vehicles, numbers of journeys and distance 
travelled and numbers of employees. 
 
However, whilst retail operations managers clearly wish to observe company 
rules on confidentiality, in our discussions, they have been surprisingly willing 
to share information on cash productivity measures at an operational level. 
This has particularly been the case where questions have been framed on the 
basis of pre-knowledge of the answers. For example, questions such as, “I 
assume you must be getting about 10 miles per gallon out of such a new 
vehicle fleet?” tend to elicit helpful answers, such as, “Well, actually it’s nearer 
10.5”, or “No, we only get about 8 on Scottish journeys”. Such conversations 
have been conducted with all of the top 5 retailers and, as described 
elsewhere, in one instance with three of the retailers together. These 
measures can be regarded as tertiary (or level C – Ploos van Amstel and 
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D’hert, 1996) but, assuming that they are reasonable generalisable across the 
industry sector, they can be used to synthesize level B measures (cost per 
function).  
 
From the interviews conducted with Asda, Marks & Spencer, Safeway and 
Sainsbury, data on standard base costs was extracted. Because of its 
commercial sensitivity, it is impossible to validate this data conclusively. 
However, the averages derived are representative and some sensitivity 
analysis has been applied to test validity. 
 
Tractor standing cost per week (including maintenance)  £450 
Trailer £200 
Rigid vehicle £500 
Miles per gallon 10.5 
Fuel per kilometre 20p 
Average all up labour cost per hour £11 
Average miles covered per labour hour 24 
Labour cost per kilometre 28.6p 
Operating cost per week of a 300,000 sq ft composite DC £250,000 
Operating cost per week of a 80,000 sq ft specialist DC £40,000 
 
Table 3: Typical benchmark costs for retail distribution operations derived from extant 
secondary data 
 
Even across the chains studied, there appears to be little variation in these 
standard figures. However, there is clearly scope for significant variation in 
total distribution costs, based on the efficiency with which these resources are 
used. Such efficiency (or lack of it) can be driven by a number of factors, 
including ratio of transport resource to warehouse resource (a larger number 
of warehouses typically drives down journey distances and thus numbers of 
vehicles and drivers), store coverage (again driving journey distance) and the 
quality of service required at store (which may sub-optimise distribution 
resources). We have observed a consensus that these factors are more likely 
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to affect the ratio of distribution cost to sales, rather than any variance in the 
unit cost standards described above. 
 
The summary results are: 
 
 Asda Safeway Sainsbury Tesco 
Composite DC’s 13 9 17 20 
Specialist DC’s 0 5 3 1 
Tractors 468 629 787 1,031 
Trailers 687 1,060 1,246 2,205 
Rigids 1 0 54 8 
Kilometres p a 90m 96.8m 110m 176m 
Annual sales £8.8 billion 7.6 billion £12.1 billion £15.3 billion 
 
(Standard base cost data derived from the interviews was then applied to this 
secondary data:) 
 
Vehicle cost £18m £26m £33m £47m 
Fuel cost £18m £19m £22m £35m 
Hours cost £26m £28m £32m £50m 
DC cost £169m £127m £227m £262m 
Direct costs £231m £200m £314m £395m 
Systems / other £23m £20m £31m £40m 
Total cost £254m £220m £345m £434m 
Cost / sales % 2.89% 2.90% 2.85% 2.82% 
 
Table 4: Estimated retailer physical distribution costs (* Source of Sales Data: IGD 
monthly survey: 12 months to June, 1999) 
 
The key deduced metric (distribution costs as a percentage of sales) was then 
tested on the interview respondents. Whilst none would specifically confirm 
their own figure, for reasons of commercial confidentiality, all three 
respondents confirmed that the calculation appeared to be basically correct. 
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2.2.1.1 Marks & Spencer Costs 
M & S have been omitted from this analysis, because their DC’s do not fit 
easily into the (otherwise common) categories of large “composite” or small 
“specialist” sites and also because they have not taken part in any of the 
recent IGD surveys. However, an attempt has been made to construct an 
estimated cost, based on an extrapolation of the “standard costs” of other 
retailers applied to the known characteristics of the M & S network. 
 
M & S’s secondary distribution costs were confirmed by respondents as being 
“about £120 million per annum”, or 4.6% of sales revenue. IGD surveys 
across all retailers suggest that a figure of around 3% RSV is the norm, 
typically split: 
 
- Warehousing: 56.4% 
- Transport: 34.6% 
- IT systems: 6.7% 
- Other costs: 2.3% 
 
Assuming that 9% of M & S’s annual costs are similarly allocated to IT and 
other costs, we estimate that M & S’s actual physical distribution costs are: 
 
- £40 million transport (36p per tray) 
- £70 million warehousing(63p per tray) 
 
This compares with an expectation, based on industry norms, of: 
 
- Transport (34.6% of 3% RSV) £27 million (Actual is 48% above 
norm) 
- Warehouse (56.4% of 3% RSV) £44 million (Actual is 59% above 
norm) 
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The absolute “pence per tray” figures are typically double those of other 
retailers, in spite of the fact that the typical delivery pallet fill (46 cases) is 
similar to that achieved in store deliveries in, for example, Sainsbury.  
 
The relatively high cost is largely explained by the number of depots. Modern 
retail composite (multi-temperature) DC’s normally process around 1 million 
cases per week. M & S’s store demographics and lead times are such that 
seven depots are required, each only handling 300,000 cases per week. 
Compared with other retailer operations, the M & S network thus stands the 
indirect costs of up to 5 “unnecessary” depots. On the basis that indirects 
could represent 30% of a typical weekly composite RDC cost of £300,000, this 
network inefficiency would be worth 20p per tray. Deducting this would reduce 
secondary costs to 3.7% of sales value. 
 
For the four major UK food retailers (excluding M & S), therefore, the average 
distribution cost as a percentage of sales is just under 2.9%. In financial 
terms, if Safeway could return Tesco’s performance ratio, this would increase 
nett margin by £5.9 million (compared with a total declared operating profit of 
£375 million in 1998). 
 
This analysis is clearly based on a number of assumptions and 
generalisations, which need to be validated with the respective retailers. It 
should also be noted that the construction of a robust and objective set of 
benchmarks for retail distribution costs was absolutely not one of the research 
aims. The intention was to attempt to establish that there was likely to be 
approximate parity in operational, organisation and relative costs and to 
provide a foundation of operational familiarity which would then inform the 
subsequent interviews. 
 
Subject to this caveat, the theory and hypotheses appear to be supported by 
the data: that is, the major food retailers have achieved parity in operational 
efficiency and therefore the physical distribution function no longer contributes 
to competitive advantage between these firms. 
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2.3 Establishing Contacts 
 
Each of the five target organisations was approached in the autumn of 1999. 
Contact was made opportunistically with the most senior manager within the 
distribution function of each of the retailers. Typically, this would be “National 
Transport Manager” or “National Distribution Manager”, occupying the 
following position in the organisational hierarchy (nomenclature varies from 
firm to firm): 
 
Figure 10: Typical retail distribution senior management reporting structure 
 
Of the five retailers, three expressed immediate enthusiasm for the project 
and a series of semi-structured interviews was conducted in the autumn and 
winter of 1999, two each with Asda, Safeway and M & S. It took somewhat 
longer to establish meaningful contact with the other two but during 2000 first 
interviews were held with representatives from Tesco and Sainsbury.  
 
The summary aims of these interviews, as explained to the respondents, 
were:  
 
- Confirm the extent to which physical distribution systems of UK food 
retailers are similar and whether they contribute a competitive 
advantage. 
- Identify potential cost savings, efficiency gains and other benefits 
which might be generated by the sharing of physical distribution 
resources by UK food retailers. 
Main Board
Stores (or Operating) Board Support Functions 
Distribution Function Store Operations
Trading (Buying) Board 
Senior Managers
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- Identify potential barriers to, and enables for, distribution resource 
sharing. 
 
It was agreed that all data gathered would be non-attributable, other than that 
already in the public domain.  Summary transcripts of interviews would be 
sent to respondents for editing and approval before any of the data was used.  
Since it was intended that these interviews would be the first stage of an 
iterative process of discussions, it was essential that commercial confidences 
were established and respected absolutely. 
 
The first objective was to confirm the reliability of data gathered from archive 
material and other secondary data sources (IGD etc) such as turnover, 
percentage of sales attributable to food, numbers of stores and key 
distribution system characteristics (numbers of lorries, cases delivered etc). 
Secondly, some standard definitions of terms were proposed, including 
defined limits to the physical distribution system (“unit of analysis”). A number 
of standard quotations from the literature and trade press were used to 
illustrate the background to the subject. 
 
The following two sets of questions were then used. The first set out to 
explore attitudes to competition and the contribution which physical 
distribution might make to competitive advantage 
 
1a) Does the retailer consider its physical distribution systems to be better or 
worse than those of the other Top 6 retailers? (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda, Marks 
& Spencer, Somerfield/ Kwik Save). 
1b) To what extent does the physical distribution system contribute to 
competitive advantage? 
1c) Would competitive advantage be compromised by the sharing of 
distribution resources with competing food retailers? 
1d) Would the sharing of such resources be counter to the retailer’s strategy 
and culture? 
1e) What benefits do you believe might arise from the sharing of distribution 
resources? 
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1f) Are there any possible benefits beyond the financial ones? 
1g) What are the main barriers to resource sharing? 
1h) What might the main enablers or facilitators to resource sharing be? 
 
The second set of questions was intended to find out whether any practical 
applications of co-operation had already been either identified or even tested: 
2a) Bearing in mind the previous definition of physical distribution, which 
excluded any activities paid for by manufacturers, do you currently operate 
any part of your distribution systems on a shared basis with another retailer? 
2b) Have you identified any opportunities for potential sharing of resources? 
2c) If so, specifically which types of resource would be involved? 
2d) Have any discussions take place with other retailers about resource 
sharing? 
2e) If not, who do you think is most likely to initiate such discussions? 
 
The six initial interviews each lasted an hour. Initially, it was hoped to capture 
the content through detailed note taking, with a draft transcript circulated to 
respondents after the event for comments and editing. However, as the 
discussions developed, it became impractical to take notes and concentrate 
on the detail of the conversations. The last interviews and the subsequent 
joint meeting were therefore tape recorded with the consent of the 
participants. In all instances, transcripts of interview tapes have been returned 
to respondents for checking and (if necessary) editing of potentially sensitive 
material. 
  
2.4 Joint Retailer Seminar 
 
Having established a dialogue, together with an understanding of some of the 
key issues underpinning resource sharing, it was then proposed to the 
respondents that they (Asda, Safeway, M & S) should meet together, with a 
view to: 
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- Share the research findings to date, on a non-attributable basis. 
- Identify specific potential synergetic benefits identified as part of the 
comparative survey of current systems. 
- Develop a framework for quantifying benefits which may accrue 
from these opportunities. 
- Develop a framework for discussion, planning, implementation and 
division of the accrued benefits. 
 
The proposed forum was a “seminar”, in terms of academic research. As 
such, attendance was viewed as a contribution to the research process, rather 
than an opportunity to identify any specific opportunities for joint working with 
other retailers at that stage. 
 
The first aim of the meetings was to confirm the reliability of data on the 
structures of operations derived from secondary data. Thereafter, the detailed 
content of the individual discussions was distilled down to four questions, or 
topics for discussion, which were then used as the framework for the joint 
meeting between the three firms. 
 
- How is it possible to define an “optimum” or “best” PD system: for 
example, is quality, service or price the defining characteristic? 
- What role, if any, does the logistics function fulfil within corporate 
strategy? 
- Are there any examples of retailers working together either in the 
field of logistics or elsewhere? 
- At what level, or in what sphere of activity, would pooling of 
information or resources be regarded as non-contentious (start with 
crates / recycling, move forward through primary transport and on 
into order systems / stock etc)? 
 
The joint meeting, held in April 2000, lasted for two hours and was recorded 
for transcription. In order to allow time for note taking and reflection during the 
discussions, a colleague from Cranfield University, who was supervising the 
project at the time, also sat in attendance at the meeting to help facilitate the 
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dialogue. After some initial reserve, all three respondents contributed to a 
lively debate which covered all of the planned topics. However, it was felt by 
all participants that the presence of “competitors” in the room constrained 
contributions to some extent. 
 
2.5 Broadmead and Tradeteam Case Studies 
 
The findings of the exploratory phase formed the basis of a paper published 
early in 2002 (Stephens & Wright, 2002). Shortly after this, two applications of 
co-operative distribution arrangements were widely reported in the press.  
 
The first of these, Tradeteam, had originally been set up as distribution joint 
venture between UK brewer Bass and third party logistics provider Exel 
Logistics. However, in 2000, Bass sold its brewing operations, including its 
stake in Tradeteam, to Interbrew. However, at the insistence of the then Trade 
and Industry Secretary Stephen Byers, Interbrew were obliged to dispose of 
these acquisitions, which they sold to Coors in 2002. Up to this point, the 
Tradeteam operation is of little relevance to this research. However, when 
Interbrew decided in the Summer of 2002 to outsource their distribution 
activities to Tradeteam, they were effectively joining with Coors to form a 
shared operation. Tradeteam also managed to attract other competing 
suppliers to join the shared platform. This appeared to form an appropriate 
environment in which to try and understand more about the circumstances 
under which competitors would share distribution resources. Access to 
Tradeteam was gained opportunistically, however, following contacts 
established as a result of another initiative. 
 
In Spring, 2004, Bristol City Council announced that it was setting up a shared 
distribution platform to address issues of congestion and environmental 
damage associated with supplier deliveries to all of the competing retail 
businesses in its Broadmead shopping centre. The Council organised the 
funding and commercial arrangements, but contracted the operation out to 
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Exel Logistics. By the Autumn of 2004, some 17 suppliers had joined the 
scheme and there therefore appeared to be a pool of retailers which might 
offer some further insight into attitudes to co-operation in distribution. Contact 
was established in the first instance with Bristol City Council, who were not 
only prepared to discuss their experiences in setting up the scheme, but who 
were also prepared to  provide introductions both to some of the retailers 
involved and to management contacts at Exel. These latter contacts were 
then used to gain access to their counterparts in the Tradeteam operation, 
who, in turn, were able to provide contacts in the participants from the major 
brewing companies.  
 
In both cases, secondary data gathered through desk research was used in 
preparation for direct contact and to gain an understanding of the context, 
development and physical attributes of the operations. Thereafter, the primary 
data was collected through semi-structured interviews, which were generally 
tape recorded, transcribed and manually coded. The Broadmead case study 
was conducted between November 2004 and February 2005, with the 
Tradeteam case following in the Spring of 2005. Over this time the progress of 
the research was discussed with representatives from the original food 
retailers. Because of the passage of time and the major changes which had 
taken place in the market since the start of the research, some contacts 
inevitably moved on to new roles or even new firms and industries. However, 
it was still possible to continue a dialogue with some of the initial targets, 
affording the chance to test experience of the model and refinements to it on 
the original participants. 
 
The output from each of the next two stages (urban transhipment and brewing 
distribution) built on the output from the previous stage. The aim was to 
provide: 
 
- Longitude to the original, grocery-based research and 
- Explore the generalisability of the findings.  
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2.6 Summary 
 
As described in the first chapter, the research is intended to examine the idea 
that, because it offers short term competitive advantage only, logistics 
capability no longer contributes to competitive advantage in developed supply 
chains, such as those in the UK grocery market. On this basis, the next 
quantum reduction in costs or increase in efficiency might come from 
collaboration rather than competition. Having established the operating 
characteristics of the market and its key players through secondary research, 
it is intended to try and understand why there are few, if any, practical 
examples of collaboration. 
 
On the basis of the exploratory research described in this chapter, the six 
hypotheses set out in chapter one in an attempt to explain the circumstances 
under which collaboration might or might not occur can be distilled down into a 
number of key phrases. These can be developed subsequently into a table of 
codes for the analysis and interpretation of further data collected during the 
research: 
 
For example, potential collaborations will be affected by: 
 
1. Maturity of systems, (typified by centralisation, transport consolidation and 
use of contractors), the remoteness from the end consumer, the willingness to 
sub-optimise costs to optimise service and the relative size / growth strategy 
of the firm. 
2. Environmental or other external pressures, such as resource shortages.  
3. Perceptions of strength relative to competitors. 
4. Measurability and comparability of benefits. 
5. Presence of active third party (contractor) brokers in the market. 
 
The following chapters will examine these influences in more detail, against 
the findings from each stage of the case study research. 
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3 A systematic review of the literature 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In order to develop a framework for the systematic review of the literature 
relevant to this project, three broad areas of interest are identified: logistics, 
competitive strategy and retailing. The contextual literature pertaining to each 
is briefly reviewed in order to develop a set of search terms for the more 
formal and objective systematic review. These terms are used to identify 
those articles written in this subject area. These, in turn, are reviewed to 
establish how much work has been conducted in the specific area of research 
interest and to summarise and critiques the key views and findings set out in 
this area so far. 
 
3.2 Systematic Reviews 
 
A review of the existing literature surrounding the research area is a vital part 
of the research process, both to synthesize existing knowledge and identify 
where a further contribution to knowledge can be generated. However, 
literature reviews, if not carried out with sufficient rigour and diligence, can be 
subjective and open to the bias of the researcher. Tranfield, Denyer and 
Smart (2003) propose the adoption of the systematic review, as applied to 
research in the fields of medical science and, latterly, the formulation of 
government policy, to the field of management research. The key elements of 
this approach are: 
 
- clear definition of the scope of the research. 
- clear definition of the literature sources to be searched, search 
methodologies, search terms and tools used. 
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- recording of an audit trail of decisions taken, particularly on the 
selection of literature to be reviewed and, equally, that to be 
excluded. 
- analysis of the internal and external validity of the literature used. 
- extraction of the key data from the literature. 
- descriptive and thematic analysis of the literature. 
- synthesis of the findings. 
 
To ensure that the disciplines of this approach are followed, a review protocol 
is prepared in advance of the search. The main aims of this are to define the 
boundaries of the subject area to be reviewed, as well as to define the details 
of the research strategy to be applied.  
 
3.2.1 Review Protocol 
Two types of literature are reviewed: contextual / explanatory and exploratory. 
The former is intended to provide a description of the context: development of 
the disciplines of supply chain management, characteristics of the UK retail 
grocery industry and alternative theories on strategy and competitive 
advantage, for example. The aim of this review is purely descriptive and need 
not be subject to the rigour of systematic review. There are two distinct 
outputs from this informal review process: 
 
- development of the search terms which can subsequently be 
applied in more formal and systematic literature searches and 
- in the absence of substantial and relevant literature being identified 
in the systematic review, a more informal “snapshot” of current 
thinking and ideas in the areas of interest. 
 
The second, more formal, review is used to inform the theoretical 
underpinning of the research interest and link it to other work in the field, as 
well as identify the relevant gap in existing knowledge. The criticality of this 
review requires that it is subject to the disciplines of systematic review. 
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3.3 Choice of Terms – Three Spheres of Interest 
 
The core argument underpinning the research project is that, since logistics 
innovations are easy to copy, they only offer competitive advantage in the 
short term until universally adopted. Thereafter, costs can be reduced further 
by co-operation by competitors to force out remaining inherent inefficiencies. 
A pilot study with four UK retailers suggested four enablers or “inhibitors”, the 
presence or absence of which might explain the circumstances under which 
such co-operation might take place. 
 
The exploratory literature review is based on the premise that co-opetition is a 
known, accepted and understood form of competitive strategy and that 
logistics and supply chain management are accepted as legitimate branches 
of management science. There is thus no need to “prove” or critique either of 
these concepts.  
 
The exploratory literature review, therefore, seeks to understand the known 
concept of co-opetition in the known context of supply chain management and 
will be managed in the following terms: 
 
- Examples of cross-channel collaboration in logistics activity will be 
sought. 
- Searches will be limited to refereed academic journals and the 
practitioner press. 
- A data extraction table will be written in Excel, classifying material 
by source, quality and relevance, noting reasons for inclusion or 
exclusion in the final review. 
 
The phenomenon under investigation can be seen as occurring at the overlap 
point of three spheres of interest: logistics operations across competing 
channels in a retail environment. The literature search is depicted by the 
overlap at the centre of the Venn Diagram in Figure 11: 
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Figure 11: A Venn diagram depicting the research area 
 
The overlapping area of interest needs to be explored further in order to 
develop a list of tentative search terms for the systematic review of literature. 
The search terms for the literature review were developed from the following 
contextual areas. 
 
- Operational context: physical distribution / logistics. 
- Strategic context: competitive strategies. 
- Commercial context: grocery retailing (note that this context is of 
lesser initial importance than the first two). 
 
3.3.1 Operational context: Logistics and Physical Distribution 
These words are applied deliberately and with care. A cynic might reasonable 
level the accusation that logistics, and the related though different disciplines 
of physical distribution and supply chain management, are not appropriate 
areas for academic pursuit in that, as “mere” branches of operational 
management, they are purely of practitioner interest and not fertile ground for 
the development and application of theory. However, the fallacy of this view 
can be demonstrated from the rich literature which has charted the 
development and evolution of a legitimate branch of management science, 
albeit from origins rooted in operations, through the integration of other 
functions into the discipline of logistics and, latterly, into the even broader 
context of supply chain management.  
 
Operational 
context: 
Logistics 
Commercial 
context: 
Retailing 
Strategic 
context: 
Competition or 
collaboration 
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The lay-man could be forgiven for thinking that the terms distribution, logistics 
and supply chain management are synonymous and can be used 
interchangeably. The literature describes a process of evolution, from physical 
distribution as a focus of cost-driven operations, to supply chain management 
as a conceptual framework for the strategic integration of business processes 
and relationships. Unfortunately, the boundaries between the stages of 
evolution have been blurred, such that no single source offers a set of 
demarcations between the various terms and the process of development has 
tended to subsume each of the previous paradigms into the next one, to the 
possible detriment of the contribution which might arise from considering the 
components in isolation. In other words, if the notion of “competing supply 
chains” (Christopher, 1998) is accepted, then there is the danger of an implicit 
acceptance that all of the component parts of the supply chain are, by their 
nature, in competition.  
 
Some of the confusion arising from the interchangeability of terms arises from 
the fact that the use of the word “logistics” in its modern connotation predates 
the treatment of physical distribution as a serious management discipline. 
Logistics has its roots in military applications and, in that arena, can be traced 
at least as far back as the beginning of this century. Even then, however, it 
embraced a broader range of disciplines than those which we would now 
regard as physical distribution. 
 
Writing in 1905, Major Chauncey B. Baker described logistics as “that branch 
of the act of war pertaining to the movement and supply of armies”, implying 
far more than a fixed network of nodes and links. Johnson and Wood (1996) 
describe how extensive use of logistics models and forms of systems analysis 
were used in World War 2 to ensure that materials were in the correct place 
as they were needed, with physical distribution forming just one part of this 
process.  
 
Outside the military context, Christopher (1996) cites Arch Shaw, writing in 
1915, who pointed out the importance to business of considering both supply 
management and physical distribution as an integrated whole: “the question of 
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supply must be met and answered before the work of distribution begins”. 
However, although the concept of logistics as an integrated discipline has a 
relatively long heritage outside the commercial arena, it was not until the late 
1950’s that there was any pressure on businesses to consider even the 
narrow discipline of physical distribution. Converse (1954) and Stacey & 
Wilson (1958) paved the way for Drucker’s seminal article of 1962, which 
described the physical distribution function as the “dark continent” of most 
firms’ activities (Drucker, 1962). 
 
Drucker described distribution as “one of the most sadly neglected, most 
promising areas of American business”, accounting for almost 50% of 
consumer spending, but contributing little: “it can only mar, soil, tear. scratch 
or otherwise damage or downgrade the product”. 
“We know little more about distribution today than Napolean's contemporaries 
knew about the interior of Africa. We know it is there, and we know it is big; 
and that's about all. For people with a technical orientation, these activities are 
low-grade nuisances”. He threw down the gauntlet to the management 
community by concluding: “There is a need for a new orientation - one that 
gives distribution the importance in business design, business planning and 
business policy its costs warrant.” 
 
Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, writers postulated ideas which developed 
the operational and scientific credibility of the distribution function. Building on 
systems theory (Bertalanffy (1950), topics covered included network design, 
transport optimisation, warehouse location and design and principles for 
balancing inventory against manufacturing (Ballou (1968 and 1987), Buxton 
(1975), Coyle and Bardi (1976), Bowersox (1983), Watson-Gandy, 1988)). 
Much of this work was summarised in McKinnnon (1989), who narrowed the 
definition of physical distribution back down to the consideration of finished 
goods only, excluding raw materials (supply) management. He defined 
physical distribution as the collective term for the series of inter-related 
functions (principally transport, stock-holding, storage, goods handling and 
order processing) involved in the physical transfer of finished goods from 
producer to consumer, directly or via intermediaries. McKinnon estimated that 
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physical distribution accounted for approximately 8% nett sales in the UK and 
US and that costs had come down over the last 20 years. "The performance 
of a nation's economy is critically dependent on the quality and cost of its 
logistics support". He defined a physical distribution channel as “composed of 
terminal nodes, intermediate nodes (warehouses) and the links between them 
represented by transport movements: a much less abstract concept than a 
marketing channel". He described two dimensions of a physical distribution 
channel: vertical (number of nodes), and horizontal (similar nodes at a given 
stage). 
 
However, the evolutionary process from logistics via “integrated logistics” to 
“strategic logistics” and ultimately to “leading edge logistics” (Bowersox & 
Daugherty, 1987) was accompanied by the widespread belief that logistics 
excellence contributed to competitive advantage. Even in the narrow physical 
distribution sense, Stock (1990) uses examples from American industry to 
describe how “such advantages in distribution are more difficult for 
competitors to duplicate in the short term, so the advantage remains for a 
period of time. It can be called sustainable competitive advantage”. As we 
have already seen, however, there comes a time when all distribution 
innovations can be copied and adopted universally, so that competitive 
advantage is nullified.  
 
Thus, during the 1960’s, the hitherto separate process disciplines of 
distribution and raw materials management were integrated, in accord with the 
original military logistics concept. Although the terms “distribution” and 
“logistics” are not interchangeable, integrated logistics is not at odds with a 
narrow functional focus based on cost, leading to universally adopted best 
practice. LaLonde (1983) maintains that it is still appropriate to “re-align (the) 
physical facilities network” as part of strategic response to environmental 
issues and pressures. 
 
In 1986, the (American) Council of Logistics Management defined Logistics 
Management as "the process of planning, implementing and controlling the 
efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, 
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finished goods and related information flow from point-of-origin to point-of-
consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements" (CLM 
1986). Sussams proposed that "Logistics is a holistic science. it does not look 
at the individual parts of a system in isolation; it looks at ways in which the 
parts are connected and suggests better connections. One of the principal 
tasks of the logistician is to impose some kind of order on (this) vast system in 
which, ultimately, everything is connected to everything else" (Sussams, 
1991).  
 
The term “Supply Chain Management” appears to have been first coined in 
the early 1980’s, and can be traced back to channels research and systems 
integration research, both in the 1960's. The SCM concept moves the focus 
away from an operational cost focus within functional silos, and instead 
emphasizes the business benefits which can accrue from the broader 
horizontal and vertical integration of business processes. As such, it is not a 
tool kit for the development of operational competencies or even excellence 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982; Treacy & Wiersema, 1995), but a new “lens” 
through which the structure of a business, and the relationships within that 
business, can be viewed. 
 
One of the other early references to SCM as a management process (rather 
than a juxtaposition of the 3 words) was Houlihan (1985) "We need a new 
perspective and a new approach: supply chain management". Porter 
popularised the term "value chain" in the same year (Porter, 1985). 
 
Ellram (1991) describes SCM as “an innovative form of competition which has 
grown out of and is supported by the current economic environment. SCM 
represents a tremendous opportunity for firms to utilise assets, particularly 
inventory, more effectively while decreasing the ownership and management 
risks of vertical integration. SCM is defined here as an integrative approach to 
dealing with the planning and control of materials flow from suppliers to end-
users. Supply chain management really represents a network of firms 
interacting.”  
 
 71
Stevens (1989) proposed one of the first models for supply chain 
management, covering the flow of goods from supplier through manufacturing 
and distribution chains to the end user. Stevens expanded this scope further 
upstream to the source of supply and down to the point of consumption (from 
dirt to dirt). Stevens’ understanding of the scope of the supply chain is the 
most commonly accepted in the literature. 
 
Setting aside the earlier military applications, the development of logistics as a 
topic for study can be summarised as having started with Drucker in 1962 as 
a consideration of the physical distribution activities of warehousing and 
transportation. Following the extension of distribution to embrace inbound 
materials and purchasing within the field of logistics in the 1970’s, the further 
integration of vertical business processes in the 1980’s and 1990’s, to 
embrace both the end customer and upstream suppliers, created the broader 
discipline of Supply Chain Management. Whilst, as seen above, differences in 
definitions vary slightly from author to author, the concepts can be described 
as nesting within each other. A depiction of this nesting of concepts is shown 
in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12: Physical distribution as a sub-set of logistics, in itself a sub-set of supply 
chain management 
 
3.3.2 Logistics: Implications for Search Terms 
The phenomenon under consideration in this study is the potential for co-
operation or collaboration between competing companies across supply 
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Information Flows 
Supply Chain Management 
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channels in the field of physical distribution. The study considers opportunities 
for sharing tangible distribution assets, such as warehouses and trucks, rather 
than facilitation mechanisms, such as information exchanges or shared 
planning tools. We are thus interested in the early to mid stages of the 
evolutionary process as described above, rather than the later developments. 
A preliminary review of available source material, even prior to a systematic 
review, suggests that much has been written about the potential for 
collaboration in areas such as information flows and supplier management. 
However, this is not relevant to the research topic and the search terms for 
this section of the Venn diagram will therefore be restricted to “logistics” and 
“distribution”. Results based on this latter term will need to be reviewed with 
care, as “distribution” has a second meaning in the business literature, 
specifically relating to the “place” element of the so-called 4 P’s of marketing: 
the outlets in which a product is potentially available to the consumer. The 
word also has a specific meaning in statistical analysis, as well as a more 
general meaning in describing, for example, the occurrence of flora or fauna. 
As with all subsequent sets of search terms, these will be applied with the 
Boolean operator OR. 
 
Summary: primary set of search terms: (Logistic* OR distribut*) 
 
3.3.3 Strategic context: Competition Strategies 
Although the work of strategy theorists has only latterly been applied to the 
retail environment, the basic “universal” strategic choices of price leadership 
or product differentiation (Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980 and 1985) have been 
refined to apply in a retail context as price versus added values (McGee, 
1987; Johnson, 1987; Walters, 1988; Treacey & Wierseme, 1995). This basic 
choice between coroporate objectives is refined into more specific operational 
goals as strategy is devolved through the heirarchy of the business (Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978; Walters, 1988; Harris & Walters, 1992). Although some 
commentators have argued that price is paramount (Corstjens and Corstjens, 
1995), others have argued that low costs (and thus low prices) are a pre-
requisite for market entry and therefore set out frameworks by which 
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differentiation can be achieved (Walters & White, 1987; Walters, 1988, Cox & 
Brittain, 1988). Distribution is generally regarded as an enabler of efficiency 
rather than as adding values and is also therefore a “hygiene factor” rather 
than a differentiator, or, after the Kano Model, a Basic factor, rather than an 
“excitement” factor (Bicheno, 1998). As the retailer, rather than the product, 
has become the brand (Walters & White, 1987), distribution has played an 
enabling role in underpinning service developments (Smith & Sparks, 1993; 
Quarmby, 1990) although innovations in this respect are easy for competitors 
to copy (Savitt, 1987). UK retailers such as Asda, Tesco and Sainsbury have 
all attributed at least part of their recent success to innovations in physical 
distribution management. 
 
As discussed briefly in chapter one, the extended enterprise has been 
adopted as a governance structure which might readily be applied to firms 
vertically integrated within a single supply chain. However, just as it is 
suggested that such vertically-integrated chains can compete with each other 
(Christopher, 1998), so others have suggested that horizontal integration may 
be effective in the field of logistics (Richardson, 1998; Whitehead, 1999). 
 
If Porter’s model can be described as businesses at war, the notion of “co-
opetition” describes business as both war and peace simultaneously. Co-
opetition, as coined by Ray Noorda of Novell (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 
1996), is based on the concept of enlarging the size of the pie to be divided, 
rather than simply upon the rules by which the pie is fought over. Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger (1996) describe the emergence of game theory, from its roots 
in submarine warfare planning during World War 2, to a developed branch of 
mathematics which helps to predict and explain the actions of players in many 
situations, including business strategy. They use game theory as the 
foundation for a model of co-opetition, where the acronym PARTS sums up 
the roles of players, added values, rules, tactics and scope of the game. The 
players are described as a symmetrical “value net”, where suppliers are 
balanced against customers, and competitors are balanced against so-called 
complementors. This notion of complementarity provides an alternative to the 
“business as war” perspective: the recognition that non-competing firms can 
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help expand the size of the business pie is then extended to ways in which 
directly competing firms can equally contribute to the well-being of the market 
as a whole. Figure 13 describes this dual role of other firms as competitors 
and / or complementors from the perspective of a single firm. 
 
Figure 13: The dual role of firms as competitors and complementors in “co-opetition” 
 
In summary, the role of any player in the “positive sum” game is to increase 
their own added value through their interaction with the other players. The 
added value of a firm is simply the size of the total pie when a firm is in the 
game, less the value of the total pie when that firm is out of the game. The 
relevance of this model to our research is clear: firms, in this case UK food 
retailers, can maintain a competitive position towards each other whilst 
seeking ways to add value to the total size of their “pie”. 
 
Alternatives to the Porter strategic model may not only be manifested in overt 
co-operation between firms, such as the examples given above, but also in 
choices concerning organisational form. Of these, the most apparent are the 
extent to which firms choose to vertically integrate (or disintegrate) support 
activities and elements of the supply chain. Two of the clearest manifestations 
of this in UK food retailing are the extent to which retailers choose to contract 
out certain operations (for example the physical distribution function) and the 
extent to which retailers attempt to subsume the identity of manufacturing 
suppliers through the development of “own label” ranges. As well as any direct 
cost or marketing advantages to be gained through such initiatives, both 
developments have a grounding in theories of transaction cost economics. 
 
One of the key trends of retail distribution over the past thirty years has been 
the increased reliance on specialist contractors (Buck, 1990, Jaafar and Rafiq, 
2005). Reliance on own-label merchandise and the use of specialist functional 
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contractors can both be seen as outcomes of a style of relational 
management, the opposite faces of which could be regarded as opportunism 
in a (manufacturer) branded market and insistence on functional control. 
 
Thinking of supply and demand in terms of simple hierarchical chains is not 
helpful in many industries, and in food manufacture and retailing in particular. 
Here, the matrix of suppliers to “creators of demand” is complex, with many 
inter-connections. Each supplier may service many retailers in parallel and 
thus each party can be a component of several parallel (and potentially 
competing) chains. This takes us back through the literature, to the starting 
point of Miles and Snow (1986), who described the emergence of a new 
organizational form – “a unique combination of strategy, structure, and 
management processes that we refer to as the dynamic network”. Brought 
about by phenomena such as vertical disaggregation, market mechanisms 
and information disclosure, the role of “brokers” emerges as parties who 
facilitate the linkages among equal partners in a network of chains and 
business inter-relationships. The influence of brokers in the logistics context 
can be seen in graphic form in Christopher (1986), who describes the 
influence of intermediaries in the supply chain. For example, where five 
suppliers sell to five retailers, there are potentially 25 sets of transactional 
links. The use of an intermediary reduces this to ten as shown in figure 14. 
Figure 14: The use of intermediary contractors to de-complex supply chains 
(Christopher, 1986) 
 
Manufacturer Manufacturer 
Retailer Retailer 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
A B C D E A B C D E
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However, in this simplified example, the difficulty of achieving vertical 
integration along any one manufacturer / retailer supply chain can be seen. If 
the intermediary is considered as a provider of distribution services, and if that 
intermediary were to be vertically integrated with the operations of supplier A, 
then the products of manufacturer 1 for retailer B will either have to find a new 
route to market, or considered as a parallel set of enterprise extensions. 
Although Buzzell and Ortmeyer (1995) refer to the same problem in that most 
retailers must work with a multiplicity of suppliers, they do not mention that 
many suppliers must also work with a range of retailers. Whether supplying 
brand-leading products, with universal availability, or specialized products with 
low throughput per store or retailer, there is a range of circumstances under 
which manufacturers may choose, or be obliged, to be part of multiple supply 
chains within a dynamic network.  
 
However, there are other spheres of activity where the role of an intermediary 
can be seen to contribute to the provision of a non-competitive operation. For 
example, most UK manufacturers and retailers have long since ceased to 
source, procure and maintain their own supplies of wooden pallets on which to 
move goods around. The engineering concern GKN joined forces with an 
Australian company to set up the Chep organization, which has operated a 
pallet pool in the UK for many years. Chep are now in competition with other 
service providers, including Hays, to operate a common pool of re-usable 
plastic crates for the transport of foodstuffs into supermarkets. Interestingly, 
prior to this, the major UK retailers tried for several years to agree procedures 
for using each others’ crates but without success. Discussions had failed 
because each retailer appeared to believe that his own crate was better than 
everybody else’s and that pooling would only be possible if his design were to 
be used. It took the intervention of (neutral) trade bodies, the Institute of 
Grocery Distribution and ECR Europe, and commercial third party service 
providers, before the mindset of competing over non-competitive resources 
could be addressed. 
 
The strategic models can thus be seen to have evolved from simple price / 
quality decisions to more complex frameworks, embracing inter-channel and 
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intra-channel competition and collaboration, often all occurring 
simultaneously. Much has been written about collaboration between 
potentially competing partners within a single supply chain: such thinking has 
evolved in parallel and in harmony with the development of Supply Chain 
Management.  
 
3.3.4 Competition: Implications for Search Terms 
The phenomenon under consideration in this study is the potential for co-
operation or collaboration between competing companies across supply 
channels in the field of physical distribution. Interest is focused on the 
potential for competing supply chains, or elements within those supply chains, 
to share or pool physical distribution assets without compromising the 
competitive relationship between the supply chains. Therefore, collaboration 
within a supply chain (between manufacturers, shippers and consumers) for 
example, is irrelevant to this study. Co-operation or collaboration between 
competing manufacturers or retailers, through shared or pooled resource, is of 
interest. Therefore the phenomena of “cooperation” or “collaboration” need to 
exist at the same time as the continuing phenomenon of “competition”. Again, 
Boolean operators are used to express the logic of this second set of terms. 
Wild cards are used in this instance to capture instances of, for example, 
competition, competitor, competitiveness etc. 
 
Summary: secondary set of search terms: (Cooperat* OR co?operat* OR 
collaborat* OR opetition) AND competit*. 
 
(Note: the specific letters “opetition” were used to avoid issues in database 
searches with hyphenation, which is used by some authors). 
 
3.3.5 Commercial Context: Grocery Retailing 
As noted above, the phenomenon of interest in the broadest sense is 
cooperation between competitors in the field of physical distribution. 
Applications in any commercial or operational context are potentially of 
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interest, although examples of application in grocery retailing are specifically 
sought, in order to try and understand this narrow context more fully, and the 
ways in which it might be generalised to other contexts. There is also an 
argument that it is impossible to draw meaningful understandings and 
conclusions from too disparate and fragmented a constituency of examples. 
 
The UK food retail market is often held up as a paragon of logistics efficiency, 
with unit costs and inventory levels significantly lower than most of the rest of 
the world (Fernie, 1995). Logistics developments as described above have 
taken place against the background of market concentration, creating an 
environment of intense competition. Arguably, the pace of change and 
intensity of competition should give rise to a research frame in which it is 
possible to isolate competition through physical distribution efficiency from 
total supply chain-based competitive strategies. Since 1960, the major 
multiples' share of the UK grocery market has grown from around a quarter to 
nearer three-quarters, at the expense of the independent and co-operative 
sectors. Within this three-quarters, the top six companies account for almost 
80% of all sales. However, this top six contains some very different 
companies (Seth & Randall, 1999). 
 
The key trends in the retail distribution environment, and the reasons which 
explain them, have been well documented in the logistics literature: 
 
- centralisation of distribution (Carter, 1986; Bowring, 1988; 
McKinnon, 1989; McKinnon, 1990; Moore, 1990 and 1991; Cullis, 
1992). Latterly, this has been described as having grown from 60% 
of total volume in the late 1960’s (Pettit, 1967) to around 95% in the 
late 1990’s. 
- concentration of retail power in the hands of a few major multiples 
(Akehurst, 1983; Fernie, 1992 and 1997;Bourlakis, 1998) to the 
extent that the top 6 UK food retailers now hold almost 58% of the 
total market. 
- use of third-party providers of distribution services (McKinnon, 
1986; Fernie, 1990; Buck, 1990), with third party transport 
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penetration having grown from 40% in 1984 to 47% in 1998, and 
warehousing penetration from 14% to 34% in the same period 
(Buck, 1990 and Sheldon, 1998). 
 
Against the background of retail concentration, the arguments for the 
centralisation of distribution are so compelling that, whilst there have been 
differences in the rate of uptake, all major UK retailers had implemented these 
techniques almost universally by the 1990’s. Having achieved parity in this 
respect, the next key trend has been the optimisation of physical distribution 
resources through the tools of: 
 
- integration of primary and secondary distribution. 
- increased asset utilisation through multi-cycling and new handling 
techniques and technologies. 
- reduction in inventory through rapid replenishment, improved 
forecasting and co-managed or vendor-managed stocks. 
 
These issues conspire to create a climate of further change, in which many of 
the traditional assumptions about the way in which firms compete are being 
challenged. Among these is the notion that competitive advantage is created 
by supply chain excellence, and thus by implication, by physical distribution 
excellence. However, an alternative approach would suggest that competitive 
advantage in physical distribution is gained in the short term only, with any 
emergent best practices easily copied and adopted by competitors.  
 
Changes in the UK food market over the last 30 years, therefore, have thus 
been characterised by two key trends: the concentration of retail power into 
the hands of a small number of multiple store operators, and the almost 
complete centralisation of these multiples’ distribution activities. Part of this 
research explores the reasons for these trends with a view to extrapolating 
future developments. 
 
Having taken more or less complete control of deliveries into stores, a further 
trend in the last five years has been for retailers to become involved in the 
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supply chain from factory to RDC. Initiatives such as ex-factory buying, 
intermediate stock-holding and retailer-controlled primary transport have been 
some of the manifestations of this trend. 
 
Distribution of fresh foods to major UK retailers is thus highly integrated and 
centralised. Typically, a major retailer will operate around 10 - 15 regional 
distribution centres (RDC's), each collating the individual store orders for 50 - 
70 stores and handling around 1 million cases per week. Some RDC's 
operate across a range of temperature regimes ("composite" RDC's), others 
are dedicated to a single product group (e.g. frozen or produce). Most retailers 
operate at least some of their RDC's themselves, with the balance contracted 
out to third party operators. Many RDC's have their own depot-base transport 
fleets for store deliveries, either operated in-house or by third parties. The 
RDC network was first established in the late 1960's and is now more or less 
complete and handles over 95% of fresh foods for major retailers.  
 
There is general agreement within the UK food supply industry that retailer 
initiatives, such as ECR (Efficient Consumer Response), will have an 
increasing impact on physical distribution systems. Examples might include 
stock and processing activities being forced back up supply chain, re-
definition of exactly "who does what" in the supply chain and further reduction 
in order lead times and extension of "chill" disciplines to other temperature 
regimes.  
 
3.3.6 Grocery Retailing: Implications for Search Terms 
Although some of the basic tools and systems are transferable to more or less 
any commercial context, the UK grocery retailing industry, and its associated 
distribution systems, are at least as mature and efficient as anything else in 
the world. A climate of intense competition and rapid concentration of the 
marketplace has prompted the rapid adoption of strikingly similar operations 
by all of the major players. Whilst, outside the context of this piece of 
research, it may be interesting to draw parallels with other markets and other 
countries, the degree of homogeneity within grocery distribution, particularly in 
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the UK, facilitates the kind of cross-channel cooperation under investigation. 
Whilst, therefore, it is of interest to understand applications in other 
commercial or operational contexts, ultimately, examples of theory or 
application in the narrow grocery retail market in the UK are sought. 
 
Summary: third set of search terms: (Grocer* or ECR or Efficient Consumer) 
 
3.4 Methodology and Results – First Iteration 
 
A hierarchy of search terms has been designed to be applied in turn, to 
determine the scale of the available literature at each level of the hierarchy, 
before pursuing a more detailed analysis of the results.  
 
- The string “(Collab* OR Cooperat*) AND (Logistics OR Distribution)” 
is applied first, in order to understand the amount of references 
available on collaboration in physical distribution within a single 
supply chain. 
- The second string “AND competit*” is then applied in to limit 
references to collaborations across parallel competing chains. In 
fact, this string may also bring back references to intra-channel 
collaboration, as a tool to deliver competitive advantage as 
compared to other chains. Such references can then only be 
identified and removed through a study of the content. 
- The third string (Logistics OR Distribution) is applied 
- The fourth string “(Grocer* OR ECR OR Efficient Consumer) can 
then be applied to further delimit the references. 
 
Because of the amount of non-refereed practitioner material available in this 
commercial and operational context, the results were limited to include 
(refereed) academic journals only. The search terms were applied to all text 
fields within the databases, in order to try and identify as many references as 
possible. Any which contained only passing or incidental reference to, for 
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example, logistics or distribution, were then manually eliminated during a 
more detailed review of the texts themselves. 
 
The search terms were iteratively applied to four databases : ABI (ProQuest), 
EBSCO (Business Source Premier), Web of Science (ISI) and Science Direct.  
The initial results were treated as a pilot, with the full list being manually 
reviewed to remove duplications and irrelevant papers. The search “rules” 
were further refined during the pilot phase: 
 
- papers with no author were removed, as these generally tended to 
be from non-academic practioner journals (despite setting limiters to 
exclude these) or abstracts or summaries of other papers. 
- papers in languages other than English were discounted 
 
Various combinations and alternative sequences of the hierarchical strings 
and additional limiters were tested, all with broadly similar results. However, 
application of all of the search strings returned a very limited number of texts 
(3), which did not include some anticipated material. Closer inspection of 
some known key texts revealed that many authors writing in the area of 
collaboration have looked at the context of collaboration in logistics or 
collaboration in retail supply chains, but rarely collaboration in both logistics 
and retailing. It was therefore decided to apply the third and fourth search 
strings separately, in effect to identify two separate bodies of literature, which 
could then be manually reviewed and integrated as appropriate. These 
searches resulted in a combined total of 11 papers: 
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First Iteration: Search on all strings: collaboration in grocery logistics 
(Collabor* OR cooperat* 
OR co?operat* OR 
opetition) AND 
competit* AND logistics 
AND (groce* OR ECR 
OR Efficient Consumer) 
3  
Manually eliminate 
irrelevant papers 
2  
 
Second Iteration: References to collaboration (etc) in (grocery) retailing, but 
with no specific references to logistics 
(Collabor* OR cooperat* 
OR co?operat* OR 
opetition) 
30,031 Known “test” papers 
included? Yes 
AND competit* 2,773 As above: No 
AND (Groce* OR ECR 
OR Efficient Consumer) 
87 As above: Yes 
Manually eliminate 
irrelevant papers 
6  
 
Third Iteration: References to collaboration (etc)  between competitors in 
logistics  
(Collabor* OR cooperat* 
OR co?operat* OR 
opetition) 
30,031  
AND competit* 2,773  
AND logistics 85  
Manually eliminate 
irrelevant papers 
7  
   
Overlap 2 Papers delivered by 
both searches 
Total references 11  
 
 
Table 5: Numbers of references identified in each iteration of the systematic literature 
search 
 
Note: See appendices 1 – 3 in the References chapter for a full list of 
references returned, together with explanation of those papers discounted as 
irrelevant 
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3.5 Outcomes from the literature review: enablers and 
inhibitors for collaborative arrangements 
 
A list of the full results after the final iteration (11 papers) is included in 
Appendix 1. Because of the low number of papers satisfying all of the search 
criteria, the content of all was fully reviewed to establish relevance (or 
otherwise) to this project. Papers listed in the appendix were rejected for one 
of the following reasons: 
 
- collaboration within a single supply chain, or so-called vertical 
integration. This collaboration is generally in the area of information 
exchange or joint planning, but can extend to logistics, but no 
consideration was given to cross-channel collaboration. 
- logistics was only an incidental consideration in a broader 
discussion on specific opportunities, largely in the areas of data 
exchange. Again, the language used has parallels in both 
disciplines: information is “distributed” through “hubs” in much the 
same way physical goods might be. 
- Two papers were themselves literature reviews of the development 
of supply chain management principles, but offered no observations 
on current practise or future opportunities. 
 
A rich picture of the contextual retail environment and the associated evolution 
of logistics systems is provided by Fernie (1995). However, this paper pre-
dates most of the developments and almost all of the literature on potential 
horizontal collaboration and therefore perhaps unsurprisingly makes no 
reference to the potential for development of partnership arrangements.  
 
Having said that, it can be seen from some of the other literature that the idea 
of potential collaboration in logistics operations between competitors is not a 
particularly new one. Heskett (1973) identified the opportunity, explaining it as 
being driven by vast technological changes in physical distribution systems 
and capabilities since the Second World War. For example, traditional 
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technologies have increased their capacities: ships and trucks are generally 
larger and can carry larger payloads than they could 20 years ago. At the 
same time, new technologies have either become available for the first time, 
such as containerisation, or have become accessible to a wider market as 
costs have fallen, for example with air-freight. 
 
To take maximum advantage of these technological changes and the 
opportunities they provide for greater efficiency and reduced costs, however, it 
is necessary for a programme of organisational change to follow. This is not 
solely driven by the need to embrace logistics as a core skill and ensure that 
the technologies have been embraced operationally and have not been 
blocked by labour or management attitudes. Rather, there is a need for 
organisations to shift responsibilities to create both internal vertical 
integrations, but also external relationships. Partly, this is driven by the need 
to create the necessary critical mass to make the most effective use of the 
increased capacity created by the new technologies, but Heskett also 
proposes two distinct sets of circumstances under which inter-firm cooperation 
will be desirable. 
 
The first is the so-called "distribution utility": cooperative inter-organisational 
development of an "arm's length" package of services, designed to allow 
"large, proud" organisations to concentrate on selling, rather than delivery. 
Such a utility might be created jointly by a group of leading manufacturers and 
their chain-store customers.  
The second of circumstances reflects environmental, as well as commercial 
pressures. City centre congestion compounded by small and fragmented 
consignment sizes conspire to make the costs of urban delivery untenable. A 
possible solution, suggests Heskett, would be the coordinated consolidation of 
freight movements via shared urban transhipment centres. 
Both opportunities - arm's length cost-sharing and consolidation of volumes - 
proposed by Heskett appear to have some support from potential participants. 
Consolidated distribution facilities might not be "far-fetched and might have 
advantages to both sectors of the industry", according to the president of a 
large retail food chain” (unattributed quote in Heskett, 1973). 
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Because of the maturity and fairly homogenous nature of retail distribution 
systems (Fernie, 1995), it can be argued that innovation in logistics might offer 
at least a short term competitive benefit. However, the complex inter-
relationship between logistics and manufacturing which has developed over 
the last few decades requires collaboration and cooperation between supply 
chain members in order to facilitate innovation. Conversely, therefore, a 
willingness to innovate and change can be seen an enabler, or explaining 
factor, for partnerships (Frankel, Goldsby & Whipple, 2002). The same 
authors note that, in spite of the widespread belief of the supply chain benefits 
driven by ECR implementation, the actual physical impacts on distribution 
systems may not be that great, with, for example, inventory levels in the US 
generally as high or even higher than before ECR was first promoted.  
 
Almost 30 years after Heskett (1973) suggested two sets of circumstances 
under which logistics collaboration would be possible, Cuthbertson and Collet 
(2001) explore the relationships between potentially competing partners within 
a single supply chain in more detail. Specifically, the relationship between 
supplier and retailer is described as being both collaborative and competitive, 
in that both parties are also highly likely to be members of other competing 
supply chains. The need for information exchange and the alignment of key 
resources (money, people and technologies) is discussed, but an opportunity 
for much wider collaboration networks is identified. Retailers deal with many 
suppliers and suppliers deal with many retailers, and therefore there may be a 
role for sector-wide organisations to act as inter-mediaries and develop 
standards and platforms across industries. Whilst the examples discussed 
focus on information and technology standards, it does not require much of a 
leap of imagination to apply this thinking to physical distribution standards and 
processes. 
 
Very recently (Hoffman 2005), it has been recognised that this potential for 
collaboration across supply chains faces an uphill struggle, because firms 
would fear the loss of some competitive advantage grounded in their logistics 
systems. Having recognised the role of third parties in facilitating information 
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exchange, not only by setting common standards but also developing the 
technologies which allow only limited access to data by the appropriately 
authorised parties, it is suggested that there may be a role for third parties in 
acting as agents to facilitate collaboration and integration elsewhere. Whilst 
recognising that vertical coordination within a single chain is likely to be much 
easier than horizontal collaboration, because of prejudices and fears among 
potential participants, it is suggested the template for integration has been 
developed in the field of information exchange. This would, however, be more 
than just an extension of traditional third party service provision, in that it 
requires the participants to join more actively in the setting of common 
standards, in the full knowledge that they are actively joining with their 
competitors in these operations, rather than operating at arm's length. "When 
senior management starts to view the supply chain as a strategic initiative, 
then collaboration will really start taking off". 
 
Data exchange between "dyads" of trading partners is nothing new, but in 
spite of the fact that technologies such as Electronic Data Exchange are well 
established and relatively cheap, inhibitors such as asymmetry of information 
exploitation, trust and opportunism are seen to exist and limit potential 
implementations (Christiaanse, 2005). Elemica was established as a global 
network for information exchange across the chemicals industry in 2000, as a 
collaboration between 22 chemical manufacturers and distributors. Although 
initially designed as a vertical integration tool between dyads within single 
supply chains (by linking enterprise resource planning systems such as SAP, 
to allow for the free flow of orders and payments), there are no technological 
or process barriers to stop its use horizontally across supply chains at each 
tier level. Indeed, the application could even theoretically be scaled to allow 
for transport pooling and optimisation (Christiaanse, 2005). However, this 
development is still inhibited by lack of inter-company process standards and 
institutional factors such as power and trust.  
 
Elemica was just one of several similar exchanges set up around 2000: other 
examples include Transora for the food, beverage and consumer products 
industries. However, in spite of rapid growth (50 manufacturers signed up 
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within weeks of the launch) and talk of a substantial global opportunity, 
including in transportation, the exchange service settled little to become little 
more than a facilitation point for e-auctions and appeared to be floundering by 
2002, laying off staff and closing offices (Anon, Food Logistics, 15.1.02 quoted 
in Christaanse, 2005). Covisint was set up as a similar data exchange 
platform by the US motor industry, as a collaboration between Daimler 
Chrysler, Ford and General Motors. But, 13 months after being established, 
Covisint still did not have a CEO and many companies appear to be 
considering building their open data exchange platforms for their suppliers, 
rather than joining industry-wide ones. Covisint also appears to have faced 
considerable resistance from automotive industry suppliers (O'Keefe, 2001). 
In the end, the major US retailers may bring about the final demise of 
Transora, as they form their own trading exchange platforms such as 
Worldwide Retail Exchange (Target and Supervalu) and GlobalNetExchange 
(Kroger and Sears). The largest retailer of them all, Wal Mart, has sufficient 
mass in its own right to have established its own platform (O'Keefe, 2001). 
 
Many writers explore the need for vertical collaboration within a single supply 
chain as a response to competitive pressures. This concept is developed to 
recognise that most firms are members or more than one supply chain and 
thus collaborations form part of a network, web or "extended enterprise" 
(Greis & Kasarda, 1997). As the manufacturing environment has progressed 
from mass production, through lean manufacture to agility, so the logistics 
function has become both more sophisticated and more fully integrated with 
manufacturing processes. Citing an example of horizontal collaboration 
between competitors in product development and machine fabrication, Greis 
and Kasarda (1997) suggest that such a collective enterprise, combining 
simultaneous competition and collaboration, is a logical response to the 
development of more complex web-like arrangements. However, whilst 
operational characteristics, such as process alignment and shared information 
systems are described, Greis and Kasarda offer little or no insight into the 
organisational traits which are likely to facilitate or impede the formation of 
extended enterprise relationships. Furthermore, their web model still only 
describes a complex set of inter-woven and simultaneous vertical 
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relationships, rather than exploring ways in which horizontal collaboration can 
be developed concurrently with, or in place of, vertical supply chain 
relationships. 
 
Although collaboration based on ECR have become "ubiquitous" in the last 
ten years, academic studies of such collaborations, and thus literature about 
them, are scarce (Corsten & Kumar, 2005). Based on a survey of 266 
suppliers to Sainsbury (the identity of the retailer is not actually revealed in 
this paper, but can be inferred from Corsten and Kumar (2003), Corsten and 
Kumar identify enablers for suppliers to collaborate with retailers in a vertical 
partnership, including relative scale of operations, perceived fairness and 
perceptions on the relationship between scale of effort invested and reward 
gained. They conclude that, while vertical collaborations in the context of ECR 
are generally a good thing, rewards are almost certainly not fairly apportioned. 
However, they still recommend that suppliers should seek to enter into such 
partnerships, although they should select potential partners carefully, on the 
basis of perceived levels of trust and the extent to which the supplier is 
"smart" and can therefore contribute experience and learning. The power and 
aggression of retailers may be beneficial to them in the short term in that it 
allows them to hang onto a greater share of the benefits of collaborations with 
suppliers. However, this will be counter-productive in the longer term, as 
cynical suppliers will simply invest less effort in the partnerships  to the 
detriment of the total benefit, in an attempt to balance reward with perceived 
effort or investment (Corsten & Kumar, 2003). The absence of mutual trust, 
possibly caused by asymmetry of power, appears to be a significant inhibitor 
to the development of successful collaborations (Frankel, Goldsby & Whipple, 
2002). 
 
ECR is occasionally believed to have fallen far short of its promised 
efficiencies and value. Many believe that unrealistic expectations among 
grocery industry participants are primarily at fault for this shortcoming. The 
level of internal and external change required to make desired outcomes a 
reality have been underestimated and poorly understood by prospective 
 90
participants (Frankel, Goldsby & Whipple, 2002; Stank, Crum & Arango, 
1999). 
 
Some of the original components of ECR (such as electronic data 
interchange: EDI) or later enhancements and applications (collaborative 
planning and forecasting: CPFR) can be seen as prerequisite technologies 
which have to be in place, but which do not, of themselves, drive collaborative 
arrangements, which can only exist when these technologies are 
complemented by trust and inter-dependence (Stank, Crum & Arango, 1999). 
 
An empirical survey conducted amongst UK suppliers of fresh produce to 
supermarkets suggests that, whilst levels of collaborative effort and economic 
factors are important in determining the value and quality of a vertical supplier 
- retailer relationship, relative inter-dependence is the most important enabler / 
inhibitor (Duffy & Fearne, 2004). Crudely, the more power the retailer has 
relative to the supplier, the greater the asymmetry independence between the 
two parties and thus a disproportionate sharing of the benefits of the 
partnership. Symmetry of dependence leads to higher levels of perceived 
"fairness" and thus trust, which in turn leads to deeper co-operation and 
collaboration, resulting in greater accrued benefits to be shared between the 
two partners. The use of Transaction Cost Economics as a rationale for 
partnerships is flawed in that, whilst it recognised the need for control 
measures and costs to deal with opportunism by one of the parties to the 
arrangement, it does not adequately recognise the impact of power on the 
potential outputs (Duffy & Fearne, 2004). Therefore, whilst vertical 
partnerships within a chain, as posited by the ECR model, will deliver an 
overall benefit, compared with traditional adversarial models which may push 
costs back up or down the chain between competing chain members, but 
ultimately leave the total sum of costs unchanged. Partnerships may 
potentially reduce overall costs, but the extent to which benefits are allotted 
fairly can be compromised by power, which is more often than not, a reflection 
of relative size.  
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So, parallel evolutionary developments in logistics collaboration and buyer – 
supplier collaboration in grocery retailing can be seen to be enabled and 
facilitated by external environmental factors as well as behavioural 
characteristics. However, although the notion of actors participating in multiple 
inter-woven supply chains is recognised, the first discussion of horizontal 
arrangements across competing supply chains is relatively recent (Kotzab & 
Teller, 2003) The co-opetition model, described above, offers a framework in 
which firms can act simultaneously as competitors and collaborators, 
specifically in a supply chain context. The same “soft factors”, such as trust 
and commitment, which were discussed in the context of the development of 
vertical integration collaborations, will have a significant effect on the success 
or otherwise of horizontal arrangements. However, in addition to the influence 
of power and its effects on relative inter-dependence, another enabler / 
inhibitor suggested in the perceived “distance” of the potential partnership 
activity from the end customer. Citing examples from the Austrian grocery 
industry, activities such as load unitisation, information exchange and even 
return of empty unitisation equipment are sufficiently far upstream from the 
consumer as to contribute nothing to competitive advantage and thus fertile 
ground for the development of horizontal collaborations (Kotzab & Teller, 
2003). ECR of itself is again described as a non-market governance structure, 
within the context of Transaction Cost Economics. However, this economic 
approach does not fully explain why some partnerships or collaborative 
efforts, either vertical or horizontal, work when others do not.  
 
3.5.1 Summary 
Three key points, therefore, emerge from this literature: 
 
- there is evidence of collaboration between competitors in supply 
chain activities other than logistics and distribution. Of these, the 
key activity is information exchange, both to drive transactional 
efficiency (EDI, collaborative planning and forecasting) and to 
design more agile and responsive chains (goal sharing, conflict 
resolution mechanisms, performance measurement). 
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- Although there has been resistance to cooperation in logistics 
because of perceptions of compromise of competitive advantage, 
there may be circumstances which over-ride these prejudices, 
particularly where a third party can facilitate the initiative. 
- More importantly, a number of prerequisites or enablers are 
identified in an attempt to explain, if not the circumstances in which 
collaborations will be established, at least the conditions under 
which they will perform best and flourish, or in which they will under-
perform. These include an imbalance of power between the parties 
leading to an imbalance of inter-dependence, relative size and 
maturity of aligned operations and processes, as well as perceived 
distance of a supply chain activity from the end consumer. Because 
of the relative maturity and thus homogeneity of physical distribution 
systems, innovation could be perceived as a source of competitive 
advantage, albeit possibly only in the short term, and thus 
willingness to innovate and change might be a significant enabler to 
the formation of collaborative partnerships. 
 
3.6 Conclusions from the literature 
 
The planned and systematic review of the available literature reveals that, 
whilst much has been written about the potential opportunities for 
collaboration across competing supply chains in some well-defined areas, little 
or nothing has been written to explore or explain the application of such ideas 
in the physical distribution environment, in spite of this idea having been set 
out several times over the last 30 years. The review identified only a very 
small number of papers which came close to dealing with the subject area in 
any detail and, within these, the notions that collaboration may be context 
specific and driven to some extent by external factors are supported.  
 
These points identify that “back office” functions exist, that offer little in terms 
of competitive advantage and thus they are candidates to be pooled or shared 
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across competing supply chains to benefit the sector as a whole. There may 
be specific sets of circumstances (for example environmental, legislative or 
commercially opportunistic) which will facilitate such cooperation. An 
understanding of the organisational inhibitors to cooperation may help 
determine exactly which enablers are required to clear the blockage.  
 
Separate bodies of research on collaboration in the grocery and logistics 
sectors suggests that, assuming that all enabling technologies are in place 
and physical processes aligned, then concepts such as relative power, trust, 
distance from the consumer and maturity of systems will all have an influence 
on the existence and success of partnering arrangements. 
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4 Review of philosophical approaches for 
research 
 
Before undertaking any piece of management research, it is essential for the 
researcher to understand the choices of philosophical perspective through 
which the phenomenon may be observed and then to form a link from the 
appropriate philosophical stance to the most relevant and reliable 
methodology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Based upon a review of the 
questions of research philosophy, this chapter aims to establish which of the 
relevant available research methods, reviewed from a realist perspective, is 
appropriate to the phenomenon and context under consideration, as 
described in the conceptual framework in the introduction.   
 
At the heart of the philosophical debate underpinning any social research lies 
the question of perspectives of social reality. Essentially, this can be 
summarised in the question as to whether social reality exists independently 
of individuals or whether it is a construction or interpretation of reality by 
individuals. The former philosophical stance is rooted in the natural sciences 
and assumes that reality, and thus individual behaviour, is governed by laws 
which can be discovered and observed. The latter position assumes 
differences between individuals and that reality is constructed by individuals, 
or groups of individuals, to explain the observed world around them. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) set out four sets of philosophical assumptions to 
examine the implicit and explicit characteristics of these opposing viewpoints. 
 
Firstly, there are ontological assumptions: those concerned with the nature or 
essence of the social phenomena under consideration. Is social reality 
external to individuals or is the product of individual consciousness? This 
gives rise to two philosophical stances known as nominalism and realism. The 
former holds that perceptions of reality are no more than words and that there 
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is no independently accessible reality which constitutes the meaning of the 
words used. The realist perspective contends that things which are known 
have an existence independently from the “knower”. 
 
The second set of assumptions relate to epistemology. On the one hand, 
knowledge can be perceived as being hard, real and capable of being 
transmitted in a tangible form. On the other hand, knowledge can be seen as 
soft, subjective, spiritual and only gained through experience and personal 
insight. A choice between these opposing assumptions is seen as profoundly 
influencing the way in which researchers will seek to uncover knowledge. If 
knowledge is seen and hard and objective, the researcher will tend to assume 
a detached observer role, whereas a personal and subjective stance will 
impose a requirement for involvement on the part of the researcher and, by 
implication, a rejection of the methods of the natural scientist. 
 
This is developed in the third set of assumptions, which concerns the 
relationship between individuals and their environment. On the one hand, 
individuals are described as responding mechanically to their environment. On 
the other hand, individuals are seen as initiators of their own actions. 
 
Finally, these assumptions culminate in a choice of methodological stances. 
Researchers based in the objectivist, or positivist, paradigm, treating the world 
as hard, real and external, will tend to favour traditional scientific research 
methods, such as surveys and experiments. Others from a more subjectivist 
(or anti-positivist) approach, seeing the world as softer, personal and 
individually created, will tend towards more recent and emerging techniques, 
such as accounts, participant observation and personal constructs. 
 
The practical application of these sets of assumptions within a societal or 
organisational framework can be summarised by consideration of the 
subjective – objective dimension, as shown in figure 15. 
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Figure 15: A scheme for analyzing assumptions about the nature of social science 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Cohen and Manion (1994), based on Barr Greenfield (1975), discuss some of 
the practical implications of these core assumptions for the development of a 
research strategy, in terms of both a societal and organisational framework. 
These are set out in figure 16. 
  
The following connected suppositions are also added to the positivist stance 
by Giddens (1974), Firstly, the methodological procedures of the natural 
sciences may be directly applied to the social sciences, implying that the 
social scientist is an observer of social reality. Secondly, the final product of 
investigations by social scientists can be formulated in terms parallel to those 
of the natural sciences. This means that their analyses should be presented 
as laws, or law-like generalisations of the same kind that have been 
established in respect of natural phenomena. Positivism, therefore, implied a 
clear view of the social scientist as analyst or interpreter of their subject 
matter. 
 
Burrell and Morgan contrast subjective and objective paradigms, with 
positivism being viewed as, if not synonymous with, then at least closely 
aligned with objectivism. Blaikie (1993) contrasts positivism with negativism. 
He argues that the “positive” root of the paradigm stems from a positive 
answer to the question as to whether the methods of the natural sciences can 
be applied to the social sciences. The answer to this question can be “yes”  
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Figure 16: Alternative bases for interpreting social reality: adapted from Barr 
Greenfield (1975) in Cohen & Manion (1994) 
Conceptions of social reality 
Dimensions of
comparison 
Objectivist 3 Subjectivist 
Philosophical basis Realism: the world exists
and is knowable as it
really is. Organisations
are real entities with a life
of their own 
Idealism: the world exists
but different people
construe it in very
different ways. 
Organisations are
invented social reality. 
The role of social
science 
Discovering the universal
laws of society and
human conduct within it. 
Discovering how different
people interpret the world
Basic units of social
reality 
The collectivity: society or
organisations 
Individuals acting singly
or together. 
Methods of
understanding 
Identifying conditions or
relationships which
permit the collectivity to 
exist. Conceiving what
these conditions and
relationships are. 
Interpretation of the
subjective meanings
which individuals place
upon their action.
Discovering the
subjective rules for such
action. 
Theory A rational edifice built by
scientists to explain
human behaviour. 
Sets of meanings which
people use to make
sense of their world and
behaviour within it. 
Research Experimental or quasi-
experimental validation of
theory, 
The search for
meaningful relationships
and the discovery of their
consequences for action. 
Methodology Abstraction of reality,
especially through
mathematical models
and quantitative analysis. 
The representation of
reality for purposes of
comparison. Analysis of
language and meaning. 
Society Ordered. Governed by a
uniform set of values and
made possible only by
those values. 
Conflicted. Governed by
the values of people with
access to power. 
Organisations Goal oriented.
Independent of people.
Instruments of order in
society serving both
society and the
individual. 
Dependent upon people
and their goals.
Instruments of power
which some people
control and can use to
attain ends which seem
good to them. 
Organisational 
pathologies 
Organisations get out of
kilter with social values
and individual needs. 
Given diverse human
ends, there is always
conflict among people
acting to pursue them. 
Prescription for
change 
Change the structure of
the organisation to meet
social values and
individual needs. 
Find out what values are
embodied in
organisational action and
whose they are.
Change the people or
change their values if you
can. 
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(positivist), “no” (negativist) or “yes and no”, implying that either the current 
methods used in natural sciences are inappropriate even in that context, or 
that the methods are appropriate but need modification for application in a 
social context.  
 
Blaikie identifies eleven philosophical responses to the basic question, six 
classical and five contemporary: 
 
 Yes  Classical  Positivism 
 No     Negativism 
 Yes / No    Historicism 
 Yes / No     Critical Rationalism 
 No     Classical Hermeneutics 
 No     Interpretivism 
 Yes / No Contemporary Critical Theory 
 Yes / No    Realism 
 No     Contemporary Hermeneutics 
 Yes / No    Structuration Theory 
 No     Feminism 
 
He describes four concepts which underpin each paradigm. Like Burrell & 
Morgan, he describes ontology, epistemology and methodology. However, 
instead of a set of assumptions on human nature, Blaikie elaborates critical 
differences between methodology and method, with method being his fourth 
under-pinning concept. Methodology is defined as the analysis of how 
research should be conducted, including discussion of how theories are 
generated and tested. Methods are described as the pragmatic tools, 
techniques and procedures used to gather data related to a research question 
or hypothesis. 
 
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) review what they describe as the “long-standing 
debate” between two basic philosophical stances: positivism and 
phenomenologism. They point out that, although there has been a trend away 
from positivism towards phenomenology in recent years, consistent with the 
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contemporary responses to positivism described by Blaikie, there are many 
researchers. particularly in the field of management science, who adopt a 
pragmatic view by deliberately combining methods drown from both traditions.  
Easterby Smith et al cite the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1853) as 
defining the positivist tradition thus: “….there can be no real knowledge but 
that which is based on observed facts.” Although not all the work of Comte, or 
of any other single philosopher, they identify a number of implications which 
follow from the positivist tradition: 
 
- independence: the observer is independent of what is being 
observed. 
- value freedom: the choice of what to study, and how to study it, can 
be determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs and 
interests. 
- causality: the aim of social sciences should be to identify causal 
explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in 
human social behaviour; 
- hypothetico-deductive: science proceeds through a process of 
hypothesizing fundamental laws and then deducing what kinds of 
observations will demonstrate the truth or falsity of these 
hypotheses; 
- operationalisation: concepts need to be operationalised in a way 
which enables facts to be measured quantitatively; 
- reductionism: problems as a whole are better understood if they are 
reduced into the simplest possible elements; 
- generalization: in order to be able to generalize about regularities in 
human and social behaviour, it is necessary to select samples of 
sufficient size; 
- cross-sectional analysis: such regularities can most easily be 
identified by making comparisons of variations across samples. 
 
The basic beliefs of the two traditions, together with their implications for 
research methodology and methods, are summarized: 
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 Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological 
Paradigm 
Basic Beliefs The world is external 
and constructed 
objectively 
 
Observer is independent
 
Science is value free 
The world is socially 
subjective 
 
 
Observer is part of what 
is observed 
Science is driven by 
human interests 
Researcher should: Focus on facts 
 
Look for causality and 
fundamental laws 
 
Reduce phenomena to 
simplest elements 
 
Formulate hypotheses 
and then test them 
Focus on meanings 
 
Try to understand what 
is happening 
 
Look at the totality of 
each situation 
 
Develop ideas through 
induction from data 
Preferred methods 
include: 
Operationalising 
concepts so that they 
can be measured 
 
Taking large samples 
Using multiple methods 
to establish different 
views of phenomena 
 
Small samples 
investigated in depth or 
over time 
 
 
Table 6: “Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigms”; Easterby-Smith 
et al, 1991 
 
The basic philosophical choices have thus been variously described as: 
 
- objective vs subjective (Burrell & Morgan). 
- positivist vs non-positivist (with a further sub-set of strategic choices 
in the non-positivist tradition) (Blaikie). 
- positivist vs phenomenologist (Easterby Smith et al). 
 
However, more contemporary responses to the application of natural science 
philosophies to the social sciences suggest a middle ground: a “yes and no” 
answer as described by Blaikie. Of these, the “realist” perspective is attractive 
in describing organizational behaviour, in the sense that it reflects the 
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principles of natural science whilst also accepting that human behaviour 
cannot be reduced to a series of chemical reactions or other absolute 
explanations. In other words, the methodology and philosophy of science can 
be applied to human behaviour, but only in the knowledge that human beings 
do not necessarily conform to the expectations of scientific prediction. Realism 
is thus described as the search for mechanisms which explain the way in 
which the actions of people or social groups can explain observed 
phenomena. Two key writers on the realist perspective, Harre and Bhaskar, 
both agree that social science is a search for the fundamental structures and 
mechanisms of social life (Blaikie, 1993). Both Harre and Bhaskar describe a 
progression from observed phenomena to explanation of mechanisms, 
although with variations in terminology. Harre believes that exploration of a 
phenomenon should lead to empirical studies, which are then followed by 
theoretical studies to confirm or refute tentative generative mechanisms. The 
same process is described by Bhaskar as being the identification of a 
phenomenon, followed by the construction and testing of a model explanation, 
which will lead to the definition of a causal mechanism which connects actions 
and the observed phenomenon. Bhaskar lists five principles which underpin 
his definition of realism: 
 
- transitive objects (concepts, theories and models) are developed to 
explain intransitive objects (entities and relationships which make 
up the real world). 
- reality consists of three strata: the empirical (observed), the actual 
(all events, whether observed or not) and the real (structures and 
processes which cause events). 
- whereas natural science laws are universally applicable, social laws 
are tendencies. which may or may not lead to specific outcomes. 
- however, definition of reality are concerned with the basic nature of 
an entity or structure, not about what is observed. 
- suggested mechanisms are developed in the light of observation 
and confirmed or refuted by research. 
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These principles are important in the consideration of the design of research 
strategies. Classically, research which leads to the proposition of theory has 
tended to be either inductive (observations lead to generalisations and thus to 
theory) or deductive (predictions lead to hypotheses which are tested by 
observation).  
 
Both strategies are essentially linear in nature, starting from a given point and 
moving through a logically arranged series of stages in order to arrive at an 
end point. The realist perspective, as set out by Bhaskar, favours theory 
development based in retroduction, which can be described as a circle or 
spiral, in which observation leads to the construction of models to explain 
underlying mechanisms. Connections between events and actions are 
observed, explanations for these connections are postulated and the 
mechanisms underpinning these connections are then demonstrated. The 
process is iterative, in that the models developed to explain the underlying 
mechanisms start by being tentative and are refined in the light of testing and 
further observation. 
 
This iterative cycle differs somewhat from the process known as grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), in that the retroductive process begins with 
an attempt to construct a model to explain a phenomenon, rather than 
allowing the model to emerge from immersion in a subject and refining it until 
a saturation point is reached. 
 
The models developed in the retroductive process would normally be 
expected to be paramorphic (that is, reflecting an unknown subject), as 
opposed to homeomorphic (where the subject is the source of the model, as 
with a model aeroplane, for example). 
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4.1 Choice of stance on Research Philosophy 
 
Although the broader context of supply chain management may, to some 
extent, be underpinned by constructions and beliefs surrounding relationships 
between people and organisations, the narrower discipline of logistics is 
essentially positivist and functionalist (Skjoett-Larsen, 1999). However, this 
implicit positivism is also tempered by the fact that logistics systems and 
operations are run by people, who do not necessarily observe constant rules 
and thus the context lends itself to consideration from a realist perspective. 
Furthermore, the arguments for retroduction are also persuasive in this 
context: observation informs theory, which is turn tested by observation which 
leads to better theory.  
 
Research in the field of logistics generally could be described as being 
characterised in two ways: 
 
- a tendency towards normative or exploratory research, which does 
not conclude in new theories or knowledge. 
- based on the positivist paradigm, on the basis that the fundamental 
essence of logistics is either economic in nature, or rooted in 
operations management, and thus measurable in a quantitative 
sense. 
 
However, these economic principles are interpreted and applied by individuals 
or social groups within organisations: this interpretation and application may 
be guided by influences which lie beyond rational (mathematical) explanation. 
 
In summary, there appear to be compelling mathematical, financial and 
economic reasons for the development of initiatives in logistics and physical 
distribution, but the application of these “scientific” principles is tainted by the 
intervention of individuals and groups, driven by motives of their own. 
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The research interest concerns the way in which the concepts of ECR have 
not been applied in situations where logic suggests they might be, with 
attitudes to the nature of competition providing a possible explanation for this. 
Given that the attitudes of a firm are the product of the attitudes of the senior 
managers within that firm, the traditional positivist approach is unlikely to 
explain the reasons for this situation. 
 
As already described, the adopted philosophical perspective (realism) has 
clear implications for the selection of research strategy and methodology 
(retroduction). In Easterby Smith (1991), the positivist studies of Pugh and the 
Aston Group (1976) and Hofstede (1984), being firmly rooted in the positivist 
tradition, are contrasted with the phenomenological work of Dalton (1959 and 
1964). Although the links between the positivist paradigm and quantitative 
research, and between the phenomenological paradigm and qualitative 
research are not absolute, there is a clear tendency for these associations. 
This has some important implications for research design. Easterby-Smith et 
al describe five choices for the researcher which are influenced by philosophy 
and which in turn influence the design of the research process: 
 
Researcher is independent Vs Researcher is involved 
Large samples Vs Small numbers 
Testing theories Vs Generating theories 
Experimental design Vs Fieldwork methods 
Verification Vs Falsification 
 
 
Table 7: Key choices for the researcher (Easterby-Smith et at, 1991) 
 
The first four of these choices relate closely to the choice between a positivist 
and a phenomenological perspective, with the last only being of particular 
relevance within a positivist approach. The fifth choice applies to either 
paradigm and is essentially concerned with the way in which the supporting 
evidence for any emergent theory is worded. A verification approach looks for 
evidence to support a contention, but each piece of support is unlikely to 
prove conclusively that a statement or theory is absolutely correct. On the 
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other hand, a falsification approach requires only one piece of contradictory 
evidence to prove that a theory is incorrect.  
 
Within the chosen context, the area of research interest tends towards the 
centre of each pair: no existing theory explains why the relatively small 
number of firms in the market tend to act in a particular way. Most of the likely 
respondents are already known in some way to the researcher and it is 
thought likely that conversation and observation, rather than questionnaire 
and survey, are more likely to uncover the attitudes in play. The position at the 
centre of this continuum appears to accord with the concept of “logical 
positivism”, or hypethetico-deductivism as developed by the so-called Vienna 
School in the 1930’s. 
 
The question of relative involvement and participation of the researcher can 
be set on a continuum from detached and unobtrusive measurer of observed 
facts, through to participant in joint action research. 
This continuum can be mapped against the scale of positivist to 
phenomologist to give a 2 x 2 matrix of possible research methodologies as 
depicted in the following figure (after Easterby-Smith et al, 1991): 
Figure 17: The influence on research design of philosophy and researcher involvement 
(after Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) 
Case Method (Yin) 
Survey research 
Grounded Theory (Glaser)
Quasi-experimental design 
Experimental design 
Survey feedback 
Narrative methods 
Case method (Stake) 
Grounded Theory 
Critical Enquiry 
Participant Observation
Grounded Theory (Strauss) Ethnography 
Ethnomethodology Co-operative Enquiry 
Action Research 
Unobtrusive Measurement
Case Method 
Realist Conventional
Detached
Involved 
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The first key choice for the researcher, in this framework, is to establish which 
of the four quadrants the research is to be based in, both from a philosophical 
perspective and in the light of the context being studied. Although logistics has 
generally been viewed from a realist / positivist stance, in this particular piece 
of work, the effects of managerial attitudes tend to move the research part 
way towards a phenomenologist / conventionalist perspective. Equally, 
although quantitative (objective) tools have traditionally been applied in the 
logistics arena, a degree of involvement is implicit in the prior knowledge of 
the informants likely to be used in the research, going as far as direct 
participation in a process of change. These arguments, therefore, place this 
research very close to the crossing point of the two continua, but slightly 
above the central dividing line. According to this model, this would suggest 
that the case method is the most appropriate strategy. 
 
 Easterby-Smith et al raise six potential issues when working in this area of 
the research model, all of which should be considered when designing the 
research and evaluating the implications of the results: 
 
- the theoretical and practical significance of the research. 
- the operationalisation of variables developed as part of the 
hypothesis. 
- the representativess of the sample selected and thus the 
applicability of the findings to a more general context. 
- the perceived credibility of both the outcomes and the methods 
used (summed up by the possible response to the research being 
“So what?”). 
- the management of bias on the part of the researcher. 
- the way in which data is reported, so that it represents more than 
just narrative stories. 
 
These issues can be distilled into three broad tests which can be applied to 
the research design and outcomes, irrespective of the philosophical stance 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991): 
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 Positivist viewpoint Phenomenological viewpoint 
Validity Does and instrument 
measure what it is 
supposed to measure? 
Has the researcher gaided 
full access to the knowledge 
and meanings of informants?
Reliability Will the measure yield the 
same results on different 
occasions (assuming no 
real change in what is to be 
measured)? 
Will similar observations be 
made by different 
researchers on different 
occasions? 
Generalisability What is the probability that 
patterns observed in a 
sample will also be present 
in the wider population from 
which the sample is drawn?
How likely is it that ideas and 
theories generated in one 
setting will also apply in other 
settings? 
 
 
Table 8: Three key tests to inform research design (Easterby-Smith et at, 1991) 
 
In attempting to formulate a model to improve the validity and credibility of 
research in the field of logistics, Mentzer & Kahn (1995) surveyed all of the 
articles published in the Journal of Business Logistics between 1978 and 
1983. They attempted to categorise the research embedded in each of the 
articles into one of four headings. They concluded that some 90% of all 
published research was either normative (exploring what organisations ought 
to do), reviews of existing literature or exploratory studies. Only 4.3% of the 
published articles concerned the testing of new hypotheses. Their implied 
criticism is that logistics research is thus essentially managerial in nature, 
rather than aimed at building a body of new knowledge. 
 
Skjoett-Larsen (1999) echoes this viewpoint, suggesting that not enough 
consideration has been given to the consideration of logistics problems and 
research from the perspective of theories borrowed and applied from other 
disciplines. Stock (1997) carried out a further content analysis of articles from 
four academic journals, in which he attempted to establish which theories and 
perspectives from other academic disciplines had already been brought to 
bear in logistics research. 
 
However, despite its relative youth, “logistics” as a field of management and 
academic research has already developed a breadth that spans both 
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measurable, technical reality and more over-arching conceptual abstractions, 
encapsulated within philosophical propositions such as “supply chain 
integration” (Christopher, 1996), “virtual enterprise” (Walker, 1993) and other 
evolving organisational paradigms. This conflict between theoretical 
generalisation and practical application is not unique to logistics, and can be 
found at the interface of management and academia in all disciplines. In this 
field, a significant gap appears to exist between abstraction / theorising and 
practical application, with the suggestion that practitioners or consultants may 
offer more useful insights through their own research than academics and 
theorists (Voss, Tsikritis and Frohlich, 2002). Perhaps because of the rapid 
growth of the influence of the logistics perspective as a lens through which to 
view the total structure and operation of organisations, the academic literature 
has tended ever further towards over-arching theories, leaving little in the way 
of detailed operational or comparative research. The normative textbooks of 
the early 1960’s, founded in economics and operations research, have not 
generally been superseded by further practical research to explain the 
dynamics of the changes in supply systems over the last 30 years (Skjoett-
Larsen, 1999). A bias and prejudice towards practicality and measurable 
objectivity at the outset of this work are, therefore, understandable although 
open to change over time.  
 
In the broader sense of extended Supply Chain Management, it may be 
possible to take a more “social science” oriented view that the discipline is so 
concerned with the management of relationships between organisations and 
individuals that a positivist orientation somehow misses the point. However, 
the narrower sub-discipline of logistics operates in a mechanistic and 
technical environment, in which success and failure can be measured and 
rationalised in purely objective terms and in which performance is described in 
terms of the “scientific” principles of economics, finance and operations 
management. This narrower technical perspective on logistics as a sub-set of 
a more complex and over-arching set of interactions is supported by the 
evolutionary view of the development of the discipline, as discussed in the 
review of literature earlier. Logistics and physical distribution grew out of 
economic principles and were later subsumed into the broader organisational 
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philosophies of supply chain management. The narrower operational context 
is still very much driven by numbers and tangible achievements. The fact that 
this objectivity and scientific rationalisation is, to some extent, undermined by 
the logisticians themselves, has been discussed as a reason for adopting a 
realist perspective in this area. Nonetheless, for an academic analysis of the 
field, it is still attractive to assume that management science can be 
universally described as objective, and measurable, and comprises a set of 
universal truths, which exist to be revealed. This positivist approach attempts 
to explain and predict reality, both in terms of tangible components and the 
reactive and deterministic actions of people (Mentzer & Kahn, 1995). 
 
In summary, the strategic choices of research methodology are therefore 
reviewed from the perspective that this research is likely to be: 
 
- realist: explanations and causes exist objectively, but are subject to 
the perceptions and actions of individuals 
- objective: the researcher is detached from the subjects under 
scrutiny. 
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5 Methodology and research design 
 
In the previous chapter, a number of possible philosophical positions were 
discussed, with the conclusion that this research should be undertaken from a 
realist perspective. It was also recognised that the normally technical and 
functional orientation of the discipline may be influenced by (possibly 
irrational) personal and subjective issues in this specific context. 
 
5.1 Review of Alternative Strategies 
 
A number of possibly appropriate research strategies were identified and 
reviewed for their suitability. These were experiments, surveys and case 
studies.  
 
Easterby Smith et al (1991) identify that experiments involve assigning 
subjects at random to either an experimental or control group. The 
experimenter, who is clearly directly involved in the process, then seeks to 
manipulate conditions for the experimental group in order to compare 
outcomes and behaviours of that of the control group. Experiments are 
popular in some areas of the human and social sciences, such as psychology, 
particularly where the context ensures a ready supply of guinea pigs. 
However, experiments can be dismissed as a research tool in this project for 
(at least) the following reasons: 
 
- They are hard to conduct in an organisational context. 
- It is the behaviour of organisations under consideration here. 
- The direct involvement of the researcher is required. 
- It would be impractical for a single researcher to manipulate 
conditions within an organisation is such a way as to simulate the 
conditions which give rise to the behaviour in question. 
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- It is difficult to repeat the conditions under which the experiment 
was conducted and replication is therefore challenging. 
 
An alternative approach to the application of experiments in an organisational 
context is the quasi-experiment. Examples of this include attempts to 
overcome the mis-match between control and experimental groups over time 
by conducting “before and after” analyses. However, the research in question 
is presumed to be time- and context-specific and no immediate change in 
situation or conditions is predicted. Furthermore, the direct involvement if the 
researcher is still required and this is at odds with the chosen philosophical 
perspective. 
 
Similarly, in order to maintain a detached and non-involved position, action 
research is rejected. This might normally take the form of a consultancy 
approach to the implementation and analysis of a pre-ordained set of changes 
within an organisational context. Again, the phenomenon under consideration 
is possibly time-specific and, quite apart from considerations of objectivity and 
participant involvement, it is not possible to determine what kinds of 
organisational change would inform the underlying reasons for current 
actions. 
 
Whilst ethnographic studies might provide some insight into the way in which 
organisations, and the individuals within them, act at a particular time or in a 
particular set of circumstances, they demand a degree of involvement and 
subjectivity on the part of the researcher which is inconsistent both with the 
philosophical perspective and the context. 
 
Surveys have been rejected for two main reasons: 
 
- In an environment of intense competition, some of the reasons for 
patterns of organisational behaviour are likely to be driven by, or at 
least prejudiced by, commercial information which is, or is perceived 
to be, highly confidential. Access to relevant parts of this information 
and a comprehension of its influence on business actions and 
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strategies is thought likely to be achieved through the building of 
relationships with informants over time. 
- The chosen research context is deliberately narrow, with only a 
small number of firms to be studied. As such, depth of 
understanding, rather than breadth of sample is the key objective. 
 
Lambert et al (1996) criticise the use of surveys in logistics research because 
of their propensity for gathering large amounts of “thin” data, without much in 
the way of extent or description. In seeking to gather “thick” data through 
surveys, they point out the dangers of respondents misunderstanding 
questions which seek to address subtle issues. 
 
The study of history is rejected, because the research is concerned with a 
current situation and industry context, for which no historical precedents are 
believed to exist.  
 
5.2 Case Research 
 
Numerous writers have commented on the appropriateness of case study 
techniques within the field of logistics research (Ellram, 1996; Juga, 1996; 
Stock, 1996 and 1997). Ellram suggests that case study research is 
particularly appropriate in considering a holistic situation, such as a complete 
supply chain or inter-firm relationship, in a real life setting. Such research 
would tend to have specific boundaries of interest, or a specific context, such 
as a particular industry or type of operation.  
 
The use of case study studies, as defined by Yin (1989 and 1994) satisfies all 
of the main strategy and philosophical issues of this research. A case study is 
defined (Yin, 1989) as 
“an empirical enquiry that investigates a current phenomenon in its real life 
context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of data are used”. 
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Case study research can be based on single or multiple studies, using both 
qualitative and quantitative data. Case studies can be used within research 
programmes that are intended to satisfy any, or all, of the following aims: 
 
- Exploration: defining the questions, hypotheses and theories for 
further study. 
- Description: providing a complete picture of a phenomenon within 
its specific context. 
- Explanation: the collection of data to build, test and confirm (or 
refute) theories which might explain causalities, regularities and 
outcomes. 
 
Case-based research is occasionally confused with ethnography and 
participant observation, leading to the misconception that it necessarily takes 
a long time and produces a mass of data which is hard to interpret. Case 
studies can, however, be designed in such a way as not to require large 
amounts of time and to be focused on specific issues key to the research. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests the following strengths and weaknesses of a 
case-based approach to theory-building: 
 
- The likelihood of generating novel theory. 
- The emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can 
be measured and hypotheses proven false. 
- The resultant theory is highly probable to be empirically valid. 
 
but: 
 
- The intensive use of empirical evidence can yield theory which is 
overly complex. 
- The resultant theory is narrow and idiosyncratic. 
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Eisenhardt (1989) proposes the following series of actions in order to take 
advantage of the positive aspects of case study research and avoid the 
possible pitfalls: 
 
- Getting started: define the research questions. 
- Select cases: specifying the population with theoretical, not randow, 
sampling. 
- Crafting instruments and protocols: using multiple data collection 
methods, possibly combining both qualitative and quantitative data. 
- Enter the field: overlapping data collection and analysis, with flexible 
and opportunistic data collection methods. 
- Analyse the data: building data displays within cases. 
- Shape hypotheses: iterative tabulation of evidence for each 
construct, searching for the evidence of “why” behind relationships. 
- Enfold the literature: making comparisons with existing literature. 
- Reach closure: through theoretical saturation where possible. 
 
Yin (1994) raises three potential pitfalls of the case-based approach: 
 
- Possible accusation of lack of academic rigour. 
- Possibly limited scope for scientific generalisation.They can take too 
long and produce too much indigestible data. 
 
All three of these dangers can be dealt with effectively through careful design 
of the research programme. Yin summarises the work of several writers in 
proposing four basic tests to which any empirical social research can be 
subjected, and which specifically address the key issues surrounding case-
based research. These are: 
 
- Construct validity: the establishment of appropriate measures for 
the concepts being studied. 
- Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions or actions are shown to lead to other conditions or 
actions, as distinguished from chance or co-incidental relationships. 
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- External validity: establishing the precise boundaries of the area 
into which the findings can be generalised (and beyond which 
generalisation is meaningless). 
- Reliability: demonstrating the execution of the research, including 
data collection and analysis, could be repeated to yield similar 
results (Yin, 1994). 
 
Mentzer and Kahn (1995) address similar issues, which they refer to as 
statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity and external 
validity. These tests lead on to a series of proposed mechanisms, which, if 
properly considered and executed, address the question of academic rigour. 
Specific examples relevant to the design of this research programme are: 
 
- The use of multiple sources of evidence and having draft reports 
reviewed by key informants (to address construct validity). 
- The search for patterns across multiple case studies and over time 
(for internal validity). 
- Replication across multiple case studies (to explore external 
validity). 
- Development of a case study database and thorough procedures 
for data collection and recording (to address issues of reliability). 
 
Two further characteristics of case study research are relevant to this work.  
 
- Case studies can effectively combine both qualitative and 
quantitative data and analysis. 
- Case study research can be based either on a single case, or on 
multiple studies. 
 
It should be stressed that the choice between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is not the same as the choice between positivist and 
conventionalist philosophies. As Donald Campbell’s introduction to Yin’s 
(1994) book points out, the author’s philosophy is firmly rooted in the 
approach and disciplines of the natural sciences, yet he is a strong advocate 
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of the use of both qualitative and quantitative information to provide 
triangulation of information and analysis within a case-based programme. 
 
A case-based approach has been selected for this research, therefore, not 
only because of its appropriateness in terms of exploring “rich” and “thick” 
data in the context of a specific, and possibly complex, real life situation, but 
because it also conforms to the philosophical stance suitable for the context 
and aims of this research. The case-based approach has also already been 
considered at length as an appropriate form of research in the field of 
logistics. However, it has been recognised that careful consideration needs to 
be given to a number of elements of the design process to ensure that the 
findings can be subjected to tests of academic rigour. 
 
5.3 Case Design 
 
Yin (2003) describes good research design as the logic that links the data to 
be collected to the initial questions under investigation. This logic can be 
further developed into five components: 
 
- Clear definition of the “how” or “why” question on which the 
research is founded. 
- Propositions, or hypotheses, which develop the base question into 
possible cause and effect relationships in areas for specific 
examination in the study. 
- The question should make the unit of analysis (firm, group of firms, 
physical phenomenon) clear: if not, the question is probably too 
vague. Given that it is possible to have both main and embedded 
units of analysis, consideration must be given to the limits of the unit 
of analysis, in particular distinguishing those units of data collection 
which are within the unit of analysis (the immediate topic) from 
those which are outside (the context). Specific time boundaries are 
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needed and units of analysis should not be idiosyncratic when 
compared to the existing literature. 
- There must be a clear logic linking the data to be collected to the 
propositions or hypotheses. 
- Criteria for interpreting the findings should be set out at the design 
stage. 
 
The last two of Yin’s points on research design can be addressed through the 
rigourous preparation of what Yin refers to as a case study protocol. In fact, 
such a protocol is considered essential in multiple case studies, to ensure 
consistency and reliability. The protocol could, therefore, be regarded as 
evidence of having completed the five stages of the case study design and 
should include at least the following: 
 
- Overview of the project (objectives, letter of introduction, auspices, 
case study issues and relevant readings). 
- Field procedures (credentials, access to “sites”, sources of 
information, procedural reminders – schedule, workspace, 
assistance). 
- Case study questions (questions to be kept in mind during data 
collection, “table shells” (column and row headings for data tables) 
for arrays of data and potential information sources for each 
question). These are questions aimed at the researcher, not the 
informants. Questions are on 5 levels: specific interviewees (1), 
individual case (2), patterns across multiple cases (3), entire study 
(4), recommendations and conclusions beyond the study (5).  
- Guide for the case study report (target audience, outline, format, 
use of other information, bibliographical information). 
 
In this model, theory is clearly developed before data collection, unlike 
ethnography or grounded theory. Theory development prior to data collection 
is essential, to inform the five stages of case study design. Even in exploratory 
case studies, where there is no existing theory, it is essential to define what is 
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to be explored, the purpose of the exploration and the criteria by which the 
exploration will be judged successful. 
 
This methodological model is reinforced by Mentzer and Kahn (1995), who 
describe a path through the validation of ideas through metric-based 
observation, through the testing of the managerial values and motivations 
which underpin observed actions, to the formulation of a model which 
connects environmental (market) causes with predicted outcomes. The 
dominant paradigm in logistics is that of functionalism / positivism and it is 
from such a position that this research is approached. Reality is not only 
observable and describable, but can be explained on the basis of 
relationships between defined causes and effects (Skjoett – Larsen, 1999). 
 
Thus, even when considering behavioural issues, the logistics paradigm tends 
towards the literature that describes scientific models for the prediction of 
behaviour and values within management. Examples include Porter (1985) on 
competition, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) or Schein (1992) on culture and, 
latterly, the application of the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Skjoett-Larsen, 1999). 
 
On the other hand, the interpretivist perspective would be that reality, in this 
case managerial actions and decisions, is the product of its inhabitants 
(Blaikie, 1993). The framework within which individuals interpret their own 
thoughts, feelings and actions needs to be understood in order to understand 
behaviour (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). However, because of its 
functionalism, the effects of managerial actions in the field of logistics can be 
measured objectively. Because findings are generally considered to be value-
free, time-free and independent of context (Mentzer & Kahn, 1995), the 
subtleties and nuances of managerial values are thus considered to be of 
limited relevance. 
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5.3.1 Multiple Cases 
Having established the appropriateness and validity of a case-based 
approach to research, Yin (1994) suggests that there are two further key 
decisions to be made prior to the detailed planning process. These are the 
choices between single and multiple cases, and between holistic and 
embedded cases. 
 
Yin suggests three sets of circumstances under which a single-case approach 
would be appropriate. These are described as “critical” cases, “extreme or 
unique” cases and “revelatory” cases. A critical case is analogous to a critical 
experiment in the natural sciences: that is a case in which a well-formulated 
theory has specified a clear set of propositions as well as the circumstances in 
which the propositions are believed to be true. An extreme or unique case is 
one in which a set of circumstances or actions is so rare that any one 
individual case is worth analysing and documenting. A revelatory case is one 
in which a researcher has an opportunity to investigate and analyse a 
phenomenon or context which has been previously inaccessible to scientific 
enquiry. 
 
Research into the physical distribution function of competing retail firms does 
not conform to the models proposed for critical, extreme or unique or 
revelatory cases. No pre-existing theory appears to explain attitudes to the 
inter-relationship between cost efficiency and competitive advantage in the 
distribution function. The environment and behaviour of the firms in this sector 
is by no means extreme or unique and the context has been accessible to 
research in the past. For these reasons, a single-case approach to this 
research has been dismissed in favour of multiple cases. 
 
The choice between holistic and embedded case studies hinges on the 
definition of the unit of analysis. Within an individual firm or specific 
phenomenon under investigation, it may be that there are several separate 
units of analysis, understanding of each of which separately can contribute to 
the richness and integrity of the overall picture. However, this particular piece 
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of research considers the phenomenon of collaboration or co-opetition in 
single situations but with multiple participants and thus a holistic approach is 
considered appropriate. Within a 2 x 2 matrix proposed by Yin (1994), this 
research project is, therefore, classed as a “Type 3” case study: multiple 
cases with a single unit of analysis in each case, as in the following figure. 
Figure 18: Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies; Source COSMOS Corporation in 
Yin (1994) 
 
Further advantages of a multiple-case approach include the fact that such 
designs tend to be seen as more robust and the evidence more compelling 
than single case designs. Multiple cases also allow for the exploration of 
validity, externally , internally and in terms of the constructs used. 
Triangulation between cases may also help to satisfy the criteria of academic 
rigour. The disadvantages of such an approach can be loss of focus and the 
additional time and resources potentially required for the research process.  
 
Having established the rationale for a multiple-case approach, Yin suggests 
one further choice that the researcher needs to make in refining the design of 
the process, that of replication. Replication is contrasted with “sampling” logic, 
the latter being concerned with achieving an operational enumeration of the 
entire universe of potential respondents and then using a statistical model to 
identify a specific sub-set of respondents which can be argued are 
representative of the wider pool. This technique is appropriate in the use of 
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surveys, but not in a case-based approach. Any conclusions drawn from case 
studies are not assumed to be generalisable to the universe, but rather seek 
to achieve some commonality across specific contexts, or “replication”. 
 
The researcher has a choice between literal replication, where each case 
produces similar results, thus reinforcing a common regularity across a 
breadth of contexts and theoretical replication, which produces contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons. Whichever form of replication is 
envisaged, it is important that the design reflects the ways in which a 
theoretical framework can be used to translate the results into a form which 
will allow them to be generalised into as broad a context as possible. Yin 
suggests that a minimum of six cases should be used in order to achieve 
theoretical replication. However, in order to consider the cases in sufficient 
depth to provide a rich and “thick” picture, perhaps only three or four cases 
can be examined, because of the issues of time, resource and the specific 
context to be researched and therefore literal replication is sought. 
 
However many cases are selected, it must be remembered that the aim is not 
to achieve any kind of generalisation though “sampling” (where a sample is 
assumed to represent a population, as in a survey) but for replication. Each 
case should be selected so that it either predicts similar results or contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication).  
 
In this project, a single case approach is not appropriate as the case would 
not represent a critical test of theory, a rare or unique circumstance, a 
representative case and would not be revelatory or longitudinal. Multiple case 
studies are more compelling and robust.  
 
5.4 Research Framework 
 
This research attempts to explore the boundaries for the application of a new 
managerial paradigm (Efficient Consumer Response) and the extent to which 
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normative theories (that cross-channel co-operation is beneficial to the market 
as a whole) are constrained by other factors. In this case, the constraining 
factor is the attitude of companies to competition. As discussed, the logistics 
literature is largely, if not wholly, based in the positivist paradigm. Supply 
chain, logistics and, specifically, physical distribution management decisions 
are based on measurable outputs of cost. Within this paradigm, therefore, the 
philosophical approach of this research is that decisions and actions, whilst 
based on economic arguments, are subject to influence by social constructs. 
However, whilst realist in this sense, the researcher sits outside the research 
setting in order to observe the rationale for outcomes in an objective manner. 
 
The flow of the research is based on the framework model proposed by 
Mentzer & Kahn (1995) and is set out in the following figure: 
Figure 19: A Framework of Logistics Research: Mentzer & Kahn, 1995 
 
The process begins with the generation of ideas, which can be driven by a 
review of literature, or by observation of a context, or both. Whilst ideas may 
be generated intuitively, it is suggested that it is important that these ideas are 
grounded in a historical perspective and in the context of other research 
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efforts in the same area. Whilst the purpose of a review of literature is to 
generate hypotheses, observation should be used to establish general 
principles or a priori constructs. Mentzer and Kahn also confirm that case 
studies are a particularly useful tool in the process of observation and thus the 
generation of ideas. Having substantiated the basis for the research, theories 
and hypotheses are generated. 
 
Based on a review of the marketing literature, a theory is defined by Mentzer 
and Kahn as: 
 
- a systematically related set of statements, including some law-like 
generalisations, that are empirically testable. 
 
Whereas hypotheses are defined as: 
 
- propositions that assert a relationship between facts. 
 
The difference between the two definitions is exemplified thus: a theoretical 
proposition might be made that “customer service is a phenomenon of what 
the customer perceives they are receiving”. A related descriptive hypothesis 
might be that “there is a positive relationship between the amount customer 
perceived logistics performance exceeds expectation and customer perceived 
logistics service quality”. A related causal hypothesis might be “the more 
customer perceived logistics performance exceeds expectations, the greater 
the customer perceived logistics service quality”.  In short, hypotheses are 
described by Mentzer and Kahn as “empirically testable statements about 
non-observable constructs”. 
 
Thus the “theories” and “hypotheses” of Mentzer and Kahn accord with the 
“questions” and “propositions” which Yin asserts are the basis of good case 
study research. 
 
To summarise, before moving on to consider the details of the design used: 
from a realist philosophical stance, it is believed that qualitative research 
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methods will reveal an organisational logic which explains certain behaviour in 
a specific operational context. It is proposed that this data will be collected 
and analysed through a multiple case study approach, in which literal 
replication is sought. 
 
It is important to note that case study design is not necessarily completed at 
the outset of the study, but rather it can be revised and altered in the light of 
experience gained at the various stages of the research, but only in stringent 
circumstances. In other words, the researcher should guard against shifting 
the theoretical concerns or objectives, whilst recognising that the research 
process may reveal inadequacies in the research design itself.  
 
Following a review of the literature on case study design, this idea has been 
developed into the preparation of a case protocol, including propositions and 
tentative data codes. 
 
Theory development prior to data collection is essential, to inform the five 
stages of case study design. From a review of the literature, the following 
hypothesis was developed: given that there is no competitive advantage 
derived from parallel and homogenous physical distribution systems and 
therefore horizontal collaboration between competitors in parallel supply 
chains should be commercially and operationally attractive, enablers and 
inhibitors must exist to explain the existence (or otherwise) and success of 
such collaborations. 
 
Given the paucity of literature available in this area, it is necessary to conduct 
exploratory research with a number of participants to postulate a set of 
proposed enablers and inhibitors. These will then be tested in more structured 
case studies to try and develop an understanding of their relevance in a 
number of physical distribution and logistics contexts and environments. 
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5.5 Some limitations on the case study design 
 
The operational context selected for this research, although significant in turns 
of its market size and operational visibility, is relatively narrow. Previous 
chapters have demonstrated the validity of the chosen field for research into 
the phenomenon of interest, but have also demonstrated that, by definition, 
the overall sample size in terms of numbers of organisations involved is small 
and, within those organisations, the number of potential respondents is likely 
to be small. This constrains both the number of cases to be included in the 
research design and also limits the potential number of interviews which can 
be conducted within each case. However, the context has been deliberately 
chosen and justified as being an appropriate area for the exploration of 
possible collaboration, or absence of it under circumstances which would 
appear to justify it. The research is seen as exploratory and therefore the 
small number of potential cases and the limited number of respondents which 
might be available within each case are defensible.  
 
As Voss, Tsikritis and Frohlich (2002) note: 
 
- Case research had consistently been one of the most powerful 
research methods in operations management, particularly in the 
development of new theory. 
- For a given set of available resources, the fewer the case studies, 
the greater the opportunity for depth of observation 
- It is important that case research is conducted and published 
because it is not only good at investigating how and why questions, 
but also it is particularly suitable for developing new theory and 
ideas and can also be used for theory testing and refinement. 
 
The research is designed around three cases: 
 
- The first exploratory case in the UK supermarket grocery sector, 
from the premise that both historical trends and events and ECR 
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initiatives suggest that logistics collaboration is not only possible but 
desirable, but is actually not being implemented in practice. This 
case seeks to explore the existence and influence of organisational 
and environmental factors which inhibit collaboration 
- Two further cases exploring instances where collaborative 
operations have been implemented, to explore the existence and 
influence of enabling factors and their relationship and interaction 
with the perceived inhibiting factors. The first of these cases was an 
example of an urban transport consolidation operation, in which a 
number of apparently competing retailers are sharing a distribution 
system to deliver their goods to stores in the centre of Bristol. The 
second of these collaborative cases is the joint distribution 
operation shared by two competing UK brewers, under the 
Tradeteam brand. 
 
Because of detailed knowledge of these operational contexts and the people 
active within them, contacts were, to a large extent, identified 
opportunistically. This carries with it the risk, of course, that existing 
relationships with these respondents may, to some extent, get in the way of or 
influence the direction of the research and its outcomes. This threat is dealt 
with in a number of ways: 
 
- Through triangulation of responses from a single firm wherever 
possible. 
- By repeating interviews with individual respondents over a period of 
time wherever possible, to check for consistency. 
- In the first case, where the relationships with the respondents was 
closed and which therefore possibly carried the greatest risk of 
prejudice, by inviting respondents from several firms to meet 
together to allow the “new” interactions between them to expose 
issues around the relationships, perceptions and organisational 
behaviours. 
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- By recognising that researcher prejudice was potentially an issue 
from the outset and including review of this issue within the process 
of reflection contained within the iterative analysis of the data. 
 
It is also worth noting that, even if the availability of opportunistic contacts had 
been ignored and that formal representation for contacts had been made from 
scratch through “suitable channels”, there is every chance that the result, in 
terms of contact with certain named individuals, would have been the same. 
These individuals were in the right areas, with the right levels of seniority, to 
have a clear understanding of what the business was doing and where it was 
going, as well as having the power and authority necessary to be involved in, 
if not actually influencing, outcomes. 
 
Having noted that the potential number of respondents was small, the cases 
consisted of ten, eight and four interviews respectively. In the major retailer 
case, these ten interviews were supplemented by the joint “seminar” as well 
as countless background site visits and operational discussions, which whilst 
contributing to the depth of contextual knowledge, were not treated as formal 
data within the context of the research. The interviews in the second case 
included not only the retailers, but also the contractor operating the system 
and the public body (Bristol City Council) which had facilitated its inception. 
The third case also included the operating contractor as well as the 
manufacturer participants. It is worth noting, too, that all of the interviews were 
relatively long. Although not managed to a particular timetable and only semi-
structured in terms of content, they all ran for over 90 minutes and, in the case 
of the joint seminar interview, for over two hours. All of these interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed verbatim, with the transcript passed back to the 
respondents for checking for errors or possible “censorship” in the event of 
later regret about something which had been said. This last offer was not 
actually taken up by any of the contacts.  
 
Whilst the cases themselves were being conducted, interviews were also 
conducted with peripheral sources, including for example, the author who had 
written the two articles which prompted interest in the research topic in the 
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first place. A discussion with Phil Whiteoak (Whiteoak, 1994 and 1999) gave 
the opportunity to test understanding of what he was proposing, as well as 
giving insight into drivers for that proposition and his knowledge of reactions to 
the articles and any possible subsequent effect on the sector and operational 
developments therein. The academic community generally was supportive 
and appeared to demonstrate not only an interest in the research topic, but 
also in its potential contribution to the field. The Logistics Research Network’s 
annual conference was a particularly useful forum for sharing ideas and 
progress from the research, as well as gaining valuable feedback from other 
academics with experience in the field (Stephens, 1999 and 2001). 
 
Deep and detailed contextual knowledge is also the rationale underpinning 
the decision to code the collected data manually which in turn explains why 
the conceptual framework was operationalised into a relatively small number 
of codes, on the advice of other researchers and academics who had also 
applied this approach. The data was manually coded and reduced through an 
iterative process of distillation, which is described in more detail in the 
following chapter on the first case. As noted above, the full interview 
transcripts were substantial in length and thus the manual coding process was 
designed deliberately to be as straightforward as possible to achieve quick 
progress in the first distillation, to get the amount of data down to a meaningful 
amount to facilitate adequate reflection and subsequent pattern coding. 
 
This research was intended to be exploratory from the start. As has already 
been stated, little has been written about horizontal collaboration in logistics 
and there are few applications of its implementation. This research and its 
conclusions are intended to be set out as a tentative proposition which might 
yet grow into something more substantial and significant through further 
research by others.  
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5.6 Case Protocol – operationalising the research 
The introductory review of the environmental context at the heart of the 
research led to the setting out of three propositions, which suggested that 
collaboration in logistics is a logical development in that physical distribution 
innovation affords, at best, competitive advantage in the short term only. 
However, in spite of the logic of this argument, there are few examples of 
collaboration in this field. The key gap in knowledge is the explanation of why 
this should be. Exploratory research in the UK grocery market suggested that 
possible influencing factors might include maturity of systems, distance of an 
activity from the end consumer, perceptions of quality and strength relative to 
competitors, external environmental pressures or threats, ease of 
measurement and parity of benefits, and the relative level of activity of third 
party contractors in a particular market. 
 
These influences were set out in a simple framework at the end of the 
introductory chapter and, on the basis of the exploratory research in the 
grocery sector, have been used as the basis to develop tentative codes, which 
are discussed at greater length in the section on the grocery retailing case 
study. 
 
5.6.1 Unit of Analysis 
In all three cases, the unit of analysis is the firms or other stakeholders who 
have either actively participated in a collaboration or who might reasonably 
have been expected to participate in a collaboration which has not actually 
taken place. More specifically, in cases of co-opetition this will be the 
stakeholders within a defined operational example, whereas in contrasting 
cases, where co-opetition has not been implemented, this will be the 
individual firm or firms who have elected not to exploit opportunities for 
collaboration. In cases where co-opetition can be seen to have been 
implemented or favoured, the stakeholder parties (facilitators, contractors, 
retailers) are regarded as units of data collection within the single unit of 
analysis. 
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5.6.2 Link between propositions and data to be collected 
(Context) What are the competitive and commercial relationships between the 
stakeholders in the (real or potential) collaboration or in the field in which 
potential collaboration can be seen not to have occurred? 
(1) What was / is the structure of the logistics system before and during the 
collaboration and what were / are the key performance indicators? 
(2) What is the stakeholders’ analysis of future strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats in the context of the impact of logistics system on 
future business development? 
(3) How have relevant logistics systems developed in the last 10 years and 
what further development plans are predicted? 
(4) Who are the key stakeholders and what is the matrix of relationships: 
competitive, co-operative, co-existence, facilitation, customer / supplier? 
(5) What were / are the financial arrangements prior to and during the 
collaboration (factory gate, open / closed book, subsidies etc)? 
  
5.6.3 Generalisation / Replication 
The protocol for this case research has been developed to facilitate replication 
in further studies. Because of the limited numbers of relevant cases available 
for study in the UK retail market, it is intended to study three cases: literal 
replication will be sought across two examples of collaboration, with 
theoretical replication sought in an environment where potential collaboration 
has not been pursued. The case study design will be reviewed after the 
completion of the first case, with the theory, propositions and design 
developed if necessary. 
 
5.6.4 Research instruments 
The main tool used to collect data was the semi-structured interview. Having 
arranged time with willing respondents, a separate list of initial questions or 
topics was prepared for each case. These were not necessarily dealt with 
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sequentially or verbatim, but were used as a check-list during the informal 
discussions to ensure that all relevant areas of research had been adequately 
dealt with. Any omissions or other areas inadequately addressed could then 
be subject either to further or deeper probing within that interview or covered 
again at a later interview.  
 
The base question / topic list for the first case study was written based on 
observations of the (then) current behaviours of the main firms operating in 
the sector: 
 
1a) Does the retailer consider its physical distribution systems to be better or 
worse than those of the other (named) major retailers? 
1b) To what extent does the physical distribution system contribute to 
competitive advantage? 
1c) Would competitive advantage be compromised by the sharing of 
distribution resources with competing retailers? 
1d) Would the sharing of such resources be counter to the retailer’s strategy 
and culture? 
1e) What benefits do you believe might arise from the sharing of distribution 
resources? 
1f) Are there any possible benefits beyond the financial ones? 
1g) What are the main barriers to resource sharing? 
1h) What might the main enablers or facilitators to resource sharing be? 
2a) Bearing in mind the previous definition of physical distribution, which 
excluded any activities paid for by manufacturers, do you currently operate 
any part of your distribution systems on a shared basis with another retailer? 
2b) Have you identified any opportunities for potential sharing of resources? 
2c) If so, specifically which types of resource would be involved? 
2d) Have any discussions take place with other retailers about resource 
sharing? 
2e) If not, who do you think is most likely to initiate such discussions? 
 
For the second and third cases, where some form of horizontal collaboration 
was already in place, the list of topics to be covered was derived from 
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previous case study research into instances of the implementation of vertical 
supply chain integration within the context of ECR (Frankel, Goldsby and 
Whipple, 2002). 
 
1. Please provide some background concerning how your relationship with 
(insert collaborating company name) began. Also please discuss how the 
relationship has evolved over time. 
2. Discuss how the decision to move to a collaborative relationship with this 
company occurred (eg Who approached whom? Where did you start? Why? 
What prompted this decision?) 
3. At what level in the company was the approval to move forward given? 
Who else was involved in the initial decisions / implementation plans? 
4. What was the implementation process? Did you have a formalised plan or a 
trial by error approach? 
5. What type of information is shared in order to accomplish this programme 
(probe for strategic versus operational information) and how is the information 
shared (eg paper, EDI, common systems)? 
6. How formalised is this relationship? Is there a written contract? Does the 
contract contain provisions for performance measurement and evaluation, 
roles and responsibilities, termination, sharing and distribution of cost 
savings? If a contract exists, how important is the actual written contract in 
comparison to the relationship? 
7. What were the initial barriers or problems when you first began this 
programme with the collaborator? How did you overcome these barriers? 
8. What are the current barriers? 
9. What are the plans for continuous improvement? What other improvement 
ideas have come from this relationship? 
10. What are the key benefits of this relationship? 
11. If available, do you have actual measured performance improvements (eg 
inventory turns, levels of inventory, number of stockouts, sales, costs, 
quality)? 
12. How has this relationship made both you and the collaborative company 
more competitive? Have you benchmarked this relationship against others in 
the industry? 
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13. What criteria are necessary to keep this relationship / programme 
successful? 
14. In hindsight, what could have made this relationship / programme better or 
have provided results quicker? 
15. What systems would you like to see implemented to measure the 
performance and effectiveness of this relationship? What is missing? 
 
Some of these questions turned out to be more useful than others: for 
example, whilst some of the retailers in the second (Broadmead) case study 
understood the concept of bench-marking (question 12), they did not perceive 
this as being relevant to their own operations. Nonetheless, the list was 
maintained as an aide memoir to ensure a consistent approach to the content 
of all associated interviews.  
 
5.7 Methodology – Conclusion 
 
Any researcher brings prejudices to their work. In the case of this project, 
these prejudices included predicted outcomes for the research as well as 
unchallenged assumptions regarding methodological preferences and 
relevance. Whilst such prejudices cannot be completely neutralised, a 
rigourous process of review of available options and rationalisation of choices 
has identified that case research will provide a rich and useful insight into the 
research topic. The nature of the subject and context are such that other 
possible tools, particularly large scale surveys or experiments, are 
inappropriate. Because of its relative sophistication and maturity compared 
with other industry sectors, retail logistics in the UK can be considered as a 
significant area in which to address the “how” and “why” questions implicit in 
the research interest. In this respect, this work is not aimed to be conclusive 
but aims to make a contribution by building theory which might then be tested 
and developed by others subsequently. Thus a relatively small number of 
interviews in a small number of cases is intended to provide a depth, rather 
than breadth, of understanding and is certainly not intended to represent a 
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generalisable “truth”. Properly constituted case research, couched within the 
guidelines and safeguards previously discussed in this chapter affords an 
appropriate tool for achieving a meaningful level of coverage in a significant 
research environment.   
 135
6 Exploratory research with three UK food 
retailers 
 
The three basic propositions set out in the introduction can be summarised as 
saying that physical distribution does not contribute to competitive advantage. 
This gives rise to the gap in knowledge, which is to explain why, given the 
arguments in favour of horizontal collaboration, there are few if any practical 
examples of application. This in turn led to the development of six hypotheses, 
which sought to establish whether the presence or absence of certain 
conditions or external factors would explain the absence of applications and, 
perhaps, predict under what conditions such collaboration might take place. 
These hypotheses were developed into a contextual framework, set out in 
figure 9 in chapter one. This attempts to show how four internal factors or 
perceptions interact with each other and with two sets of external influences. 
One of the internal factors is described as having two dimensions, giving a 
total of seven initial groupings for the collection and analysis of data. 
 
Following the initial exploratory research into the UK grocery context, a 
number of “shorthand” phrases were suggested as indicators of some of the 
themes which might emerge from the data in connection with the hypotheses. 
These initial themes also formed the basis of a published article describing the 
outcomes of the initial phases of the project (Stephens & Wright, 2002). 
Briefly, these “shorthand” themes included customer orientation, in terms of 
the price / service positioning and distance of a supply chain activity from the 
end consumer, perceptions of a firm’s quality and strength relative to that of its 
competitors, the presence of active contractors in the market and the 
influence and extent of external or environmental pressures and threats. 
These factors and the extent to which they appear to be relevant to the 
research are all discussed in more detail in this chapter.  
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As recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994), the suggested framework 
and emergent influencing themes were used to develop a tentative set of data 
codes for the analysis of subsequent data.  
 
6.1 Explanation of categories, characteristics and 
possible data codes 
 
The provisional table of codes and a graphical representation of the code 
hierarchy are set out in the figure and table below. 
 
Figure 20: Hierarchical structure of tentative data codes 
 
Categories 
External Internal 
Make or buy Importance of PD Strength Quality Customer impact 
Cost / service 
Distance 
Environmental
Resources 
Legislative Contractors 
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Category Code Description 
Customer impact Distance – 1.1 DIST Distance, either 
physical or by echelon, 
of a supply chain 
activity from the end 
consumer 
 Cost / service – 1.2 
SERV 
Extent to which costs 
are compromised to 
satisfy store / customer 
demands 
Quality Perceived quality of 
logistics system relative 
to competitors – 2. 0 
QUAL 
Extent to which a firm 
perceives itself to be 
better / worse than the 
competition in terms of 
cost and / or service.  
Potential for equal gain 
or loss arising from 
collaboration. 
Strength Perceived market 
strength relative to 
competitors – 3.0 
STREN 
Attack / defence 
positions in respect to 
named competitors and 
growth targets 
Importance of 
physical 
distribution (PD) 
Extent to which PD 
systems contribute to 
competitiveness – 4.0 
VALU 
Extent to which PD is 
regarded as integral to 
the customer offering 
and differentiated from 
competition 
Make or buy Use of contractors – 5.0 
CONT 
Use of “white trucks” 
and other technologies 
to pursue integration 
synergies 
Environmental Legislative or social 
pressures to reduce 
environmental impact or 
other external pressures 
– 6.0 ENV 
Degree of perceived 
threat from empty 
running, road tolling, 
curfews, resource 
shortages, market 
forces 
 
 
Table 9: Provisional table of coding categories 
 
The influencing factors can be considered in more detail in six categories. 
 
 138
6.1.1 1. Impact on Customers 
The traditional strategic trade-off between cost and service has been 
discussed, together with the ways in which this model of basic strategic choice 
has been superseded. However, even in more complex models, improved 
performance still tends to be measured in terms of lower cost, greater 
efficiency or improved customer offering. In general, improvements in any of 
these dimensions would be viewed as a good thing, but there may be 
circumstances under which a firm would sub-optimise one dimension in favour 
of another. So, for example, a firm might still choose to ignore a compelling 
financial opportunity in order to optimise service. In the grocery distribution 
context, this might be, for example, a policy of always adhering to a delivery 
schedule to suit the needs of store managers, even when an alternative 
schedule might offer lower cost. In other words, the retail trading floor is 
deemed as the main driver of the business and everything else is subservient 
to this. This might be one possible reason why retailers might ignore 
opportunities for efficiency and cost improvements through collaboration, as 
possibly having a detrimental effect on service to stores.  
 
A second characteristic with a potential impact on customer positioning is the 
extent to which supply chain activities are visible to the end consumer. Whilst 
vehicles making deliveries to stores in the High Street may be highly visible 
and provide an opportunity for direct advertising of the firm’s offering, more 
upstream activities, such as primary transport, consolidation or unitization may 
be not only invisible to consumers, but also of very little interest. This might 
give rise to the proposition that the visible downstream activities might provide 
some kind of positioning opportunity which might carry competitive advantage, 
while the upstream activities do not and are thus more appropriate for non-
competitive collaboration. Examples of activities carried out at this “distance” 
have been identified in several industry contexts, particularly in Sweden 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). 
 
1.1 DIST  Distance of a supply chain activity from the end consumer 
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1.2 SERV  References to required service levels to stores or 
consumers 
 
6.1.2 2. Perceptions of quality of each firm’s own systems 
relative to competitors (Own quality) 
It is not within the scope of this research to attempt to benchmark the 
distribution systems of retail firms against each other, although some use is 
made of secondary data to establish that there is approximate parity of scale 
and sophistication of systems. However, it is likely that, even in the absence 
of such objective data, firms will have a perception as to whether their 
systems are better or worse than those of their nearest direct competitors. 
This may be important in the sense that a firm might be more likely to 
collaborate with an “equal”: in other words, a partner who had no more nor no 
less to gain from the potential relationship. Perceptions of quality relative to 
competitors might thus be important in determining attitudes to collaboration. 
 
2.0 QUAL  Perceived quality / efficiency of logistics systems 
 
6.1.3 3. Perceptions of each firm’s own competitive strength 
relative to competitors (Own strength) 
A development of the above point about quality might be that, even if a firm 
perceives that its systems might be comparable to those of a competitor, it 
would still be unable to develop a collaborative arrangement because its over-
arching competitive strategy might be to take market share from that 
competitor or, at the extreme, look to take it out of the market or take it over. 
Where competitors have very similar market shares, the quest for a single 
percentage point gain over the nearest rival might make any form of 
collaboration completely unpalatable to management. Paradoxically, the 
notion that firms with very different market shares might be more inclined to 
collaborate could be odds with the notion of “equal gains” implicit in category 2 
above. Tentative codes: 
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3.0 STREN Aggression towards other parties in the relationship / 
marketplace 
 
6.1.4 4. Perceptions of contribution of logistics to 
competitiveness (PD Contribution) 
Although the UK grocery industry has been selected on the basis that there 
ought to be approximate parity of systems and costs between competitors, it 
is still possible that individual firms might believe that their systems still offer 
something different which has yet to be copied or adopted by the competitors. 
This point complements category 1 above, in terms of trying to identify factors 
which might explain why a firm thinks its systems are better or worse than 
those of other firms: 
 
4.0 VALU Value added to the retail offering by the distribution function 
 
6.1.5 5. Make or buy: Attitudes to use of contractors vs in-
house operations (Brokers) 
The theory of transaction cost economics provides one theory for the 
presence of third party contractors in the UK grocery distribution market, 
although there are other more prosaic explanations, as discussed in the 
introductory section. Although the use of contractors has been seen to be 
widespread, it has generally been about the out-sourcing of stand-alone 
operations, such as a warehouse or transport network dedicated to a single 
network. As has been pointed out, Whiteoak (1999) sees a developing role for 
contractors as the “glue” to join up the operations of competing retailers. 
Potentially, this could be at the instigation of the contractor, who might 
conceivably seek synergy opportunities between competing stand-alone 
operations without passing the benefit back to the retailer. On the other hand, 
competing retailers might actively encourage contractors to fit complementary 
operations together, with a share of the benefits being passed back to them 
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5.0 CONT Examples of use of third party contractors in distribution 
operations 
 
6.1.6 6. Firm’s interpretation of importance and probability of 
external environmental factors (External drivers) 
As has been previously discussed, some distribution and logistics innovations 
have been the result of external influences, such as labour disputes, road 
congestion or pressure on shop floor space. Given parity of current costs and 
architectures, but no other impetus to change, it may be that further external 
factors may expedite the need for collaboration, because no single firm has 
the power or wherewithal to deal with them effectively on their own. 
 
6.0 ENV Environmental policies, legislation and constraints 
 
It should be stressed that these codes are deliberately tentative prior to the 
start of the exploratory research with grocery retailers and are likely to be 
developed and extended on the basis of the initial interviews.  
 
Figure 21: The dimensions of each data code may make it more probable that 
collaboration might take place. 
Possible 
collaboration Customer 
impact
Quality Strength 
Value of PD 
Environmental
Make / buy 
Probable
collaboration
External factors
Internal perceptions
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The relationship between the codes and the propositions can also be 
explained by considering the relative “dimension” of each code as a facilitator 
for collaboration. For example, the figure above shows how the arrows 
representing the variables extend different distances towards the centre of the 
chart: the length of the variable arrow is influenced by the external factors and 
internal perceptions. This length determines the extent to which collaboration 
might move from impossible, to possible to probable. The next figure 
illustrates how one of the variables (distance) might be operationalised. 
 
Likelihood of 
collaboration 
Proximity of supply 
chain activity from end 
user 
Physical distance from 
head office control 
Impossible Store delivery 1 mile 
Unlikely Secondary 
warehousing 
20 miles 
Possible Primary delivery 50 miles 
Probable Supplier consolidation 100 miles 
Highly likely Load unitisation 500 miles 
Highly likely Product coding 1,000 miles 
 
 
Figure 22: Example of operationalisation of a data dimension: distance  
 
6.2 Entering the field 
 
The evolution of the physical distribution function as a major contributor to 
efficiency and cost reduction is evident in the UK grocery industry, where a 
common template for highly centralised systems has developed. However, 
innovations are easily copied and thus competitive advantage is only possible 
at the leading edge. As logistics initiatives in grocery have broadened into the 
umbrella of Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), it has been suggested that 
further efficiency gains will be made possible by cross-chain collaboration 
between competitors. This exploratory research seeks to understand the 
circumstances under which such “co-opetition” might be possible. UK grocery 
retailing, with apparent homogeneity of highly developed distribution systems 
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and evidence of significant vertical channel integration, ought to provide a 
context with rich potential for exploring opportunities for horizontal integration 
across supply chains. 
 
6.3 Exploratory phase – UK Food Retailers 
 
UK grocery retailing was identified as the context for the initial research for 
two reasons: 
 
- This sector is recognised as having been in the forefront of logistics 
developments and, as such, a standard model of best practice has 
been ubiquitously applied, potentially eroding the competitive 
advantage of physical distribution innovation. 
- The Efficient Consumer Response programme had already opened 
channels of dialogue between competitors in areas of potential 
shared gain. 
 
The key players in the UK food retail market, and the basic characteristics of 
their distribution systems and networks were discussed in chapter two. For the 
purposes of research into UK grocery logistics, the list of potential target 
organisations was narrowed down based on five parameters: national 
infrastructure, comprehensive range of foods, centralized distribution systems, 
turnover greater than £2 billion and adoption of current distribution best 
practices. 
 
On this basis, Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda, Safeway and Marks and Spencer were 
identified as potential target informants. As discussed earlier, of the other 
“majors”, Morrisons (prior to the acquisition of Safeway) was discounted as 
being too regionally-oriented and Somerfield was still in the throes of 
assimilating its recent Kwik Save acquisition.   
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Telephone contact was made directly with senior managers in the distribution 
or logistics functions in these firms and, having identified individuals who 
expressed some interest in the subject, this was followed up sending out a 
written summary of the research proposal and methodology. Representatives 
from three retailers expressed interest in taking part more or less immediately 
and a dialogue was opened, therefore, with representatives from Asda, Marks 
& Spencer and Safeway. In fact, as the research developed, managers from 
all three of these firms were able to identify other colleagues from within their 
organisations who were also able to be contacted and drawn into the 
research. Each of the contacts at these three firms was interviewed 
individually at least twice and then all three met together for a collective 
discussion. An initial contact was also identified at Tesco, but after one 
interview, the respondent declined to take any further part in the research for 
personal reasons, although they gave permission for the first interview to be 
used. Although not stated expressly, it seems likely that the Tesco respondent 
came under peer or managerial pressure not to take further part. Although 
contact was not attempted with Somerfield, a contact there became available 
much later in the research process, during the course of the third case study 
and a single interview was conducted with this respondent to triangulate the 
evidence gathered from the more in depth relationships with the other 
retailers. Because the Tesco and Somerfield interviews were conducted 
differently to the Asda, Marks & Spencer and Safeway interviews and are, 
therefore, possibly less reliable as insights into those organisations, the 
findings from these two interviews are discussed separately below. The 
smaller amount of data from Tesco and Somerfield is also evidenced in the 
gaps in the data displays against some of the code categories: no data on 
Somerfield’s attitudes towards distance from consumer or environmental 
issues, for example, was identified. No interested contacts were found at 
Sainsbury. 
 
Whilst the main data collection tool was the interview and later the collective 
interview or “seminar”, other data was collected as well. Most interviews were 
conducted on the retailers’ premises, either head office or distribution site, and 
there was thus opportunity to gather other materials, such as internal 
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publications, data from notice boards, minutes from meetings and external 
(financial) reports. Some of the visits also included site and facility tours, 
which provided insight into operating methodologies, as well as a richer 
understanding of the climate, culture and mood prevailing in the organisations 
at the time.  
 
6.4 Converting data into evidence 
 
All of the interviews, and the seminar, were tape recorded and manually 
transcribed. Although transcription is a laborious and time-consuming 
process, it has great value in giving the researcher the opportunity to reflect 
on the data collected in great detail. During transcription, the tape is listened 
to over and over again, giving time for the detail of the language used and the 
inferences made to emerge as the words are typed up. The type-written 
scripts were printed, read and re-read many times, to allow for further 
reflection. As well as data coding during these processes, notes and memos 
were then added to the script for further consideration and linking later on.  
 
Once an overview of the contents of each interview had been assimilated, an 
iterative process of “distillation” was employed to reduce the data and identify 
its key elements. Word processing functionality was used to identify and 
extract the key content from each full length interview into a shorter summary 
of main items. This summary was then again distilled and the process 
repeated until patterns among and between the key coded items could be 
discerned. An example of the scale of this would be take the 18,000 words 
which represented the long-hand transcription from a 90 minute interview and, 
after coding, reduce this to a 2,000 word summary, which in turn was 
eventually reduced to around 200 words of salient text, upon which the key 
themes and relationships can be marked up.  
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The process of data reduction and distillation from masses of long-hand 
transcription to a few key patterns representing the basic evidence can be 
represented as a pyramid, shown in figure 23 below. 
 
Before moving on to consideration of the findings revealed as the outputs of 
this analytical process, it is helpful to understand the context of each of the 
key firms under examination, through an exploration of their recent history, 
key business issues and standing in the market relative to the other players.  
 
Figure 23: The distillation process to reduce data to evidence 
 
6.4.1 Context M & S 
Although M & S’s UK food turnover was given as £3.16 billion in the 1998 IGD 
Retail Survey, this fell in 1999. Food sales were still believed to be around 
41% of total UK sales, so a more up-to-date food sales figure can be inferred 
from the annual published accounts of total sales. M & S traded through 289 
stores in 1999. The average store size is 38,000 square feet, although this 
includes non-food sales areas. 
 
Food throughput averaged 2,244,000 case per week, of which a full supplier 
breakdown has been provided. Of this figure, roughly a third is cold chain, 
about 5% frozen and the rest ambient grocery. Apart from a limited number of 
commodity bread lines, all products are handled through the central 
distribution network. This comprised seven sites for chill and ambient, and two 
for frozen. There was also a bonded warehouse for beers, wines and spirits, 
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but products from this store are then delivered through the depot network. All 
of the depots were operated by contractors, who own the sites and vehicles. 
 
All products were “picked to zero” each day, with no stock being held in the 
depots. Products were distributed in two waves per day: short-life products 
were delivered into depots during the afternoon and evening and delivered to 
store around 7 a.m. the following morning (AM cycle). Longer life products 
were delivered to depot in the morning and into store the same afternoon 
(evening vehicle, or EV cycle). There is a significant volume bias towards AM 
cycle, driven by the generally short shelf-life of M & S foods, which are 
marketed on the basis of their freshness. 
 
There were also believed to have been some small scale examples of co-
operation, both covert and overt. Some vehicles in the textiles fleet, for 
example, were painted in plain livery with no logos, to allow for work in non-M 
& S operations. Reference was also made to a facility for distribution of frozen 
foods, shared with Asda, as well as delivery journey integration with other 
retailers in more remote parts of the country. At the time of the initial 
interviews, discussions were also ongoing with a number of retailers about the 
possibility of sharing trains to import goods from mainland Europe. Also, 
although not a retailer-driven initiative, M & S were obviously aware of the 
joint venture between two of their contractors, Exel and Tibbett & Britten, who 
collaborated to set up Joint Retail Logistics (JRL) specifically to service M & S’ 
non-food, general merchandise operations. 
 
Marks and Spencer started life as a market stall in Leeds in 1884 and over the 
following 120 years became one of the most respected retailers in the world 
and central to the British shopping experience (Seth and Randall, 1999). From 
a base in clothing, M & S began to expand significantly into foods in the 
1930’s, developing a niche offering based on high-margin value-added items 
in the 1950’s and virtually creating the chilled prepared foods market in the 
1970’s and 1980’s. Food sales rose from £256 million in 1975 to over £3 
billion by 1998. Furthermore, this growth was based on a typical store range 
of 3,000 items (SKU’s) as opposed to the 30,000 SKU’s of the other grocers. 
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The foundations of M & S’ success were quality, value, innovation, supplier 
partnerships and commitment to all stakeholders – customers, shareholders, 
suppliers and staff (Seth and Randall, 1999). These foundations were 
manifested in the early adoption of efficient centralised distribution systems, 
particularly in the “cold chain”, supported by sophisticated IT systems. 
Therefore, although M & S have only ever achieved a market share of around 
3% of the total grocery market, their innovations in product ranges and 
operational systems have been highly influential and largely copied and 
adopted by other grocery retailers, to varying effect.  
 
However, their expansion overseas was less successful than that of, for 
example, Tesco. Ventures into Canada in 1972, Europe in 1975 and, later, the 
USA and the Far East were later unwound and by 2001, they had virtually 
retrenched to the UK (Burt et al, 2002). This was to avoid the international 
operations “undermining its UK stores any further” (Datamonitor, 2005). Other 
strategic idiosyncracies included the retention of a “Buy British” policy, 100% 
own-branding of goods and a reluctance to accept credit cards, other than its 
own store card, long after its competitors.  
 
However, the strategy was called into question following a downturn in sales 
in 1998, and, together with this, all of the factors which underpinned this 
strategy. In a sense, over the last five years, through the leaderships or 
Richard Greenbury, Pater Salsbury, Luc Vendervelde and Stuart Rose, there 
has been a focus on branding, marketing and range, with areas such as 
logistics relegated to a subsidiary role, with little contribution to make to the 
recovery of the company. This is typified by a quote from Garth Thorne, a 
senior supply chain manager at M & S in 1999 (Motor Transport, 4.3.99): 
“Why shouldn’t the big retailers work together to pool their resources?  The 
competitive edge is on the sales floor, not in the truck.” 
 
Writing in 1999, Gary Davies (Davies, 1999) suggested that the two 
conventional models used to explain the evolution of retail businesses, the 
“Wheel of Retailing” (Hollander, 1960) and the “retail accordion” (Hollander, 
1966), were both flawed, in that they would suggest that M & S should be 
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vulnerable to lower cost, lower priced or more focused retailers. At the time of 
writing, argues Davies, this was not the case, as evidenced by the long-term 
survival and success of M & S. Arguably, the years since 1999 suggest that 
the models were, after all, correct, and that the M & S clothes business could 
be attacked by, among others, Tesco, Asda and Next and the food business 
could be eroded by quality and innovation issues by all of the major multiples. 
 
During the course of this research, perceptions of M & S have changed. “In 
terms of performance, no British company can match them” (Peter Doyle, 
quoted in Seth and Randall, 1999) contrasts with “M & S is experiencing 
unprecedented troubles. The company has seen its sales stagnate, profits 
collapse and market share fall” (Mellahi, Jackson and Sparks, 2002). 
 
Three interviews were conducted with senior managers in M & S’ logistics 
during 1999 and 2000. In June 1999, just before the first interview, M & S 
reported the first large drop in profits (from £1.2 billion to £0.6 billion). By the 
time of the last interview, in July 2000, reported profits had halved again. 
Merriden (2000) notes that many M & S managers realised the “writing was on 
the wall” long before the 1999 results were published. In the first interview in 
August 1999, the respondent commented that food sales were probably 
already falling from the levels of the previous year. This interview contained 
several references to a climate of change and even mention of “a disastrous 
year”. Although, as mentioned above, whilst logistics was not central to the 
recovery plans, the trading results had an effect on the way in which new 
approaches might be taken to reduce logistics costs, including possible 
collaboration with other retailers. For example, when asked if competitive 
advantage might be compromised by sharing resources with a competitor, the 
first respondent replied: “Up until a year ago, I would have said ‘yes’. 
However, we have been through a period of radical change and I think we 
probably now feel that further advantages could only be gained by pooling”.  
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6.4.2 Context: Asda 
Asda Stores Ltd was founded in 1965, as a partnership between Yorkshire 
retail entrepreneur Peter Asquith, and Associated Dairies. Asquith had set up 
and sold one store in Pontefract, before opening another in a converted 
cinema in nearby Castleford. The partnership was formed by Asquith’s need 
to get funding for his expansion plans, which include the purchase of two 
existing UK stores from an American company, Gem International. This early 
partnership set the style of Asda for years to come in two ways: the two Gem 
stores (in Leeds and Nottingham) were several times the size of existing UK 
supermarkets and thus formed the basis of the development of the so-called 
superstore. Secondly, Asda continued to buy up unconventional properties, 
such as cinemas and abandoned mills, for conversion to stores, rather than 
looking for traditional High Street properties or getting locked into long term 
arrangements in shopping centres. The other fortuitous piece of timing for the 
start of the partnership was the abolition of Retail Price Maintenance by the 
Heath government in 1965. This paved the way for Asda’s two-strand 
approach: price discounting in store formats which were significantly larger 
than the current norm and away from the conventional High Street 
battleground. On this basis, expansion continued throughout the next 15 
years, with a take-over approach from Jack Cohen of Tesco rejected in the 
meantime (Seth & Randall, 1999).  
 
Asda’s straightforward strategy became somewhat diverted as a shortage of 
suitable retail sites and problems in getting planning permission led it to 
diversify into furniture. Not only did this distract management from their main 
strategic focus, it also led to financial difficulties. The makings of Asda’s near 
downfall in the 1980’s can be attributed to a number of factors. Shoppers were 
increasingly trading up, seeking an offering based on quality rather than price. 
On this basis, Asda’s reluctance to invest in own-label goods and better 
premises left it vulnerable to competitors such as Sainsbury. It had also failed 
to expand significantly away from its Yorkshire base into the relatively more 
affluent South East. Finally, the merger with MFI furniture stores in 1985 was 
unlikely to be justified by any real synergies, and merely compounded the 
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issue of lack of focus. The then chairman John Hardman took two significant 
decisions to turn events round in 1987. Firstly, Asda demerged from MFI and 
secondly, a long-term partnership was established with the ex-Next 
entrepreneur George Davies, to drive Asda’s expansion into clothing, which 
would sell alongside its food range. However, the expansion into the South 
East, the acquisition of 61 former Gateway stores from the newly-formed 
Isoscoles group and substantial investment in new centralised distribution 
systems, which were commissioned in 1989, drove Asda to the verge of 
bankruptcy (Walters, 1988).  
 
In 1991, Hardman was replaced as CEO by ex-McKinsey consultant, Archie 
Norman. Norman achieved two major successes: managing (and ultimately 
turning round) the City’s perception of Asda’s potential, and redefining Asda’s 
specific offering to consumers, based on price competitiveness and volume 
trading, allied with a good fresh food range and high efficiency. Having set the 
recovery process in motion, this was accelerated in 1995 by the “Breakout” 
strategy: an attempt to position Asda as the best value for money clothing and 
food store in Britain. Using the armoury of higher than average store sizes, the 
George (Davies) clothing range, people-based service - often combing craft 
skills such as bakery and butchery – and a “market hall” approach to store 
layout, Asda improved both market share and profitability throughout the rest 
of the 1990’s. The growth in scale demanded by the strategy drove Asda to 
consider a merger with Safeway in 1997, but this was abandoned as news of 
the exploratory talks leaked to the press. In 1999, as talks were underway with 
the Kingfisher group over a potential merger, US retailing giant Wal-Mart 
stepped in with a significantly higher bid and Asda became part of Wal-Mart’s 
strategy for expansion into Europe. The two companies have much in 
common, in terms of store size, range and service ethos. Each company had 
been studying the other from afar for years, and it remains to be seen which 
party will exert most influence over the other in terms of development and 
change (Seth & Randall, 1999).  
 
During the first year after the take-over, Wal-Mart pumped significant sums of 
money into promotional activity at Asda, whilst using key Asda management 
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to address operational and strategic issues in other acquisitions throughout 
Europe. Latterly, some of the Wal-Mart I.T. solutions, which were developed 
to facilitate the early implementation of ECR in the US, such as the “Retail 
Link” system, are being implemented in the UK. 
 
Asda is still run from Yorkshire, with its head office now situated on the banks 
of the Leeds and Liverpool Canal in central Leeds, a city that has undergone 
a parallel rejuvenation of its own in the last decade. Having pioneered the 
superstore format (that is, stores larger than 25,000 square feet) from the time 
of the acquisition of Gem in 1965, Asda has held true to this strategy and now 
operates 235 stores with an average size of over 40,000 square feet. Since, 
the Wal-Mart take-over, financial figures need to be extracted from the global 
accounts with care, but the current turnover is believed to be between £9.5 
and £10 billion, putting Asda firmly in the “Top 4” UK grocery chains, along 
with Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway, with a market share of perhaps 12% 
(Sources: interviews with Asda management). (Market shares are notoriously 
difficult to calculate, because of the difficulty in defining total market size. For 
example, the expansion of supermarkets into petrol and clothes, together with 
the appearance of foods in non-traditional retail environments, such as petrol 
forecourts, means that estimates of total grocery market size vary between 
£70 billion and nearly £100 billion).  
 
The strategic change process started by the “Breakout” campaign continues, 
with emphasis being placed on new ranges and personal and friendly selling 
styles. Asda’s initiatives in selling ready meals over the counter, rather than 
from refrigerated displays, started with the Curry Pot and extended into pizzas 
and Chinese ranges. That this style of presentation has now been imitated by 
virtually all of Asda’s competitors emphasises how innovative this was 
perceived as being. Asda’s desire to be seen as a serious operator in fresh 
and value-added foods was underlined by the opening of its first drive-through 
take-away food outlet, in Canterbury in 1998. 
 
In terms of physical distribution systems, Asda was one of the last major 
companies to adopt the central distribution model, with six composite RDC’s 
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all being opened more or less simultaneously in 1989. The higher than 
average size of Asda’s stores had allowed it to defer to move away from direct 
manufacturer-to-store deliveries for longer than most, and there had been 
other distractions during the 1980’s, as discussed above. The scale of this 
one-stage implementation - £200 million was spent on a total of nine sites 
around 1989 – was such that it contributed at least in part, to the financial 
problems faced in 1991. It could be argued that being a late adopter of the 
centralised model allowed Asda to learn from the lessons of others, although 
the depots were still built to traditional “composite” format, with room for stock 
as well as picking, even though the trend to eliminate stock from RDC’s was 
already well underway at the time of the opening of the Asda depots. Thus 
Asda’s sites, like many others, were ultimately the wrong shape for stock-less 
cross-docking operations, with too much height in relation to floor-space. To 
some extent, this has been addressed by the addition of mezzanine floors into 
most of the depots: Asda spent £16 million on alterations to depots in 1996, 
giving a claimed 30% increase in capacity.  
 
Once the new depot network had been settled down, Asda claimed a 10% 
reduction in distribution costs between 1994 and 1995, with a further 4% the 
following year. Having built the initial six central depots as composites, 
handling all temperature regimes, Asda started to move away from this in 
1999. As volumes conitnue to grow, rather than building new composites, 
Asda is building new depots adjacent or close to existing sites and separting 
the temperature regimes between the old and new buildings. The Bristol RDC, 
opened as a composite in 1989, became solely temperature-controlled in 
1999, with ambient goods moving to a new site across the River Severn in 
Chepstow. A new chilled facility in Wakefield, opened in 2000, allowed for the 
conversion of the original Wakefield depot to ambient goods only. This 
programme has continued with some of the other original sites (Source: Asda 
management interviews). 
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6.4.3 Context: Safeway 
The major retailer phase of this research was carried out prior to Morrisons’ 
acquisition of Safeway in 2004 and it is thus “old” Safeway, managed 
independently from Morrisons, which is considered here. 
 
Safeway had only existed in this form since 1987, when Argyll acquired the 
name and UK stores from the American chain of the same name, from which, 
however, it remained completely independent. Like Somerfield, Safeway was 
the result of acquisition and consolidation strategies in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
and can be seen to result from the integration of (at least) 14 or 15 separate 
grocery retailers, including Liptons, Presto, Lo-Cost and Cordon Bleu. The key 
stages of this consolidation were the merger of Allied Suppliers and James 
Gulliver Associates to form Argyll, which acquired Hintons to form Presto and 
eventually acquired the UK operations of Safeway. This chart also contrasts 
the growth through acquisition of Safeway and Somerfield, with the more 
organic growth of the other major retailers. Whilst Tesco has made some 
significant acquisitions, Asda and Sainsbury’s have made few and Marks & 
Spencer have made none (Seth & Randall, 1999).  
 
At the time of the research, Safeway had more or less completed the process 
of integrating the distribution systems of Safeway UK and Presto, acquired in 
1987. The rationale for the merger was to build scale, whilst combining the 
brand superiority of Safeway with the superior distribution systems of Presto, 
largely based on four purpose-built distribution centres, established after the 
purchase of the Hinton’s chain in 1984. The key elements of this integration 
were the rationalising of two separate distribution centre networks into one, 
with the closure of some depots and the opening of a new state-of-the-art 
centre at Bellshill in Scotland, and the implementation of Presto systems into 
the Safeway sites. These systems changes included moving Safeway from a 
“pick-by-store” methodology (in which order picking only commences after all 
stock has been received with a resulting short peak in activity) to Presto’s 
continuous stockless pick-by-line method and separating picking of faster 
moving lines from slower ones. On the other hand, the Safeway methodology 
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of distributing goods to stores on wooden pallets, rather than on metal roll 
cages, was extended into Presto. (Christensen 1990 and 1999). Significant 
changes were also introduced in transport management, with the Safeway 
practise of back-hauling suppliers’ products into the depot network on vehicles 
returning from store deliveries being rolled out into the Presto depots, and 
transport generally being more centrally managed as a network operation, 
rather than the depots being left to their own individual devices. 
 
In spite of the successful integration of the distribution systems and the 
enhancements developed, Safeway encountered problems with falling market 
share in the late 1990’s, with its branding generally perceived to be over-
priced. Problems were exacerbated by technical issues, including computer 
systems failure and generally poor on-shelf availability. Discussions with Asda 
about a possible takeover began in 1997, but stopped in 1999 when details 
were leaked to the press. However, rumours that Asda was still preparing a 
hostile bid were rife in 2000, at the time these interviews took place. In an 
attempt to turn the tide, an ex-Wal Mart CEO was drafted into the business in  
2000. Among the weapons used by Carlos de Priadez to try and recover 
ground were more regionally-based promotions and “guerrilla” promotional 
tactics, whereby local stores would be allowed to plan and execute their own 
local major promotions to target specific local competition. Both these tactics 
placed a degree of strain on Safeway’s distribution systems (Source: Safeway 
management interviews).  
 
6.5 Joint Retailer Seminar 
 
Having established a dialogue, together with an understanding of some of the 
key issues underpinning resource sharing, it was then proposed to the 
respondents that they (Asda, Safeway, M & S) should meet together, with a 
view to: 
 
- sharing the research findings to date, on a non-attributable basis 
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- identifying specific potential synergetic benefits identified as part of 
the comparative survey of current systems. 
- developing a framework for quantifying benefits which may accrue 
from these opportunities 
- developing a framework for discussion, planning, implementation 
and division of the accrued benefits. 
 
The proposed forum was a “seminar”, in the academic sense. As such, 
attendance was viewed as a contribution to the research process, rather than 
an opportunity to identify any specific opportunities for joint working with other 
retailers at that stage. 
 
The first aim of the meeting was to confirm base data on the structures of 
operations, derived from secondary data. Thereafter, the detailed content of 
the individual discussions was distilled down to four questions, or topics for 
discussion, which were then used as the framework for the joint meeting 
between the three firms. 
 
- How is it possible to define an “optimum” or “best” PD system: for 
example, is quality, service or price the defining characteristic? 
- What role, if any, does the logistics function fulfil within corporate 
strategy? 
- Are there any examples of retailers working together either in the 
field of logistics or elsewhere? 
- At what level, or in what sphere of activity, would pooling of 
information or resources be regarded as non-contentious (start with 
crates / recycling, move forward through primary transport and on 
into order systems / stock etc)? 
 
The joint meeting, held in April 2000, lasted for two hours and was tape-
recorded for transcription. In order to allow time for note taking and reflection 
during the discussions, a colleague from Cranfield University, who was also 
supervising the project at the time, sat in attendance at the meeting to help 
facilitate the dialogue. After some initial reserve, all three respondents 
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contributed to a lively debate which covered all of the planned topics. 
However, it was felt by all participants that the presence of “competitors” in the 
room constrained contributions to some extent. 
 
6.6 Discussion of findings 
 
A summary data display for the three major respondents in the first case study 
is set out in the table below: 
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Table 10: Summary data display for the three major respondents in the first case study 
Variable Asda Marks & Spencer Safeway 
DIST You can’t escape from branding 
– it means the world to us. I want 
to see loads of Asda trucks 
running up and down the 
motorway which look “bang on 
We wouldn’t want another retailer-
liveried vehicle delivering to a 
store, because the public would 
see that. Does it really matter in 
Dover, is the question we’re asking 
now 
Via Wincanton at Bathgate, we 
do some Woolworths deliveries 
into the far North of Scotland 
SERV I think we’re more focussed on 
our stores, and if a store 
particularly wants something 
going in a particular way, we’ll 
do it. And we’ll do everything we 
can to support the store. For 
example, half our vehicles are 
well and truly empty compared 
to our competitors because it’s 
all designed to get the product 
there in a particular format, 
which will enable speed at the 
store. Because our view is that’s 
where the real cost is, at the 
store, not in the logistics end 
If they (Asda) are putting stores 
truly first and they’re willing to run a 
half empty vehicle or whatever, 
then they’re giving a better service 
 
Asda’s view is stronger on 
service, probably; I might be 
wrong here, but our view is that 
service is absolutely 
paramount. OK, cost is 
important, probably 70% 
service and 30% cost. We’re 
probably 50 / 50. 
QUAL Rather than trying to fit what we 
do with what other people are 
doing, we’d prefer to just have 
one network of our own, both 
primary and secondary, and 
work internally to try and make it 
as efficient as possible 
Our costs as a percentage of 
selling value looks a lot higher than 
anyone else’s, but then you go 
through and find that they all hire 
their trays out to their suppliers  
There’s this equality thing, 
which is very important: you’ve 
got to make sure that whatever 
you’re giving, you’re getting  
 
STREN Do you think we’ll ever work with 
another food retailer? The 
answer’s “no” because we’re 
trying to cripple them all BUT 
The whole idea of not sharing 
resource with other people goes 
against the grain of EDLC (every 
day low cost). It’s a bit like 
cutting of your nose to spite your 
face 
We talk about Waitrose because 
we are still not out to be a 
supermarket:  we are still out to be 
a food specialist and we want to 
stay that way because there are 
enough supermarkets, so we don't 
want to be in that business 
because we could not do it. 
For example Carlos is out to 
stamp on Somerfield and out to 
take on Sainsbury's.  It's very 
much: we were talking to 
Somerfield and then “you are 
not talking to them anymore”. 
VALU It’s of huge competitive 
advantage, every aspect of 
logistics, and I don’t for one 
second expect our company to 
co-operate. In fact, I think you’ll 
see the opposite 
Wal-Mart, if you take the model 
of what they’ve done in the 
States, is all about doing things 
themselves. Of course, they 
learn from other people, and 
they will leverage resources that 
are shared. What they won’t do 
is work with competitors 
Over our whole supply chain, 
there’s a kind of intellectual 
property rights, which, I’m not sure 
that by sharing something with 
somebody, they would be able to 
discern.  
At the end of the day, you can 
invest a lot of time in making a 
step-change, but the 
competition will catch up and 
possibly go past you very 
quickly. 
CONT I want my contractors to work 
with other retailers, but only 
because, at the end of the day, 
that will give me the best price. 
There’s lots of it: that’s why we 
painted the vehicles white and now 
we get the revenue. It’s all still 
organised by the contractors, 
though 
There’s nothing to stop you 
having a third party facilitating 
a Tesco and Safeway 
operation out of a single site for 
one of those flows. 
ENV  Driven by the results of a 
disastrous year, we are being 
driven into thinking about it. Not 
long ago, we were very protective: 
we wouldn’t let anybody into our 
sites or have people wandering 
around our business 
unaccompanied. But we have 
changed: we have been knocked 
off course by the events of last 
year. 
But, there’ll come a point 
where congestion, the way 
these local transport plans and 
things, the way that everyone’s 
not going to be able to go into 
cities with trucks 
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6.6.1 Asda 
Despite not having particularly strong views on the quality and performance of 
their distribution networks, the overwhelming impression given by the three 
Asda respondents was of their aggression towards the competition, which 
also had a touch of arrogance about it. Indeed, Asda’s whole attitude towards 
the importance of competitive pressure and the degree to which it affected 
both strategy and operations was significantly stronger than that of the other 
participants, with the language used being peppered with references to battle 
and war.  
 
“We cannot divorce ourselves from something which I think is a real 
bloodbath.” 
“I make no bones, when we see someone who is going under a little bit then 
vultures are hovering and the last thing that any of you are going to do is 
anything that could help them because if they have suffered you know you are 
going to gain.” 
“There’s no battleground as hard as Safeway and Asda in Scotland, surely.” 
“Do you think we’ll ever work with another food retailer? The answer’s “no” 
because we’re trying to cripple them all.” 
 
Paradoxically, however, there was one comment that perhaps indicated a 
grudging acceptance that, whilst this aggressive attitude was deeply 
engrained in their corporate thinking, it might ultimately be counter-productive 
to some extent: “The whole idea of not sharing resource with other people 
goes against the grain of EDLC (every day low cost). It’s a bit like cutting of 
your nose to spite your face”.  
 
One retailer, Morrisons, was mentioned by Asda with respect, but this related 
to the way in which this retailer managed to combine a low price offering with 
a sense of theatre in the stores, rather than an acknowledgement of 
operational excellence. 
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Interestingly, the fact that Asda’s whole motivation appeared to be driven by 
overcoming the competition was also reflected in the relatively few references 
to their customers. This makes the concept of “distance” of a supply chain 
activity from the customer almost irrelevant. The customer was perceived as 
being on the receiving end of the Asda philosophy rather than driving the 
strategy. 
 
“If we could convince every customer that the product will be there and they’ll 
not buy it anywhere cheaper, then they’ll go there.” 
“The core essence of what we’re about is about price. Of course it’s about 
quality, particularly freshness of product and our clothing brand is absolutely 
critical to us, but it is about the customers truly believing that what they’re 
buying there is better value than they get elsewhere.” 
 
This confidence also meant that any opportunity to use the distribution 
operation to reinforce the branding to customers was perceived as important 
to the business. 
 
“You can’t escape from branding – it means the world to us. I want to see 
loads of Asda trucks running up and down the motorway which look “bang 
on”. 
 
Although Asda did not particularly perceived their systems as being any better 
or worse than those of any other retailer, there was a recognition that the 
systems had to work properly and efficiently in order to support the 
competitive offering. 
 
In spite of the general expression of aggression towards their competitors, 
however, Asda did not make any particular claims about the excellence or 
otherwise of their own systems. Indeed, some surprisingly self-effacing 
comments were made about the way in which the systems were managed 
and that there may well be ways in which the systems could be improved 
based on experiences elsewhere. 
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“To be honest, and you’ve seen some of this, we haven’t got a clue where 
some of our suppliers are, or come to that, anybody else’s”. 
“We’re really excited about the roll-out of Wal-Mart’s systems next year: that’ll 
give us the chance to do ex-factory buying, which will really up the primary 
possibilities.” 
 
There was even a recognition that systems might currently be sub-optimised, 
but that, by implication, this is less of an issue that pressure from, or 
collaboration with, a competitor. 
 
“Rather than trying to fit what we do with what other people are doing, we’d 
prefer to just have one network of our own, both primary and secondary, and 
work internally to try and make it as efficient as possible.” 
 
This realism about the possible shortcomings of their own systems seems to 
inform Asda’s attitude towards their contractors: they see the contractors as 
being able to bring synergies and efficiencies to the operation on the basis of 
their work with other retailers. In other words, Asda recognise that their 
business might derive benefit from being aligned with that of a competitor, but 
that it requires the involvement of an intermediary to facilitate this, given 
Asda’s stated public attitude towards the competition: 
 
“Our preferred route is to work with a small number of partners on a 
commercial basis: the way they then try to make their money is to work with 
other retailers.” 
“I want my contractors to work with other retailers, but only because, at the 
end of the day, that will give me the best price.” 
 
In summary, Asda’s overall position can be described as combative and 
confident, to the extent that it is highly unlikely that they would want to 
collaborate with anyone other firm in their immediate market sector: 
“It’s of huge competitive advantage, every aspect of logistics, and I don’t for 
one second expect our company to co-operate. In fact, I think you’ll see the 
opposite.” 
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Wal-Mart, if you take the model of what they’ve done in the States, is all about 
doing things themselves. Of course, they learn from other people, and they 
will leverage resources that are shared. What they won’t do is work with 
competitors. 
 
6.6.2 Safeway 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Safeway’s attitudes and philosophies seemed to fall 
part-way between those of Asda and Marks & Spencer, with some evidence of 
attempts at collaboration and an openness to discussions about further 
opportunities under the right circumstances, tempered by a strong belief in the 
relative quality of their own operations. Safeway had been prepared to share 
their distribution templates and planning models with, amongst others, 
Somerfield and Boots, both of whom could be regarded as competitors in at 
least some respects. 
 
“So, I think there are opportunities to try and utilize some of the strengths of 
some of the other retailers and pass some of your own strengths on to them.” 
 
On the other hand, there was a recognition that it was unlikely there would be 
parity of gains for the partners in such collaborations and that these would, 
therefore, not proceed on this basis. 
 
“We were almost willing to give Somerfield our consolidation model…. It was 
very much we were giving them a lot but we had nothing coming back.” 
“There’s this equality thing, which is very important: you’ve got to make sure 
that whatever you’re giving, you’re getting.” 
“The difficulty within that is getting the equality between the two.  I have 
recently been on a forum with Boots and Somerfield and everything …..was 
Safeway giving something to those two with 40-50% benefit going to them and 
5% coming back.  We have pulled out of that and are not doing anything.” 
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This readiness to collaborate under certain circumstances and with more 
confidence of an equality of benefit contrasts with the strong views expressed 
about Safeway’s own perceptions of its operational capability. 
 
“We believe, in terms of physical secondary distribution, we are the most 
efficient. 
“If you do a like-for-like, then we’re more efficient in terms of physical 
distribution than (Asda).” 
“If you look at Tesco, again with the bench-marking we’ve done there, we 
think we’re more efficient than them anyway in terms of physical distribution.” 
 
However, there appeared to be other major retailers where there was less of a 
gap in perceived operational quality and that there may be more opportunity to 
develop collaborative efforts with these firms: 
 
“I think (the answer is) finding the right joints: Safeway and M & S might be 
the right joint: I doubt Safeway and Asda would be.” 
“I have a bit of an issue with Sainsbury’s – no issue with Tesco.” 
“We’ve tried to talk to Sainsburys a couple of times but they’re not so 
interested.” 
 
However, the change in strategic direction which was underway at the time, 
under the new leadership of Carlos de Priadez, had in turn changed the 
nature of some traditional competitive relationships and thus the possibilities 
for exploring collaboration: 
 
“For example Carlos is out to stamp on Somerfield and out to take on 
Sainsbury's.  It's very much: we were talking to Somerfield and then “you are 
not talking to them anymore”. 
 
Safeway appeared to have more concerns about impending external 
influences than the other respondents. They had made much of the time over 
their use of railways to transport product into the North of Scotland and thus, 
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by getting vehicles off the busy A9 road, could be seen to be promoting their 
environmental credentials. 
 
“But, there’ll come a point where congestion, the way these local transport 
plans and things, the way that everyone’s not going to be able to go into cities 
with trucks.” 
 “For the past six or seven years, transport costs have been relatively 
inexpensive compared to warehousing costs, of establishing a new centre. 
That will start to change with road pricing and congestion.” 
 
However, this external downside was balanced by the external opportunities 
seen as arising from working more closely with contractors to seek synergy 
benefits from a fit with other competing retail businesses. 
 
“There’s nothing to stop you having a third party facilitating a Tesco and 
Safeway operation out of a single site for one of those flows.” 
“Tesco delivering to a Safeway store or vice versa would be the most difficult 
thing to do, but in terms of a Tesco vehicle that’s got no Tesco livery on, it’s 
not a problem.” 
 
6.6.3 Marks and Spencer 
Marks & Spencer’s network is beginning to show its age. M & S was one of 
the first retailers to move to centralised distribution and some of the sites now 
date back to the early 1970’s, albeit several of them have been extended and 
developed. “I do not believe our system contributes in any way to our 
competitive advantage”.  
 
Although the depots are physically smaller than those of the other major food 
retailers, the operating methodologies are very similar. “I would say that our 
systems are very much on a par with those of other retailers: no better and no 
worse”.  
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One area of difference, and thus opportunity, is that M & S have not made any 
significant use of factory gate pricing or managed primary initiatives. In fact, 
because most of the warehousing and transport operations are contracted to 
a single third-party provider (Gist), it is the contractor who appears to glean 
the benefits of primary and secondary transport integration rather than M & S 
themselves. “The sorts of things we would want to get involved in are 
consolidation points, and we don’t really care who else’s product is involved at 
that stage”. 
 
The one food sector which sits outside the main distribution network is frozen. 
Until shortly before the first interviews, this had been handled through two 
dedicated third party sites. Falling volumes, however, had led to the need for 
an alternative shared-user solution. “Our frozen food business has been in 
decline and we’d reached the point where we were scraping the barrel in 
terms of trying to find any more cost saving opportunities in the two (non-
shared) sites”.  
 
One of M & S historical behaviour traits was identified as being the lack of 
interest in advertising. This in turn meant that they did not, at the time, attach 
a particularly high value to the branding of, for examples, their vehicles. 
However, it was perceived that in the areas which the end customer was close 
to, that is the store and the high street, the branding and therefore the 
dedication of resources mattered.  
 
“How many of the general public are going to sit there with their binoculars 
outside a distribution depot?” 
“We wouldn’t want another retailer-liveried vehicle delivering to a store, 
because the public would see that”.  
 
However, even this assertion appeared to be only important in their own 
heartland, perhaps where senior management or their families might have 
been able to see it. In other words, it was perceived as being important that M 
& S trucks were seen in Kensington High Street or near Marble Arch but 
“Does it really matter in Dover? That’s the question we’re asking now”. If 
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remoteness from Head Office is as significant to the method of operations as 
distance from the end consumer, then M & S should have more opportunity 
than most to take advantage of collaborative operations. 
 
As already discussed, the relatively low sales volume (compared with the 
other UK supermarkets) combined with national coverage, means that the M 
& S national RDC network is almost certainly more expensive to run. “Our 
costs as a percentage of selling value looks a lot higher than anyone else’s”. 
Even with lower volumes, stores and the buying teams still demand deliveries 
of fresh foods to stores at least twice a day. “The food business was saying 
‘these sheds and lorries cost a fortune’, but we were saying to them ‘because 
you want this and you do that, that’s why it costs you a fortune”. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the logistics infrastructure has had to scaled to 
deal with the peaks of a trading pattern that are even more marked than those 
of the competition. “We peak more than any other retailer at Christmas: it’s a 
particular threat to us as we have a lot of customers that come at Christmas 
and don’t come the rest of the year”. 
 
So, whilst efforts have been made to rationalise and contain costs (the depot 
network was reduced from eight RDC’s to six), there are implications for 
distribution driven by other elements of M & S’ core value set. “The bottom 
line comes to pound notes, but there are other factors: environmental and HR 
ones, for example”. Costs would not be optimised at the expense of service 
either to the stores or to the end consumers. This would tend to make M & S 
less likely to participate in collaborative initiatives, as these would be more 
likely to achieve savings in costs, at the possible expense of service, rather 
than making improvements to service per se. 
 
It is questionable as to whether Marks and Spencer have ever acted in an 
aggressive way towards their competitors. “We are all big boys: we should be 
prepared to work together”. Quite apart from the inconsistency of this 
approach to their paternalistic and human relations-based historical ethos, 
their strategy was traditionally based on niche differentiation based on a 
clearly defined set of quality values and they thus perceived no need to 
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annihilate the competition through price or volume. Having then hit a crisis of 
strategy, they were too small and specialised a player to adopt aggressive 
market tactics and are, therefore, more likely to seek co-operative, rather than 
competitive, solutions than some of the other retailers. “Not long ago, we were 
very protective and wouldn’t let anybody into our business, but we have 
changed. We have been knocked off course by the events of last year”. 
Attitudes to competition, however, were seen to be vary depending on which 
retailer was under discussion. The relationship (or lack of one) between Tesco 
and Sainsbury was often held up as being an example of competitors between 
whom collaboration would be highly problematic. M & S were more nervous of 
Sainsbury than, say, Asda, who at the time were in the process of being 
acquired by Wal-Mart. “In principle, I have agreement that we can share with 
anyone if it reduces cost. In practice, I think we’d probably be OK with most 
things (with Asda) because it’s a different relationship to that between 
Sainsbury’s and Tesco’s”. “We talk to Waitrose, because we are still not out to 
be a supermarket, we are out to be a food specialist”.  
 
“We’re not really competing with Asda on the food side. It’s yet to be tested 
how far we’ll get into bed together”. 
 
There was also an interesting view that, since logistics per se did not 
contribute to competitive advantage, then it might be used to grow the overall 
size of the cake available to competitors, rather than any one firm’s slice of it. 
“By working together on this, we think we can develop a market advantage, as 
opposed to an individual competitive advantage”.  
 
Some of the other criticisms of M &S strategy levelled after the 1998 / 99 
results (amongst others, Mellahi, Jackson and Sparks (2002)) are recognised 
by M & S. “Traditionally, we have always adopted an attitude of ‘we know 
best’, but now we are looking to other people”.  
 
Finally, however, M & S appear to believe that there is one area of their 
supply chain where they can derive competitive advantage, and that is in the 
values which they are able to add throughout the supply chain, but particularly 
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in sourcing, product design and manufacture. One respondent referred to this 
as their intellectual property. “Tesco are competing very much on price: for us, 
it’s more about intellectual property; it’s how you make the whole thing work”. 
 
6.6.4 Tesco and Somerfield 
Although not part of the main research, the responses from Tesco and 
Somerfield were consistent with some of the findings from those firms 
questioned in depth and the key headlines are set out in the table below. In 
short, Tesco hardly mentioned competitors at all: a reflection, perhaps, of their 
market dominance with the result that they can afford to be self-sufficient in all 
areas with no perceived benefit to themselves arising from collaboration. 
Tesco’s only real interest in collaboration was essentially negative and driven 
by fear of further press interest in their scale and influence.  
 
Given the already negative press coverage about the scale of Tesco’s market 
share and profits, it was assumed that the media would certainly be 
suspicious, and probably hostile, about the actual business intentions 
underlying any collaboration with a competitor. 
 
“How would Mrs Housewife in the UK react to us doing joint issues regarding 
distribution?” 
“If you look at the press this week, there is still this view – not only from the 
tabloid media, but also from a number of people across the country who are 
saying “Yes, but they’ve still got a strangle-hold on retail”. If they then 
perceive: “Hey, these guys have got a strangle-hold on retailing and they’re 
also starting to work together, is that a concern?” 
 
Somerfield appear to be suffering from even lower self-esteem than the then-
troubled Marks and Spencer and, as such, appeared to be prepared to 
countenance more or less anything, including collaboration at any level, in 
order to try and drive out costs and improve service.  
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Table 11: Summary data display for secondary respondents in the first case study 
  
“It’s obvious that our business isn’t too profitable and that our distribution 
costs are higher than those of all the others.” 
“We know that we need to move our distribution costs by about a percentage: 
not by a hundredth but by a whole percentage point of sale.” 
Variable Tesco Somerfield 
DIST “How would Mrs Housewife in the UK 
react to us doing joint issues regarding 
distribution?” 
 
SERV Delivery on time is now getting as 
important as some of the cost drivers 
We’re even looking to move fresh 
deliveries the dame way, and possibly 
down to even less if necessary. 
The whole of service has gone out of 
the window, 
QUAL We’ve actually moved certain products 
from what we call the first wave onto 
second wave, which again gets better 
utilisation of your vehicle fleet and also 
gives us that volume through some of 
the what were traditionally low periods 
of the 24-hour working day 
It’s obvious that our business isn’t too 
profitable and that our distribution costs 
are higher than those of all the others. 
Kwik-save really don’t give a toss how 
things get to the store, as long as it can 
get there as cheaply as possible 
STREN It is a very, very competitive industry 
where we are looking throughout the 
business on a daily basis at what our 
competitors are doing 
There’s every chance we’d work with 
other food retailers, but, to be honest, 
they probably wouldn’t want to work 
with us. I suppose we’d probably avoid 
Tesco on the basis that we’re scared of 
them 
There are certainly some retailers who 
we would not regard as competitors: 
Marks & Spencer and Waitrose, for 
example, are in a completely different 
part of the market to us 
VALU I think it’s all about “what can we do 
internally?”, but that we’ll eventually 
turn round and say “have we actually 
taken everything we can do and, if we 
take the total amount, do we need 
assistance from outside. 
Because it’s been handled by a third 
party, there is a general assumption 
that “OK, that’s acceptable” 
Any synergies, which don’t carry some 
kind of commercial compromise, are 
possible. For example, I guess we 
could even be interested in looking at a 
Sainsbury vehicle driving past our door 
and carrying on to do a delivery in 
Cornwall. 
CONT Because it’s been handled by a third 
party, there is a general assumption 
that “OK, that’s acceptable” 
We’re happy to work with any 
manufacturer or third party in transport: 
we really don’t care whose name is on 
the vehicle. “If you’ve got a vehicle 
going from A to B and if you’re cheap, 
then we’ll use you”. 
ENV Obviously, we’ve got the restrictions 
now: it will become very difficult to 
service stores if those restrictions get 
tighter. 
As convenience grows, the market offer 
and also the time of that market offer, 
you’ve actually got to say “Well, how do 
we deliver that?” 
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“Our policy is definitely driven by a lack of capital and a high degree of 
caution.” 
“We’d work with other food retailers, but, to be honest, they probably wouldn’t 
want to work with us.” 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Of the seven dimensions explored through the analysis of the major retailer 
data, there are marked differences between the frequency of occurrences of 
data referring to them and, within individual factors, marked differences 
between some of the retailers.   
Although there are some anomalies in the patterns, with, for example, Marks 
and Spencer having a specific interest in thinking about issues either 
upstream from the consumer or otherwise “out of sight”, it is clear that the 
most important informing factors are those around relative quality of systems 
and competitive strength compared to perceptions of that of the direct 
competitors, as the frequency of references in figure 24 shows. 
Figure 24: Comparative frequency analysis of data codes in the retail case 
 
Whilst the confidence and aggression showing in Asda’s responses was not 
entirely unexpected, Safeway’s positioning in this respect was surprisingly 
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close to that of Asda. Marks & Spencer’s market positioning appeared to be 
sufficiently different to that of its competitors that neither the quality of systems 
nor relative strength appeared likely to have a strong influence on the 
propensity to collaborate. However, although Marks & Spencer appeared to 
attribute real value to their systems and their interaction with their contractors, 
all of these activities were deemed sufficiently remote from the consumer as 
not to make a significant marketing contribution. 
 
It would be tempting to infer that size, in terms of market share or profit, is the 
single biggest influencing factor in terms of potential collaborations. However, 
the differences in overall share between, for example, Asda and Safeway are 
not that significant. The relative aggression seems to be associated with a 
confidence about future strength and the ability to steal market share from 
competitors, rather than current positioning. The Tesco responses in this area 
were particularly interesting, although they do not form part of the core 
analysis. There was a clear sense that Tesco has now reached such a mass 
that the external environment can be almost completely controlled. On the 
other hand, there is not a massive difference between the market shares of 
Marks & Spencer and Somerfield but, in spite of recent problems, there was a 
marked difference in the levels of confidence between the two businesses. 
Although Asda made no mention of the influence of external and 
environmental influences, the other two retailer did and it is intended to retain 
this dimension in the model for the net case studies.  
 
Other points of interest include the marked difference between the relative 
positioning of M & S towards the role of contractors when compared with the 
others. It should also be noted that the Asda data contains no references at all 
to external factors. 
 
Since the originally proposed conceptual framework and resulting code table 
had been developed on the basis of extensive familiarity not only with the 
major retailer context but also, to a lesser extent with the specific firms 
involved, it is not surprising that there were very few examples of data which 
did not fit the proposed model. It is, therefore, not intended to make any 
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changes in the framework or model, both of which are generally supported by 
the data from the first case, at this stage.  
 
There were clear limitations to these findings in that they were context specific 
and based on a limited number of respondents. They did, however, provide a 
framework which, it was suggested, might offer a different perspective for the 
consideration of parallel supply chains: that is, that not every single element of 
a competing supply chain needs to be competitive, without compromising 
overall competitiveness. Having established this tentative framework, the 
intention was then to try and look for examples of practical application where it 
might be tested, challenged and enhanced. 
 
Whilst examples of actual co-operative activities between the major UK food 
retailers were hard to find, two examples of inter-firm co-operation in physical 
distribution did come to prominence shortly thereafter. In Bristol, a number of 
competing retailers in the Broadmead shopping centre came together to share 
an urban transhipment and delivery operation and, in the UK brewing industry, 
two major competitors came together to share a common distribution network. 
Both of these examples appeared to offer the opportunity to test the tentative 
models developed with the food retailers. 
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7 Second case study: Broadmead 
Shopping Centre, Bristol 
 
The first exploratory case was conducted in a context where the literature and 
trends in operational and organisational development, specifically Efficient 
Consumer Response (ECR), suggested that horizontal collaboration across 
competing supply chains ought to take place, but where, in reality, there were 
no examples of significant or successful applications of this thinking. This first 
case was undertaken to testing and critique the model developed to explain 
horizontal collaboration, or the absence of it, in terms of organisational and 
environmental enablers and / or inhibitors. 
 
The research was designed to then reappraise the model design, using data 
collected in situations where horizontal collaboration was in place and 
appeared to be working. The original hope and intention was that such 
examples existed amongst the major UK grocery retailers. Although there 
were some small-scale examples of tentative collaboration, particularly in 
upstream areas like common trays and primary consolidation, nothing worthy 
of further research emerged in its own right and it was necessary to look 
elsewhere. One of the unexpected advantages of the length of time spent on 
the preparatory stages of the research (literature review, methodological and 
philosophical considerations etc), together with the fact that, for personal and 
professional reasons, it was necessary to suspend the research project for 
three years from 2001 to 2004, was that the concept of horizontal logistics 
collaboration was an idea whose time had not quite come. Although this 
research stems from ideas and writing from the late 1990’s, the fact that there 
are still only limited examples of application may simply be that the time was 
not right, rather than the concept of itself being flawed. 
 
As the research associated with the first case was being brought to a 
conclusion in 2004 with a short series of interviews to examine whether the 
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data collected prior to the three-year interlude was still valid and relevant, 
reports of successful and substantial applications of collaboration began to 
appear in the trade press. The two panels below indicate one of the 
developments which appeared to be gathering pace that year: consolidation 
of competitors’ deliveries to tackle problems of urban traffic congestion. 
 
The major retailer case had focused on the question that, since there seemed 
to be compelling evidence for the benefits of horizontal collaboration, 
facilitated by other collaborative initiatives such as ECR, why were there few, 
if any, practical examples of implementation. The Broadmead experiment, on 
the other hand, appeared to offer an example of actual implementation, 
without any apparent explanation as to how it had come about or what it may 
indicate in terms of trends and applications elsewhere. At first glance, 
therefore, the Broadmead trial appeared to offer an opportunity to test the 
tentative model and conceptual framework developed to explain the major 
retailer context in an actual implementation, albeit in a context somewhat 
different to that of the first case study.  
3.2.1 Freight scheme cuts city centre lorry traffic 
A unique scheme to tackle Bristol's city centre traffic congestion and pollution has already
seen a 51% reduction in delivery vehicle movements serving participating retailers in and
around the city's Broadmead Shopping Centre.  
The Bristol Freight Consolidation Scheme has so far recruited ten retailers and Bristol City
Council is now working with supply chain experts Exel to encourage more Broadmead
businesses to sign up to the initiative. 
Bristol City Council selected Exel to implement and manage the consolidation centre for a
trial period of eight months. The trial began in May and so far 10 retailers, including Lush,
Monsoon, Tie Rack and Accessorize have been recruited. 
Besides reducing traffic congestion and pollution, the retailers benefit from definite delivery
times, more effective stock replenishment and improved staff planning and productivity. 
 
(Press release from Bristol City Council, 30.7.04) 
http://www.bristol-
city.gov.uk/PressReleaseViewer/viewer.html?pressReleaseId=235399  
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In order to appraise the suitability and feasibility of the Broadmead case for 
further research, it was clearly necessary to understand more about it. The 
press articles were apparently based on releases issued by Bristol City 
Council and Exel Logistics, so the media contacts at these two organisations 
were followed up in the first instance to gain a deeper understanding of the 
operation prior to seeking fuller access. Both organisations supplied media 
packs and contact details for further information. Telephone contact was 
established more or less immediately with the named manager at Exel, who 
not only agreed immediately to be interviewed but also provided other 
contacts within his organisation. The relevant member of Bristol City Council 
agreed to be interviewed and arranged contact with the permanent (ie non 
elected) staff member responsible for the establishment and management of 
Joined-Up Thinking (Motor Transport, 2.9.04 - extracts) 
 
The idea of consolidating retail deliveries at one point is not new – it has already proved
successful at Heathrow – but an experiment in Bristol is aiming to take it further. 
There has been some success in consolidating inbound deliveries for shopping centres in
various sites, notably Exel’s Heathrow operation for BAA – but this serves a compact site
run by a single entity. 
…. what is happening at the Broadmead centre in Bristol, where an EU-funded
experiment is being undertaken by Exel, with the aim if reducing environmental impact,
cutting vehicle miles and improving service to retailers. 
The process began in March last year, with contact being made via consultancy TTR
(Transport and Travel Research), and Exel identifying the stakeholders in the project:
these included Bristol City Council, the board of the Broadmead shopping centre, the
Galleries (a separate mall within Broadmead) and the local chamber of commerce,
Business West. 
The first step, according to Exel commercial manager Ian Foster, was understanding the
market. “There is a wide spectrum of users, from retailers who might have one delivery a
week to those who would have five or six a day,” he says. 
For the purposes of this trial, they didn’t look at the whole retail community. 
“We looked at 20 or 30 businesses,” says Foster. “In terms of delivery type, we focused
on vans – on retailers who get lots of small deliveries from couriers”. 
The operation is not large: the warehouse covers only 600 sq m and the transport
operation involves a single 7.5-tonner. But the initial results have been significant, with a
51% reduction in vehicle trips for those retailers using the scheme. This compares
reasonably well with the figure of 66% achieved at the Heathrow site. 
The retailers involved are certainly enthusiastic; Lizzie Lane, store manager of “fresh
cosmetics” retailer Lush, has arranged deliveries on Mondays and Fridays. “We’ll agree a
delivery time – and I haven’t had any problems,” she says. 
But this trial is on a small scale, and will have little impact on the half-million vehicle trips
made in Bristol every day. 
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the contract. This individual in turn offered to arrange contact with a sample of 
the retailers involved in the trial. 
 
No changes were proposed to either the tentative conceptual framework or 
the associated model variables before the start of the Broadmead case. 
Similarly, the structured interview, supported by observation and secondary 
desk research, had proved satisfactory as a method of data collection and no 
changes were made to the methodology for the second case. Interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed verbatim, manually coded using the same 
variable set as in the first case and then iteratively reviewed and distilled to 
allow pattern coding to emerge. 
 
7.1 Case Study Protocol 
 
In April, 2004, Bristol County Council launched an Urban Consolidation 
initiative, funded by the European Union through its Civitas / Vivaldi 
programmes and operated by Exel Logistics. The operation is designed to 
serve retailers in the Broadmead shopping centre in Bristol, of whom 17 had 
joined the scheme by December, 2004. The case study design was based on 
semi-structured interviews with a number of the key stake-holders in the 
operation: 
 
- The political sponsor and operational administrator on behalf of 
Bristol City Council (“Facilitator”). 
- Senior managers responsible for the operation on behalf of Exel 
Logistics (“Contractor”). 
- Managers from four of the retailers who joined the scheme from its 
inception and have continued to use it since (“Retailer”). 
 
As discussed in the chapter on Methodology, the unit of analysis in cases 
where co-opetition has not been implemented will be the individual firm or 
firms who have elected not to exploit opportunities for collaboration. The unit 
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of analysis in cases such as Broadmead, where there is evidence of co-
opetition, will be the stakeholders within that defined operational example.  
In cases where co-opetition can be seen to have been implemented or 
favoured, the stakeholder parties (facilitators, contractors, retailers) are 
regarded as units of data collection within the single unit of analysis.  
 
Interviews were conducted with each stakeholder group as follows: 
 
- Facilitator (Bristol City Council): single two-hour interview with the 
Councillor responsible for transport policy and the staff member 
responsible for policy implementation. 
- Contractor (Exel): telephone interview with the manager responsible 
for implementation and face-to-face interview with the Senior 
Manager responsible for operations and strategy development in 
the area of shared solutions. 
- Retailer: face-to-face interviews with four of the first retailers to sign 
up to the scheme. These interviews were all conducted on the 
retailers’ own premises and were accompanied by site tours and a 
demonstration of the relevant operations. These retailers were 
nominated by the staff member from Bristol City Council on the 
basis that they ought to represent a fair cross section of the total 
businesses involved and were operationally different enough to 
represent a range of possible interests in and reactions to the trial. 
 
7.2 Brief History of Urban Transhipment 
 
McKinnon (1998), in a review of previous literature on the subject, describes 
how interest in urban transhipment was first raised in the 1970’s, waned in the 
1980’s but began to be rekindled in the 1990’s. He points out that 
transhipment is a misleading term, in that it covers a number of very different 
scenarios: 
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- The consolidation of small loads for onward delivery on large 
vehicles. 
- The disaggregation of large loads into smaller units for delivery on 
small vehicles. 
- The consolidation of small parcel loads onto single smaller delivery 
vehicles. 
 
The scenarios can be summarised in the difference between the “small order 
problem” and issues associated with (environmentally unfriendly) large 
vehicles.  
 
These differences in interpretation and focus in part explain why the initial 
interest in the concept faded. Other important factors were the 
decentralisation of commercial activities away from town centres and towards 
edge-of-town facilities, with good road connections of their own, together with 
the general shift towards the centralisation and retailer-control of distribution, 
which facilitated the consolidated (and efficient) delivery of large single loads 
to a single store on a single vehicle. One model which survived various 
research initiatives and discussions throughout the last three decades was 
that of “peripheral transhipment”: edge-of-town consolidation of small orders 
for independent stores who could not aggregate sufficient delivery volume for 
a single efficient delivery. The growth of environmental concerns, particularly 
relating to CO2 emissions and the damage allegedly caused in city centres by 
the new 38 tonne vehicles, reinforced interest in this model. McKinnon (1998) 
concludes that, whilst there is little merit in dislocating the existing centralised 
distribution systems of the larger retailers, there may be a role for, among 
other things, developing transhipment of small orders, consolidated for 
delivery to smaller retail outlets in inner urban areas. 
The European Commission established a forum for logistics providers, 
academics and policy makers called Best Urban Freight Solutions (BESTUFS) 
in 2000, which sought to raise the profile of the debate on the potential and 
benefits of urban consolidation. The project was initially funded for four years 
and was intended to identify and promote best practices with respect to urban 
freight transport. (deliverable D1.2 final from www.bestufs.net/). The group 
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developed wider interest in the subject in 2001 and 2003, with two 
international conferences being held on so-called “city logistics”. These 
included specific analysis of two actual applications of the concept in 
Germany (Kuhler, 2001 and Kuhler & Groke, 2003). The first UK successful 
and enduring UK implementation was by third-party provider Exel Logistics to 
the various small retail outlets at Heathrow Airport, London (DfT, 2002). The 
BESTUFS group went on to launch BESTUFS 2 to “to identify, describe and 
disseminate best practices, success criteria and bottlenecks with respect to 
City Logistics Solutions (http://www.bestufs.net/index.html). The other main 
initiative covered in the project was road pricing, which featured alongside 
analysis and commentary on eight urban transhipment cases across Europe, 
including Heathrow (Egger and Ruesch, 2003). 
A further review of the literature on the subject, together with a survey of 67 
existing schemes, was carried out by the University of Westminster in 2005, 
which identified the difficulties of objectively measuring and trading off costs 
and benefits. A formal model was proposed to assess future opportunities to 
ensure that this trade off did not act as an inhibitor to developments (Browne 
et al, 2005). 
 
7.3 The Bristol Experiment 
 
Bristol is one of five European cities taking part in an EU-funded initiative 
called Civitas, designed to look at opportunities and developments in urban 
transport. A sub-set of this programme, called Vivaldi, provides specific 
funding for specific trials of worked examples of ideas generated through the 
scheme, so that costs and benefits can be evaluated over time before making 
further changes and developments to urban transport policy. As part of this 
work, Bristol has sponsored trials on things like low-emission buses, a 
commercial vehicle driver’s access atlas, “dial-a-ride” schemes and access to 
home delivery services for elderly citizens without access to the internet. The 
idea of trialling an urban transhipment centre to service the pedestrianised 
Broadmead Shopping Centre, in the centre of Bristol, was first mooted in 
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2003. Although Bristol City Council were aware that 3PL Exel Logistics were 
already running similar operations at Heathrow Airport and Meadowhall 
Shopping Centre in Sheffield, the proposed operation was put out to formal 
tender, with Exel being the only respondent. The operation was set up on a 
trial basis in April 2004, with all costs, including the consolidation warehouse 
and delivery vehicle, being met from EU funds by the Council. The trial was 
subsequently extended in November for a further 6 months. Participating 
retailers instruct their suppliers / hauliers to deliver goods according to their 
existing schedules, but to a dedicated Exel warehouse at Emersons Green, 
just off the M4 to the north of Bristol. There, Exel receive and consolidate the 
goods for onward delivery to stores, according to a delivery schedule agreed 
with the retailers. 
 
7.4 Findings 
 
The pilot study stage of this research suggested a number of factors which 
might influence the decision as to whether retailers might chose to take part in 
such a co-operative venture. However, as the case study interviews confirm, 
there are a number of key differences between the participants in the Bristol 
experiment and the major food retailers previously  
discussed: 
 
- the extent to which these competitive relationships differ between 
much smaller (non-food) retailers: generally, firms placed a much 
higher emphasis on service to stores than on competitive 
advantage or differentiation. 
- the supply chains of these smaller retailers are less developed: 
central warehousing has been generally implemented but, because 
of the smaller delivery unit sizes, transport is still largely carried out 
by general carriers. 
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- the additional costs of the transhipment operation are (currently) 
borne by the EU via Bristol City Council and thus there is no on-cost 
to the participants. 
 
The circumstances under which horizontal supply chain collaboration might 
take place were set out graphically, based on the conceptual framework 
underpinning this research, at the start of the first case study. 
 
The environmental context for this second case study differs from the first in a 
number of important key areas, which in turn affect the influence of the 
following variables. 
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Environmental 
Variables 
Major Retailer Case Urban Consolidation 
Logistics system 
characteristics 
Mature central 
distribution model, with 
high levels of transport 
integration and 
resource control or 
ownership. “Just in 
time” methodologies to 
underpin availability 
and freshness. 
Some retail-controlled 
central stockholding but 
no central transport 
structures and all 
transport with multi-
user contractors. 
Availability supported 
by in-store stock. Lack 
of availability promotes 
switching or 
opportunism. 
Market structure High levels of 
concentration with a 
small number of large 
and powerful players 
Highly fragmented: up 
to 300 retailers in the 
immediate market 
Competition Competition targets 
clearly identified and 
competitive stance 
embedded in strategy 
Niche propositions 
replace direct 
competitive strategies 
Cost drivers Clear trade-off between 
cost and service, 
determined by strategic 
market positioning 
Better service 
apparently available at 
no additional cost 
External influences Fears over anti-
competitive perceptions 
in the media and in 
government impede 
collaboration. Possible 
resource shortages 
encourage 
protectivism. 
Presence of brokers to 
facilitate shared 
solution. Threat to 
overall market size 
posed by new out-of-
town development. 
 
 
Table 12: Contextual effects on the key data headings 
 
Before considering the validity of the proposed model in the context of the 
Broadmead case, through a detailed examination of the seven variables, 
these contextual differences between the two cases are explored in more 
detail. 
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7.4.1 Logistics system sophistication 
Although centralised warehouse systems for order consolidation were in place 
for at least some of the retailers, transport delivery systems were “immature” 
in that they were generally contracted to a mixture of carriers on a shared-
user basis. This immaturity appears to be an enabler to the use of a new 
consolidation methodology. 
 
All of the stores surveyed were small, with weekly volume ranging from just 4 
boxes (Tie Rack) to up to 50 pallets (Mastershoe). However, three of the four 
stores (the ones which were part of national chains) received their stock from 
a central warehouse, although transport was then sub-contracted to a mixed 
range of carriers. The fourth store was part of a very small local chain, which 
had no centralised operations in place. The contrast with the “major” High 
Street retailers thus appears to be that warehousing has matured to the 
centralised model for even the smallest of stores, but transport is still operated 
on an immature spot-market model. All of the shops confirmed that the switch 
to using the consolidation service just required that their carriers be given the 
new delivery address. Generally, suppliers were required to deliver to a 
central warehouse, with orders and controls managed from the centre, but 
with stores having some degree of control over the final transport delivery leg. 
The data includes numerous references to the contrast between the relatively 
uncontrolled and unsophisticated nature of the former supply arrangements, 
and the new more robust supply arrangements: 
 
“We’ve used every delivery company under the sun….it was a bit of a 
shambles”  
“We can rely on what time these people are going to turn up….it is 
dependable”  
“We don’t have to have someone with a key letting themselves in”  
“Deliveries used to be…..a bit of a nightmare: now, they’re pretty reliable”  
 
The contrast between the supply arrangements between these smaller outlets 
and the bigger chains was also noted: 
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“(We didn’t look at) Marks & Spencer, House of Fraser because…..they’re 
already doing their own consolidation, aren’t they?”  
“The best fits come where you have got less sophisticated supply chains….a 
lot of this stuff does not go through any sort of central distribution as we would 
recognise it”  
 
Although national volumes for each store allows for central consolidated 
warehousing of supplier volumes, transport volumes are so small and variable 
as to offer limited opportunity for internal optimisation. Although there are no 
direct costs incurred by the stores in this trial, there was a view that the 
service improvement achieved might justify an on-cost in the future, 
particularly where operational benefits for other elements of the supply chain 
are identified or new value added services developed: 
 
 “Arguably, they (the carriers) are deriving some benefit….which could be 
contributing to the scheme”  
“A lot of the consolidation is not store on store, it’s consolidating several 
deliveries for one store”  
“It makes the new (Shopping Centre) development more attractive….because 
you need less delivery bays, less conflict and make it more appealing for 
retailers to move there, knowing that they’ve got a smooth delivery solution”  
“Neither of them (Heathrow or Broadmead) breaks even at the moment, but 
will do over their life as additional services are provided”  
 
7.4.2 Market Structure 
 
When the project was first mooted, Bristol City Council carried out a survey of 
all the businesses in Broadmead and established that there were 300 trading 
overall, of which at least 120 were likely to be relevant to the consolidation 
exercise. These cover a whole range of types of goods and services, including 
fashion, electrical and electronics, homewares, gifts and entertainment. The 
first case study looked at grocery, where consumer bevaviour can generally 
be characterised by a single weekly visit to a preferred outlet, perhaps 
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supported by top-ups or distress purchases. Broadmead is aimed at the 
casual leisure shopper, who, whilst they might have a pre-determined set of 
purchases in mind prior to visiting, is perhaps more likely to buy on impulse 
and unlikely to limit their interest to one store or product group at the expense 
of another. In other words, whilst all of the shops in Broadmead are, in a 
sense, competing for the same overall consumer spend, it is harder to draw 
direct correlations, such as every pound spent in retailer A can be clearly 
identified as a pound lost to retailer B. There will be a more complex web of 
inter-dependencies and consumer decisions and, as such, the competitive 
positions of each business vis a vis its rivals is less pronounced and markedly 
less aggressive: 
 
 “It (sharing with competitors) wouldn’t bother me at all. As long as we get our 
stuff – it’s only a delivery. I know some companies get very funny.”  
“It’s totally different to what we sell.”  
“As long as the stock gets here on time and it’s not damaged, then I don’t 
really have (any issues with competition).”  
 
7.4.3 Nature of competition 
 
None of the stores surveyed perceived the other involved parties as 
competitors, even where they were operating in similar markets. There was a 
clear view that sharing space on a truck had no bearing whatsoever on the 
offering to the ultimate consumer, particularly since the trucks were all 
operated by third parties and were not part of any marketing or branding. 
 
“As long as it turns up on the day…..it doesn’t bother me at all”  
“It doesn’t matter who else’s stuff is on the truck”  
“I don’t really have any issue with sharing this resource (with competitors) as 
long as the stock gets here on time”  
“There have been a couple of times when they’ve had to do a second run for 
us……or Accessorize….wouldn’t have got their products on time”  
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“There is not really a competitive angle in this. At no stage has anyone said “Is 
my product on the same truck as so-and-so’s?”  
“Because of the relative size of these retailers, they all gain an equal benefit”  
 
7.4.4 Cost drivers 
 
Because of the absence of on-costs for consolidation, there was generally 
little interest in the systems for measurement or the kpi’s (with one exception, 
where the environmental benefits were closely aligned to the strategy of the 
store). However, there were measurable (and unexpected) “added value” 
benefits which could contribute to the sustainability of the initiative. 
All of the stores involved in the trial noted that the shared consolidation 
operation had brought new added values to transport, which had not been 
available under the previous autonomous arrangements. These included: 
 
“Exel transfer the boxes to cages, empty the cages and take the empties 
away”  
“We hope to build on the scheme and provide some value-added services for 
retailers”  
“We (Exel) have 120 boxes for you: how many do you want and which ones 
do you want first?”  
“We get a report every month telling us how many lorries we’ve saved”  
“They hold it, put it onto pallets…..and build up a reasonable amount of stock 
between delivery days”  
“We don’t really bother with all the figures: it’s not an interest”  
“We have a weekly system to show how the business is progressing” 
“They offered to provide us with insulated boxes”  
“They would carry the things up the stairs for us”  
“We get a newsletter: numbers, but I can’t remember!” 
“We have kpi’s in place for on-time deliveries and stock loss and also for the 
target of the 40 retailers”  
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Although the extent to which some of these added values was appreciated 
varied from outlet to outlet, there was common recognition that the overall 
offering was more comprehensive.  
 
7.4.5 External Influences 
 
This operation was wholly funded by the EC via Bristol City Council at no cost 
to the retailers. Although it is highly unlikely that the initiative would have 
taken off without the external stimulus of the Vivaldi project, some of the 
parties involved made reference to environmental and social concerns.  
 
“They saved 66% of lorries coming in, which is really good”  
 “I’d rather it all went in one big lorry than we had six or seven lorries coming 
in”  
“It’s trying to do something more imaginative and creative….with the freight 
sector”  
“The area has over 90,000 deliveries per year….we’re trying to reduce the 
transport impacts and conflict between vehicles”  
 
However, this interest in external factors was tempered by some pragmatism 
about a totally integrated solution: 
 
“It is believed that there are a number of retailers in this market who might be 
interested in buying a transport-only solution, as oppose to the full supply 
chain offering”  
“We use them at Heathrow, because it’s compulsory there”  
 
The Broadmead shopping centre was also perceived to have been under 
threat from the development of a major new out-of-town centre, at Cribbs 
Causeway, near Bristol. Although the effect of this development on overall 
trade had not been as bad as expected, plans are afoot for an extension to 
Broadmead in an attempt to try and draw some of the lost business back into 
the city. 
 188
 
7.5 Discussion – Implications for the Model 
 
The key themes emerging from the Broadmead case study have been 
discussed in the context of the key differences between this case and the 
grocery retail study, on the basis that the differences between the two 
contexts may go some way to explaining why collaboration has been possible 
in Broadmead, whereas it continues to appear elusive in grocery retailing, in 
spite of evidence that the contrary position ought to be true. However, do 
these contextual considerations undermine or reinforce the validity of the 
model posited as a framework for this research? Certainly it appears to be the 
case that the relative significance of the some of the variables might vary from 
context to context, because of the differences discussed above. For example, 
inter-firm competition was a significant factor in the grocery retailing case and 
therefore comparative perceptions of relative strength and systems quality vis 
a vis the nearest competitors were important. In Broadmead, these appeared 
to be significantly less importance. Similarly, grocery retail supply chains are 
sufficiently long and complex as to give meaning to the concept of distance of 
an activity from the end consumer. The less sophisticated supply chains in 
Broadmead did not carry associations of distance, and many of the 
respondents actively talked about the proximity of supply chain activity to the 
customer and the resultant visibility of it. Environmental issues and concerns 
were not of great significance in grocery retailing, whereas they appeared to 
be important to the Broadmead participants. To some extent, this was 
undoubtedly a case of respondents wanting to be seen to saying the right 
things, about congestion or air pollution for example. To some extent, this 
mirrors the concerns among the grocery retailers of appearing to be anti-
competitive, but there was also a sense among the Broadmead retailers that 
there were other, threats in the environment, such as the drift to out-of-town 
shopping centres and conflict for  resources such as loading bays and 
booking slots.  
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The effect of these contextual characteristics at Broadmead on data analysis 
is that some of the variables need to be viewed as linked together. 
Unsophisticated supply chains, such as those evidenced here, do not carry 
the concept of “distance” as such with them, but still have a contribution in 
terms of service to the customer. A later finesse to the model in this respect 
might be that distance matters more in developed (and thus value-adding) 
supply chains, whereas it is of less significance when the offering is les 
sophisticated.  
 
Similarly, because the notion of inter-firm competition was less pronounced, 
concerns about the quality of supply chains were less developed. It should 
also be remembered that many of the respondents in the Broadmead study 
were seeing the supply chain only from the perspective of the store itself, 
where assortment and availability are everything. Respondents in the grocery 
retail study had a broader view of the total supply chain and might, therefore, 
be expected to be more concerned about issues associated with upstream 
activities. 
 
A summary of some of the key data identified against the original variable 
codes is set out in the table below. 
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Var’ble Promoter Contractor Customer 
DIST people can see it and think 
“well, at least they’re doing 
something”  
there is a branch called 
Vivaldi, which is all about 
sorting out the money for 
“Demonstration Projects” 
and that’s what this is.  
we did a big press thing, 
which was quite frightening: 
all these people asking me 
hard questions with long 
words that I didn’t know the 
answers to! But, it was quite 
good.  
SERV one of the people benefiting 
is the retailer and that’s a 
value added service to 
them that we should 
perhaps be thinking about 
charging them for  
Neither of them breaks 
even at the moment, but 
will do over their life as 
additional services are 
provided.  
I’m at this end, and as long as 
I receive my stock and it 
comes in in a condition so I 
can sell it at the right time, 
that’s all that bothers me  
QUAL did they perceive a 
problem? Did they 
experience conflicts? Were 
they constrained in any 
way?  
Because of the relative 
size of these retailers, 
they all gain an equal 
benefit. It would be fair to 
say that they are smaller 
operations and not 
particularly sophisticated  
 
because you know exactly 
when it’s going to come, you 
can deal with it  
 
STREN Come and join the scheme 
because it’s already got all 
these big established 
retailers on board  
All of this has no bearing 
on competition, or what 
they might perceive as 
competitive advantage. 
Small retailers generally 
do things when they see 
other people doing them. 
As long as the stock gets here 
on time and it’s not damaged, 
then I don’t really have (any 
issues with competition)  
It (sharing with competitors) 
wouldn’t bother me at all. As 
long as we get our stuff – it’s 
only a delivery. I know some 
companies get very funny  
VALU the deliveries are making 
more time to do what they 
want to do, which is selling 
things instead of having to 
manage deliveries  
that the best fits come 
where you have got less 
sophisticated supply 
chains  
 
You can always set your 
watch by what time they’re 
going to turn up. 
I’d rather that it all went in one 
big lorry than we had kind of 
six or seven lorries coming in.  
CONT we were looking for a 
contractor, because it’s so 
far adrift from our core 
business  
Bristol were looking for a 
model and Exel were 
looking for a city 
application   
Anyone can carry things: 
anyone can deliver everything 
and everybody charges much 
the same  
ENV We’re trying to improve air 
quality, reduce the transport 
impacts and also conflict 
between vehicles in 
delivery bays  
the prime agenda of the 
customer is sustainability 
 
the sort of ethics that we had 
behind the company, they 
kind of involved us more on 
an environmental level, 
lowering the vehicle emissions 
and stuff like that  
 
 
Table 13: Summary data display for respondents in the Broadmead case study 
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7.5.1 Distance / Service (“Customer Offering”) 
For all of the key participants, the visibility of the scheme to third parties, 
including consumers, was an expected and desirable outcome of the 
collaboration. This was of more significance to the Council and Exel than to 
the retailers. 
 
“Because the van is marked up like that, it’s kind of advertising the project in 
itself when it goes around Broadmead and people….can see it and think “well, 
at least they’re doing something” (City Council) 
“The obvious (gain) was when we got the front page “Lorry scheme a brilliant 
idea” in the editorial (Bristol Evening Post). I think it does sort of indicate that 
the support that we’ve had from all concerned.” (City Council) 
“There was a mutual coming together of minds: Bristol were looking for a 
model and Exel were looking for a city application.” (Exel) 
 
Some of the retailers (Past Times, Lush) ran their own central warehouses, 
but there was no recognition or mention of any supply chain activities other 
than the single transport leg from the warehouse or supplier to the store, 
usually by general parcels carrier. The concept of relative distance of supply 
chain activities was therefore not relevant in this case. Arguably, the transport 
leg, being the only activity in the control of the individual stores and thus able 
to be the subject of the collaboration, is the nearest supply chain activity to the 
customer. But, because it does not carry any individual retailer branding (in 
terms of livery) or any special, unique or value-adding attribute as far as 
customer offering is concerned, it is of no competitive interest whatsoever. 
However, the proximity of the operation to the end consumers was picked up 
by all of the retailers in consideration of the importance of delivery service and 
thus availability for the consumer: 
 
“Never had anything go missing – nothing. Delivery paperwork all comes 
through OK – perfect. Nothing – not a problem at all. We used to do with our 
old companies, when it was individually delivered, but since it’s come through 
those guys, nothing.” (AR) 
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“If the cost is not a lot of difference between what we were paying originally 
and what we’re going to be paying to use Exel, I think they will keep it on 
because it’s been so good.” (JW) 
“You know, the only difference is dependability – on timeness – and bringing 
the stuff directly to you rather than hanging around”. 
 
There is a potential paradox in this duality of role for the final transport leg. For 
the major retailers, where the store brand is everything, it is an opportunity to 
reinforce the branding on the truck. For smaller retailers, or in markets where 
the product is the brand, this advertising opportunity is less important.  
 
7.5.2 Strength / Quality (“Competitive positioning”) 
The positioning of all of the retailers in this respect could be described as 
“modest”, with most making mention of the shortcomings of their systems. 
This was supported by the Council and by Exel, both of whom believed that 
the collaboration initiative would improve service generally. Again, the 
unsophisticated nature of the previous arrangements meant that there was 
little or nothing in place in terms of comparative service or cost benchmarking 
at the store level and thus no perceptions of relative weakness or strength. 
There were, therefore, virtually no references to the other participants as 
competitors and none of the aggressive language which characterised 
discussions with the grocery retailers. 
 
“It (sharing with competitors) wouldn’t bother me at all. As long as we get our 
stuff – it’s only a delivery. I know some companies get very funny”.  
“So it’s (their goods) totally different to what we sell”.  
“It doesn’t matter who else’s stuff is on the truck: quite frankly it doesn’t.”  
“As long as the stock gets here on time and it’s not damaged, then I don’t 
really have (any issues with competition).”  
 
There were also references to a necessary need for parity of benefit, an issue 
first brought up in the grocery retailing case. 
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“Because of the relative size of these retailers, they all gain an equal benefit. It 
would be fair to say that they are smaller operations and not particularly 
sophisticated.”  
“The best fits come where you have got less sophisticated supply chains.”  
“Small retailers generally do things when they see other people doing them.”  
“The large retailers are clearly inappropriate because of their efficiency.”  
 
7.5.3 Value 
The model developed for the grocery retailing case considered the extent to 
which existing supply chains were deemed to add value to a firm’s operations. 
Unsurprisingly, bearing in mind what has gone before, the apparent value 
added to the operations by the collaboration itself in the Broadmead case was 
of greater significance. As with the “customer offering” variable of cost and 
service, it may be appropriate to develop the model in the light of the second 
case, in that the presence of perceived current high added value may be an 
inhibitor to collaboration, whereas opportunities to add new value where little 
or none exists, nay be a facilitator.  
 
“Neither of them (Broadmead or Exel’s other operation at Heathrow airport) 
breaks even at the moment, but will do over their life as additional services 
are provided.”  
“You can always set your watch by what time they’re going to turn up.”  
“I’d rather that it all went in one big lorry than we had kind of six or seven 
lorries coming in.”  
“If they’ll pay or not depends on the price, but there would probably be some 
value in the fact that it’s predictable.”  
“(It’s) a value added service to them that we should perhaps be thinking about 
charging them for.”  
“One retailer….has indicated that they were expecting that request (for a 
charge) to come. That doesn’t surprise them, which does seem to suggest 
that they do see some value in having this service, even at a cost.”  
“It actually makes their development more attractive. It is in their commercial 
benefit, because you need less delivery bays, less conflict, it makes it more 
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appealing for new retailers to move there, knowing that they’ve got a smooth 
delivery solution.”  
 
“if the cost is not a lot of difference between what we were paying originally 
and what we’re going to be paying to use Exel, I think they will keep it on 
because it’s been so good.”  
 
7.5.4 Contractors / Environmental (External factors) 
Because of the lack of centralisation and absence of centralisation, all of the 
retailers bought in third party transport services prior to the Broadmead trial 
and thus the use of contractors was not perceived as an issue. Physical 
distribution was not regarded as a core skill of either the retailers or the 
Council and was naturally devolved to a third party. Whilst this leaves a 
potential gap in the data and analysis for this particular case, it might also 
reinforce the proposition put forward in the conceptual framework, based on 
Whiteoak’s (1999) proposal, that third party contractors could provide the 
neutral facilitation of cross-channel collaboration between competitors. This is 
perhaps too great a leap of logic at this stage. The proposition that neutral 
facilitators might replace in-house systems in competitive environments is not 
relevant in a context with unsophisticated systems and an absence of 
perceived competition. However, the presence of a contractor in this instance 
certainly seems to allow the proposed trial to be developed and implemented 
more quickly than might otherwise have been the case. 
 
“Exel are interested in the concept of co-opetition in supply chains, for 
commercial reasons.”  
“They (Exel) were very keen to do an urban – a city centre – trial, because it 
seems the logial progression of the good work they’ve done at their other two 
sites.”  
“I don’t think we ever wanted to get into the business of being van drivers. But, 
whether it was a whole package solution or some smaller part that we were 
looking for a contractor, but it’s so far adrift from our core business.”  
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“There was a mutual coming together of minds: Bristol were looking for a 
model and Exel were looking for a city application.”  
 
Unsurprisingly, since the original motivation for the trial had been to look at 
opportunities to reduce environmental damage from urban traffic and 
congestion, there were numerous references to the positive influence of 
“green” politics. However, other external factors were mentioned as being 
influential, including the operational impacts of congestion, particularly at store 
back doors, and the need to be more efficient in the fact of competition from 
elsewhere, particularly alternative out-of-town shopping centres. 
 
“It was certainly one of things that the (European) Commission picked out as 
being one of the most innovative things that was going on. They were very 
interested in it.”  
“Another aspect was to look at how delivery systems could be more efficient, 
particularly building upon the sort of perceived take-off of e-commerce.”  
“The area has over 90,000 deliveries per year, so there’s a considerable 
scope for reduction in that total through consolidation. We’re trying to improve 
air quality, reduce the transport impacts and also conflict between vehicles in 
delivery bays.”  
“It came about when Cribbs Causeway was being built and the threat that that 
presented to Broadmead. People were talking about losing sort of 40% of their 
trade.”  
“It actually makes their development more attractive. It is in their commercial 
benefit, because you need less delivery bays, less conflict, it makes it more 
appealing for new retailers to move there, knowing that they’ve got a smooth 
delivery solution.” 
“The prime agenda of the customer is sustainability, in terms of reducing 
vehicle movements and reducing emissions.”  
“We get a report once a month telling us how many lorries we’ve saved.”  
“They knew the sort of ethics that we had behind the company, they kind of 
involved us more on an environmental level, lowering the vehicle emissions 
and stuff like that.”  
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7.6 Conclusions 
 
There were several important contextual differences between the grocery 
study and the Broadmead case, of which supply chain sophistication, market 
structure and nature of competition were the most significant. This had the 
effect of changing the relative emphasis of some of the variables contained 
within the model. However, no evidence was collected which contradicted the 
original model. The core premise underpinning the research is that there are 
factors which, under different circumstances, will either promote or inhibit 
inter-firm supply chain collaboration. The Broadmead case appears to support 
that notion, albeit while also providing a richer understanding of the 
circumstances under which an inhibitor might become an enabler and vice 
versa. The learnings from the Broadmead case, as applied to the original 
framework and data from the first case can be summarised: 
 
Distance: The distance of a supply chain activity from the end consumer can 
be a facilitator for collaboration between sophisticated supply chains. It is not 
a relevant or valid measure in simpler supply chains. 
Service: The prioritisation of service over cost may inhibit collaboration 
between mature supply chains. Parity of gains in service and cost may 
facilitate collaboration. 
Strength: Perceived relative strength over a competitor will inhibit 
collaboration.  
Quality: Perceived relative systems quality compared with a competitor will 
inhibit collaboration. Perceived parity of potential quality gain will facilitate 
collaboration. 
Value: Perceptions that supply chains add competitive or strategic value will 
inhibit collaboration. Parity of perceived value will facilitate collaboration. 
Contractors: The presence of contractors will facilitate collaboration. 
External Environment: Shared perceptions of environmental threats or 
opportunities will facilitate collaboration. Ownership or control of a potentially 
short resource will inhibit. 
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8 Third Case Study: Tradeteam 
 
The grocery case study was carried out in a context where horizontal 
collaboration between competing supply chains does not generally exist, in 
spite of evidence to suggest that it should. The model to explore the 
facilitators and barriers to such collaboration was developed from that work 
and then tested in the Broadmead case, an example of co-operation between 
competitors, facilitated by third parties. During the course of the Broadmead 
case study, deeper contacts were established with one of these third parties, 
Exel Logistics, who were also a key partner in another example of horizontal 
collaboration which had emerged since the research first started, namely the 
Tradeteam operation in the UK brewing industry.  
 
An informal meeting was held with a member of the Exel senior management 
team in January, 2005, as part of the process of collecting background 
contextual information for the Broadmead case. The conversation moved on 
to consider other potential areas for development in this respect, specifically 
that Exel are interested in the concept of co-opetition in supply chains, for 
commercial reasons. In particular, Exel are looking at the hotel, leisure and 
catering (HOLECA) markets, with a view to attempting to take business away 
from food-service contractors such as Brakes and 3663. It is believed that 
there are a number of retailers in this market who might be interested in 
buying a transport-only solution, as oppose to the full supply chain offering of 
Brakes and their competitors. There are also believed to be opportunities in 
consolidating products from several dedicated sites in the Midlands for 
delivery within the M25. Tradeteam was cited by this respondent as another 
example of what Exel call an “Industry Platform”: the solution of choice for all 
of the major players in a given industry sector. According to this respondent, 
This pub delivery operation was set up as a joint venture, with Exel owning 
51% and Coors 49%. The under-pinning themes are “one system, one fleet, 
one back office”.  
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Desk research, in fact, revealed that the establishment and development of 
Tradeteam was more than just a straightforward joint venture between 
manufacturer and logistics provider, and that the operation has actually 
evolved into a three-way relationship between two rival manufacturers and 
Exel for reasons which were outside the scope of the original rationale. 
Having started out as a jointly-owned distribution operation between Exel and 
Bass, the manufacturer partners are now the international brewers Coors and 
InBev. In order to understand this operational and commercial context better, 
it is necessary to look more closely at the detailed history of the venture. 
 
8.1.1 Exel Logistics 
The previously nationalised National Freight Company was sold to its 
employees in 1982 and renamed the National Freight Consortium (NFC). After 
a series of modest acquisitions in the following years, the company was 
EXEL AND INTERBREW ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO OUTSOURCE LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES 
Proposed contract worth around £500m  
(London, 10 June 2002) – Exel, the world leader in supply chain management, today confirmed that Interbrew
has announced its intention to outsource to Exel’s Tradeteam business the ongoing development and operation
of its UK retail drinks distribution network.  
Tradeteam will provide services to Interbrew UK until at least 2010, and the agreement is expected to have a
total turnover of around £500m over the life of the contract. The deal will be subject to relevant regulatory
clearances and finalisation of detailed commercial terms but it is expected that as part of the deal approximately
1,500 Interbrew employees will transfer to Tradeteam.  
The decision supports Interbrew’s focus on its core sales, marketing and brewing activities in the UK. The
proposed agreement with Tradeteam will provide Interbrew with enhanced distribution capabilities and help drive
significant performance efficiencies that will underpin the success of the business going forward. It is expected
that outsourcing secondary distribution operations to Tradeteam, the leading specialist drinks logistics operator,
will allow Interbrew to focus on developing the strong position of its leading brands.  
The award confirms Tradeteam’s position as the leading independent drinks distributor in the UK and will
continue to support Tradeteam’s role in providing a competitive independent route to market.  
Stewart Gilliland, Chief Executive of Interbrew, UK and Ireland commented: “Exel’s Tradeteam has established
itself as the leading independent distributor in the UK market. This deal recognises Tradeteam’s strengths and
will allow Interbrew to generate significant improvements in performance in our core activities.”  
Graham Fish, Group Commercial Director for Exel added: “Tradeteam has been a strong example of how
customer focus and innovation has created significant value for our customers. This agreement with Interbrew
confirms Tradeteam’s leading role in creating competition and efficiency in the industry.” 
 
Exel Logistics press release, 10th June, 2002
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rebranded as Exel Logistics in 1989, with the aim of building a global 
business. Exel was launched in the USA in 1992, in Mexico in 1993 and then 
began major expansion through acquisitions in Europe and the Far East. The 
Exel brand was launched globally in 2000, following a merger with the Ocean 
Group. Further major purchases included Power Logistics in 2002 and Tibbett 
& Britten in 2004. Most recently, Exel itself has become the subject of a 
takeover by global giant Deutsche Post, who have announced plans to merge 
Exel’s UK operations into their DHL logistics brand, albeit with the 
management of the new integrated brand being taken over by the existing 
Exel UK team. 
 
8.2 Development of Tradeteam 
 
Tradeteam was established in September 1995 as a joint venture between 
Bass Brewers and Exel Logistics. Bass paid £15.5 million for its 49.9% 
holding: in return, Tradeteam paid Bass £31 million to take over 45 distribution 
centres and 700 vehicles.  
In August 2000, Bass sold its brewery operations, including the Carling and 
Bass brands and the stake in Tradeteam, to Interbrew. After the sale, what 
remained of Bass, essentially hotel and catering operations, was renamed Six 
Continents plc. However, the sale of Bass was subsequently blocked by 
Steven Byers, the Trade and Industry Secretary, on the basis that the 
enlarged Interbrew would have a 32% UK market share. Interbrew sold most 
of the breweries and the Tradeteam stake to Coors in February 2002. 
Confusingly, Interbrew retained the Bass brand name for draught ale, but 
contracted production of this brand out to Marstons brewery.  
 
Coors first reported on its stake in Tradeteam in its 2003 Annual Report. At 
that time, the assets of the venture were worth $129.4 million and, the report 
notes, “Tradeteam also delivers products for other UK brewers”.  
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In June 2002, Interbrew outsourced its distribution operations to Tradeteam, in 
a 10-year deal worth £500 million over the life of the contract. 1,500 Interbrew 
employees transferred to Tradeteam. Thus two major competitors in the UK 
brewing industry – Coors and Interbrew – share a common distribution 
system, albeit part-owned by the former. This appears to have increased the 
size of the Tradeteam business by 70%. According to Press Releases at the 
time, Interbrew made this move to allow them to focus on core sales, 
marketing and brewing activities, as well as providing enhanced distribution 
capabilities and improved efficiency. “This deal recognises Tradeteam’s 
strengths and will allow Interbrew to generate significant improvements in 
performance in our core activities”, said Stewart Gilliland, Chief Executive of 
Interbrew, UK and Ireland.   
 
In August 2004, Interbrew, then the world’s third largest brewer, joined with 
the fifth largest, Companhia de Bebidas das Americas (AmBev), to form 
InBev, the largest brewer in the world. The origins of Interbrew can be traced 
back to 1366 in Belgium. The combined company has a portfolio of more than 
200 brands, of which the leaders are Stella Artois, Brahma and Becks.  
 
In February 2005, Molson and Adolph Coors combined to form the Molson 
Coors Brewing Company, with the UK operation continuing to trade as Coors 
Brewers, based in Burton, of which the main brands are Carling, Grolsch and 
Worthington. Based on the purchase of most of the former Bass operations 
from Interbrew, Coors now claim to be able to trace their UK heritage back to 
William Worthington in the 1740’s and now have a 20% share of the UK 
market.  
 
Tradeteam has also secured contracts with outlets, as opposed to suppliers: 
in 2002 it announced deals with JD Wetherspoons, to supply promotional lines 
from a number of independent breweries as well as Guinness and Corona 
Extra, and Associated Church Clubs, to supply products from Interbrew, 
Coors and Carlsberg-Tetley. However, “weaker performance” by Tradeteam in 
the third quarter of the financial year was reported by Exel in October 2004. In 
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January 2003, Tradeteam was reported as having 3,500 employees across 57 
sites, delivering 13 million barrels of beer annually to 25,000 outlets.  
 
InBev’s strategy is founded on its brands, described on its corporate web-site 
as the “cornerstone of our relationships with consumers”. Competitive 
advantage will be sustained by investment in brands. Bass remains one of the 
key multi-country brands in InBev’s portfolio, even though its production is 
now outsourced.  
 
Coors’ strategy is similarly based on the strength of its brands, particularly in 
respect of their perceived quality: “We’re passionate about beer and 
determined that everyone else should feel the same”. Coors was the first UK 
brewery to achieve the ISO 9002 quality standard. The brands are supported 
by five values: integrity, quality, excelling, passion and creativity.  
 
8.3 Research Protocol 
 
A rationale for case study research in this area was discussed in the 
background to the previous case, the Bristol Broadmead Consolidation 
Centre. Because of the nature of the phenomenon under consideration, a 
case study approach is also relevant in the Tradeteam example. The unit of 
analysis under consideration is the shared logistics operations for Coors and 
Interbrew operated by Tradeteam. The desk-based background research has 
not only set the context for the case, but has also identified the three key 
stake-holders in the operation.  
 
The same basic research tools were used in this case: semi-structured 
interviews lasting an hour or more that were tape recorded, then transcribed, 
after which the data was manually coded, reduced and analysed. Pattern 
codes were sought in line with the seven variables set out on the contextual 
framework. 
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As mentioned above, the initial contacts were identified opportunistically and 
then used to identify more specific operational respondents. This third case 
was intended to gain further understanding of whether the conceptual 
framework and its seven variables had validity in a second actual example of 
logistics collaboration. It was not, therefore, intended to try and gain a deep 
and rich insight into the workings of the brewery industry or even into the 
Tradeteam example itself, but rather to expose the proposed model to an 
actual implementation. As will be seen later, this case also appears to afford 
the opportunity to propose how the model might be calibrated at some stage. 
On this basis, and bearing in mind the definition of the unit of analysis, key 
respondents were identified from within the Tradeteam operation itself 
(Business Development Director), Coors and InBev (Contract Managers). 
However, after an initial discussion, the InBev contact declined to be 
interviewed for unspecified reasons, and further approaches to InBev via their 
Head Office by both telephone and e-mail were declined. This does not 
appear to reflect any sensitivity about the Tradeteam operation of itself, but is 
rather a manifestation of a corporate policy towards disclosure of commercial 
information. Whilst this refusal of access was disappointing, it does not 
fundamentally undermine the validity of this case. Understanding the attitudes, 
experiences and motivations of each side of the dyad ought to be possible 
through access to one of the two manufacturer parties, albeit accepting that 
access to both manufacturers might have been a better outcome. 
 
In the analysis of the data which follows, BA is the Tradeteam contact and FB 
is from Coors. 
 
8.4 Findings - Contextual Issues 
 
In the Broadmead case study, a number of key contextual differences, 
compared with the grocery study were noted. Consideration of the brewery 
industry under the same contextual headings reveals some similarities to the 
other cases, but also some important key differences. 
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Table 14: Comparison of Tradeteam contextual factors to the other cases 
 
Of these, the factors to emerge most strongly from the Tradeteam case 
interviews were that competition is between brands, rather than supply chains 
and that, being relatively simple and of common format, the supply chains 
themselves do not contribute to competitive advantage.  
 Grocery study Broadmead case Tradeteam case 
Logistics 
system 
characteristics 
Mature central 
distribution model, 
with high levels of 
transport 
integration and 
resource control or 
ownership. “Just in 
time” 
methodologies to 
underpin availability 
and freshness. 
Some retail-
controlled central 
stockholding but no 
central transport 
structures and all 
transport with multi-
user contractors. 
Availability 
supported by in-
store stock. Lack of 
availability 
promotes switching 
or opportunism. 
Single, manufacturer-
controlled 
stockholding echelon, 
with non-integrated 
radial transport for 
final leg deliveries. 
Availability supported 
by stock. Combines 
stock levels of small 
retailers with 
centralised platform 
of major retailers. 
Market 
structure 
High levels of 
concentration with 
a small number of 
large and powerful 
players 
Highly fragmented: 
up to 300 retailers 
in the immediate 
market. 
High levels of 
concentration, as in 
major retail. 
Competition Competition targets 
clearly identified 
and competitive 
stance embedded 
in strategy. 
Niche propositions 
replace direct 
competitive 
strategies. 
Competition almost 
exclusively driven by 
brands and marketing 
effort. 
Cost drivers Clear trade-off 
between cost and 
service, determined 
by strategic market 
positioning. 
Better service 
apparently 
available at no 
additional cost. 
Assuming that basic 
cost parity achieved, 
service is prioritised 
to minimise 
switching. 
External 
influences 
Fears over anti-
competitive 
perceptions in the 
media and in 
government 
impede 
collaboration. 
Possible resource 
shortages 
encourage 
protectivism. 
Presence of 
brokers to facilitate 
shared solution. 
Threat to overall 
market size posed 
by new out-of-town 
development. 
Legislative pressures 
led to divestment of 
activities. Strong 
contractor presence. 
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8.4.1 Logistics Systems 
As was noted in the Broadmead, major retailer supply chains tend to be at the 
forefront of logistics developments and other sectors lag behind them in many 
respects. There are some parallels between the move to retail centralised 
distribution and the consolidation of logistics activities within the brewing 
industry. The typical supply chain structure comprises stock in vats or tanks at 
the brewery; stock in kegs or cans at the distribution centre and a 
straightforward radial transport operation to make final leg deliveries. 
“Brewery supply chains tend to be fairly simple.” (BA 28.4.05) 
“They (brewers) monitor the stock levels and the forward orders and they 
replenish our network to meet forecast demand.” (BA 28.4.05) 
There is a strong contractor presence: as well as the Tradeteam operation for 
Coors and InBev, third party provider Gist operates the Carlsberg network. 
Unlike UK food retailer operations, distribution is still largely manufacturer-
driven, as opposed to being retailer-led. This is largely explained by the 
strength of the brands. There are some small exceptions. The pub chain JD 
Wetherspoon has set up its own in-house centralised distribution operation. 
Arguably, Wetherspoons could be seen as an attempt to develop a branding 
for the retail outlets to compete with, or at least complement, the brands of the 
brewers whose products they sell. 
This contrasts with the major retailer case, in which the retailers see 
themselves as the important brands, rather than the brand strength of the 
product ranges they sell. 
“For us, it’s all about the individual products whereas for them, the brand is all 
they’ve got.” (FB 13.5.05). Perhaps the one exception to this contention would 
be Marks & Spencer where, given that the range is virtually 100% own label, 
the product branding and store branding are one and the same thing. 
 
8.4.2 Market structure 
Tradeteam view their total target market as being 60,000 pubs across the UK, 
although there are in total 130,000 licensed premises including other types of 
outlets, such as clubs and hotels, etcetera. Their estimate for the average 
 205
turnover of a pub is £10,000 per week, so the overall market size is estimated 
to be £60 billion: a bit smaller than the total grocery market. However, like 
grocery, the market has become somewhat polarised. There are two major 
players in the pub sector: Punch and Enterprise, who between them own 
something like a third of all the outlets. On the supply side, there are basically 
just four national brewers – Coors, Interbrew, Carlsberg and Scotco – with a 
second tier of two so-called “super-regionals”, Greene King and 
Wolverhampton and Dudley. 
 
None of the respondents was in possession of firm market share data for their 
respective operations. At the operational level, the business is managed on 
the basis of numbers of pubs or barrels throughput (a barrel is 26 gallons). 
Scotco are estimated to have 30% of the pubs, Tradeteam 25% and 
Carlsberg in third position with 11% or 12%. After this top three, the rest is 
very fragmented. Tradeteam’s next major target for business growth is the 
8,000 strong chain of pubs operated by Punch, currently with Carlsberg: the 
contract for this work comes up in the next two years. Also, although quite a 
bit smaller, the Spirit group of pubs come up at about the same time and that 
would also be an attractive target for Tradeteam, giving them overall market 
dominance. 
 
8.4.3 Competition and Supply Chains 
The Tradeteam operation is a clear and distinct example of an active and fully 
intentional collaboration between close competitors.  
“The propositions that Coors and Interbrew see themselves as competitors 
and collaborators are both true.” (BA 28.4.05) 
The factor which emerges most strongly from the data, however, is that this 
close competition is absolutely defined by the relative strength of brands and 
marketing effort. Market share is driven absolutely by the marketing effort 
invested behind the brands and all other areas of supply chain activity are 
seen as subservient to this. It is taken as a given that service, in terms of 
availability and cost, must be provided as a matter of routine, but once 
established, this provides nothing further in terms of competitive advantage.  
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Because all of the brewing groups can, to a large extent, offer a full range of 
products to their pub customers, pubs can switch their entire range fairly 
easily. There is thus a perceived need to ensure that service levels are 
maintained to avoid switching. 
“In a sense, Tradeteam is just a reaction to what is effectively factory-gate 
pricing. The pubs want the brands, the delivery service, the technical services 
and they want to be able to go to whoever they want and have all of that lot 
consolidated for them into one supply chain solution.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 
8.4.4 External Influences 
The biggest external influence over both the market and its associated supply 
chains has been the emergence of the major pub chains, following legislation 
to separate beer manufacture from retail supply in 1989. The so-called Beer 
Orders was a piece of legislation limiting the numbers of pubs which could be 
owned by anyone, including the brewers. Prior to that time, Bass owned all 
their pubs in what was essentially a captive vertically-integrated market. After 
the legislation, they had to divest themselves of all their pubs. New pub retail 
groups were created as a result and all of these started to implement some of 
the practises observed in the operations of successful retailers in other fields.  
They said things like “we don’t want 10 different supplier vehicles turning up at 
my pub”. They were after things like FGP (factory gate pricing). “I want 
consolidation of suppliers based on what my punters want” (BA 28.4.05) 
The decision to consider doing something different with the supply chain was 
a response to a changing market. The brewers have also seen an ever-
increasing trend in drinking at home and purchases from supermarkets: there 
has been a concurrent fall in drinking in pubs by as much as 3% a year. “The 
Bass view at the time, therefore, was that they had these damn great 
networks, pubs switching volume between suppliers and a decline in volume 
as well. There were lots of good reasons to try and get rid of a load of the 
infrastructure.” (BA 28.4.05) 
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8.5 Discussion – Implications for the model 
 
As in the Broadmead case, the relative influence of the model variables was 
different again in the Tradeteam case from that of the major retailers. Because 
the supply chains are fairly simple and a standard model, based on 
manufacturer-driven distribution centres, has been widely applied, the 
concepts of distance of supply chain activities from the consumer and relative 
service and quality measures between competitors are a little less meaningful 
in this case, whilst still valid. The consumer is likely to be far less aware of all 
supply chain activities in the brewery industry than in grocery supermarkets or 
even High Street shops so the concept of “distance” is less useful here. 
Furthermore, the trade-off between cost and service appears to be less 
absolute and mutually exclusive in this case. Of far more interest in 
considering logistics collaboration are the perceptions of the nature of 
competition and attitudes towards the outsourcing of non-core or non-value 
adding activities, and thus the presence of contractors in the market. 
 
A summary of some of the key data identified against the variable codes is set 
out in the table below. 
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 Contractor Manufacturer 
DIST The areas of competition are marketing, 
brand strength and quality of product. 
Everything else is very much a back 
office thing. 
The long-term real relationships have 
not all gone, but they’re certainly moving 
away. 
So everything is down to brand strength, 
it’s not controlled by distribution. 
SERV They thought it might have an impact on 
the level of service to the end point. 
The pubs want the brands, the delivery 
service, the technical services and they 
want to be able to go to whoever they 
want and have all of that lot 
consolidated for them into one supply 
chain solution. 
QUAL (The old distribution system) was not 
any kind of competitive advantage. 
Distribution isn’t about competitive 
advantage, and it provides as good a 
service as the competition, then it is 
able to build volume because it provides 
a multi-user platform. 
STREN Sometimes, when you and try and bring 
businesses together, there is more 
resistance from the bigger ones, 
because they believe they have less 
synergy to gain than the smaller ones. 
The propositions that Coors and 
Interbrew see themselves as 
competitors and collaborators are both 
true. 
It may well be the case that the small 
producers get an easier route to market 
than they might otherwise have done, 
but you have to ask if we’re really 
competing with them. 
It’s not about competing on distribution, 
but much more about “what are we 
selling versus what they are selling?”  
VALU Interbrew had already had the chance to 
look at Tradeteam and Whitbread 
Distribution Services and worked out 
that there were synergies between 
them. 
We never viewed distribution as any 
kind of differentiator in this market. 
Distribution is viewed just as a service 
that is required. 
CONT They went after a JV (joint venture) 
because giving up your logistics at that 
stage was seen as being just too 
radical. 
The Bass core business is about 
producing and selling brands, so let’s 
get into bed with a distribution 
professional, so the solution is seen to 
be independent. 
ENV Doing something different with the 
supply chain was a response to a 
changing market. 
People were looking for different 
solutions, rather than all of the 
traditional routes to market. 
 
 
Table 15: Summary data display for respondents in the third case study 
 
8.5.1 Distance / Service (“Customer Offering”) 
Supply to and consumption in pubs tend to take place at completely different 
times of the day, so there is an argument that no supply chain activities are 
actually visible to the end customer. In terms of the concept of distance, this 
gives all logistics activities sufficient distance from the consumer, allowing 
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distance not to be an inhibitor and thus allowing collaboration to take place, 
within the framework of the model. 
“For them, the areas of competition are marketing, brand strength and quality 
of product. Everything else is very much a back office thing.” (BA 28.4.05) 
Traditionally, there were strong relationship at the “back door” between the 
brewery dray-men making the deliveries and the landlords and managers of 
the pubs. 
“From our point of view, the people most in contact with the customers were 
the drivers.” (FB 13.5.05) But this has now changed, and the professional 
managers brought in to manage the assets of the new pub chains appear to 
have distanced themselves from these more traditional arrangements: “The 
long-term real relationships have not all gone, but they’re certainly moving 
away.” (FB 13.5.05) 
However, although the distribution function is increasingly regarded as 
disconnected from retail operations, given the importance of branding to 
competition, branding has to be removed from supply chain assets in order to 
facilitate collaboration. 
“From a very early stage, we neutralised the appearance of the original fleet, 
removing all the things like Bass logos, and Stella and Boddingtons stickers, 
so we got to the blue and silver we run now.” (BA 28.4.05) 
 
The relative importance of service over upstream distance is evidenced by an 
example in which it was proposed that common stock, supplied by other 
manufacturers, for both the brewers be managed as a single pool by 
Tradeteam. This was recognised as being economically and operationally 
feasible and desirable, but was not implemented because of concerns over 
service to the pubs. 
“We put it (shared common stock) to them and Coors were happy with it, but 
Interbrew struggled with the idea. They said it was all to do with things like 
who got the first call on the stock and who got the freshest stock. They 
thought it might have an impact on the level of service to the end point.” (BA 
28.4.05) 
This is reflected in the fact that switching between suppliers remains a 
concern for brewers, with competitors being able to offer a full range of 
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competing products, albeit with brand strengths not necessarily being 
comparable. 
“We operate effectively as a wholesaler. In this case, we can certainly lose the 
business if we don’t give them what they want.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 “There are now lots of routes to market. We could certainly lose business if 
we weren’t able to provide the service.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 “The issue now is that when we talk to a group of perhaps 300 or 400 pubs, 
they look at the total 40,000 deliveries we make and say “What kind of service 
am I going to get?” (BA 28.4.05) 
 
In the Broadmead case, customer service was perceived to have improved as 
a result of the collaboration. In Tradeteam, the collaboration has allowed for 
the full range service now demanded by customers to be delivered, which 
could also be regarded as an overall improvement. 
 
8.5.2 Strength / Quality (“Competitive Positioning”) 
The major important organisational characteristic or trait to emerge from the 
major retailer case was “arrogance”. However, in Broadmead, the apparent 
“modesty” of the retail respondents was noted, largely driven by their relatively 
small size of operations and niche positioning. In the brewery industry, the 
equivalent concept might be described as “realistic”. There was a recognition 
that the real competition is in the brands and that almost everything else, 
therefore, should be approached in a rationale and objective way. If service 
levels can be maintained and costs reduced through collaboration, then this 
should be seriously considered.  
“Everything is down to brand strength, it’s not controlled by distribution.” (FB 
13.5.05) 
“So, if distribution isn’t about competitive advantage, and it provides as good a 
service as the competition, then it is able to build volume because it provides 
a multi-user platform.” (FB 13.5.05) 
“It was not any kind of competitive advantage (to Interbrew).” (BA 28.4.05) 
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“We can use both companies as a point of reference to demonstrate that 
sharing a distribution route does not compromise competitiveness.” (BA 
28.4.05) 
 
This objectivity extends to questioning the assertion, raised in the major 
retailer case, that there needs to be parity of opportunity for gain between 
prospective participants.  
“Sometimes, when you try and bring businesses together, there is more 
resistance from the bigger ones, because they believe they have less synergy 
to gain than the smaller ones.” (BA 28.4.05) 
Major or stronger retailers would be reluctant to collaborate with smaller or 
weaker players, on the basis that the latter would have more to gain from the 
partnership. The brewers, on the other hand, did not regard this as significant.  
“It may well be the case that the small producers get an easier route to market 
than they might otherwise have done, but you have to ask if we’re really 
competing with them.” (FB 13.5.05) 
“It’s not about competing on distribution, but much more about “what are we 
selling versus what they are selling?” (FB 13.5.05) 
 “But here, there wasn’t even any resistance from Coors, even when they 
were 90% of the Tradeteam business and we wanted to bring in much smaller 
customers. In fact, from their point of view, this was the whole idea in view of 
the changes going on in the market: to try and use up excess capacity.” (BA 
28.4.05) 
 
Although participants might have been expected to argue that the common 
platform offered them, to some extent, an advantage over other firms who had 
not joined, there were actually some views that the operation was far from 
perfect. 
“Would you believe that Tradeteam operates on three different ERP systems, 
because of where it came from? We have the Coors system, because that is 
driving their product in and taking their orders. The same is true for Interbrew 
and then we have our own third system for dealing with our own direct 
relationships with the pub groups. However, it’s not a complete mess: there is 
a common transport planning system – we use DIPS – and this takes 
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downloads from all three systems and makes up a common plan.” (BA 
28.4.05) 
 
8.5.3 Value 
It is certainly the view of the participants in Tradeteam that the distribution 
function offers nothing in terms of adding value to the customer offering. “We 
never viewed distribution as any kind of differentiator in this market. 
Distribution is viewed just as a service that is required. It certainly doesn’t 
allow us to win any new business. I may be slightly different, but I don’t think 
we could win volume because of distribution or supply chain operations, no 
matter how good they are: people come to us because they want the brands. 
It’s definitely the case that retailers can fail because of their supply chains – 
just look at Sainsburys – but, as long as it’s all working OK, does it really 
make a difference? I don’t think so.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 
This is not necessarily a view shared universally across the industry, however. 
Carlsberg, who operate to a similar model in terms of contractor-operated, 
manufacturer-driven warehousing, have chosen not to collaborate with 
competitors. “They believe very strongly that they must have total control of 
their routes to market.” (BA 28.4.05) 
“Carlsberg…..they see the distribution service as providing a competitive 
advantage. They didn’t want to get into shared user and definitely saw their 
drays as a competitive advantage. For them, it was all about keeping 
traditional values.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 
The influence of the major retailers, arguably at the vanguard of logistics 
developments in the UK, continues, both in terms of offering a model for 
adoption by retail pub groups and through the implementation of factory gate 
pricing and other interventions in the supply of products from the brewers to 
the major supermarkets. 
“The pub market is now much more aligned to the retail sector. They’re 
looking at Tesco, Sainsbury and at the various retail supply chain models, with 
things like e-trading and factory-gate.” (FB 13.5.05) 
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It’s interesting to see that those very same retailers are not interested in 
sharing their resources to the same extent. It intrigues me that Tesco can get 
so much into FGP, which might give them a short-term benefit and they could 
have got all of that a different way. (FB 13.5.05) 
Furthermore, it is argued that retailer initiatives in this respect might actually 
be counter-productive: brewery distribution is already effective and any slavish 
desire on the part of an individual retailer to extend their influence up the 
supply chain might introduce either inefficiency or additional risk. 
“Now they collect in full loads, but we could have got this full load benefit for 
them anyway and, in the meantime, they’ve had to take on all the risks. I really 
don’t understand why they’ve bothered.”  (FB 13.5.05) 
 
8.5.4 Contractors / Environmental (External factors) 
One of the key contentions of the proposed model was that the active 
presence of contractors in a market, allied to a willingness on the part of firms 
to out-source non-core activities, were enablers for implementation of 
collaborations. Brewery distribution has been seen as non-core for most of the 
major players for some years. Even Carlsberg, who seek to maintain control 
of their supply chain for the time being have contracted out the actual 
operational management.  
Tradeteam is particularly interesting, in that it initially represented a staged 
move from in-house operations to collaborative out-sourcing, via a joint 
venture with the logistics provider. This could be seen as an attempt to deal 
with organisational inertia or political barriers to change within an organisation.  
“The JV was basically just a dressed-up sort of out-sourcing. Bass had 
probably decided this 10 years ago, but they didn’t go for straight outsourcing. 
Instead, they went after a JV (joint venture) because giving up your logistics at 
that stage was seen as being just too radical. (BA 28.4.05) 
Having established the principle of partial loss of control over logistics, once 
the joint venture had to be divested as part of the Bass disposal, there were 
no further barriers to complete divestment of control to a third party. 
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“They sold Tradeteam as part of the deal with Coors, but realised that they 
could still realise the same synergy benefits through outsourcing.” (BA 
28.4.05) 
Furthermore, once the first major player had started to divest itself of 
distribution operations, it was perhaps easier for other players to follow suit. 
“Interbrew had clearly decided that they wanted to give their logistics away.” 
(BA 28.4.05) 
Interestingly, the contractor responsible for running the stand-alone operation 
for Carlsberg attempted to facilitate some collaborations of its own in the 
market-place, which was  
“Gist were already running an NDC at Northampton to service the retail trade 
and therefore put up a proposition to Interbrew, which said “we’ll synergise 
with a third party, in this case Carlsberg, on your behalf”. (BA 28.4.05) 
 
Having challenged and addressed organisational barriers to change, the use 
of contractors is consistent with focusing on core skills. “The Bass core 
business is about producing and selling brands, so let’s get into bed with a 
distribution professional, so the solution is seen to be independent.” (FB 
13.5.05) 
Contractors, particularly those with experience of working in shared-user 
environments also have the expertise to deal with organisational concerns 
about sharing the visibility of commercially sensitive data with competing 
collaborative partners. “Tradeteam are scrupulous about not talking to each 
one about the other one’s business: there are Chinese walls around these 
things.” (FB 13.5.05) 
 
The single biggest environmental factor driving the Tradeteam collaboration 
appears to have been the fundamental changes in the shape and dynamic of 
the market, driven by the separation of beer manufacture from retailing by the 
1989 Beer Orders, together with later legislative actions on market 
dominance.  
“What had been a completely vertically-integrated industry was in a market 
which needed to change.” (FB 13.5.05) 
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“Doing something different with the supply chain was a response to a 
changing market. Having built up these systems over the years, there are 
loads of reasons why the brewers still might want to get rid of them. 
Fundamentally, it’s driven by a change in the market.” (BA 28.4.05) 
 
These fundamental changes furthermore created the opportunity for “rational” 
players to question the structure and value of their existing supply 
arrangements. 
“There were lots of good reasons to try and get rid of a load of the 
infrastructure.” (BA 28.4.05) 
People were looking for different solutions, rather than all of the traditional 
routes to market. We couldn’t carry on protecting the position of where we 
were. There was a definite opportunity to set up an industry platform.” (FB 
13.5.05) 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
There were contextual similarities and differences between the brewery case 
and the first two cases. Market dominance by a small number of key players 
and common distribution models reflected the major supermarkets, whereas 
an emphasis on product branding, service and a resulting emphasis on “front 
of house” rather than “back office” functions was closer to the context of the 
small retailers in the Broadmead case. Again, this example of collaboration 
has not rendered any of the variables in the model completely irrelevant, but 
suggests that their relative significance as inhibitors or facilitators will vary in 
different contexts as described. A multi-dimensional nature may need to be 
introduced to the model therefore, which sets the seven suggested variables 
up against the contextual factors discussed in the second and third cases. 
This is set out in the following table:. 
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 Logistics 
System 
Character 
Market 
Structure 
Basis of 
Competition
Cost 
Drivers 
External 
Influences 
DIST      
SERV      
QUAL      
STREN      
VALU      
CONT      
ENV      
 
 
Table 16: The setting of logistics variables against contextual variables as a result of 
the Tradeteam case 
 
Each cell of the table can then be populated by a contextual measure to 
predict combinations of circumstances in which horizontal collaboration might 
be more likely to take place. For example, where logistics systems are 
undergoing an evolutionary or even revolutionary change, and thus 
competitive advantage is, to some extent, achievable at the leading edge, 
then distance of a supply chain activity from the end consumer may be an 
important predictor for collaboration. Similarly, a market based on competitive 
product branding, rather than outlet or “system” branding might be more likely 
to see collaborative developments. 
 
This proposition, together with the tentative development of these explanatory 
dimensions will be explored in the context of a comparative analysis of all the 
data across all three case studies. 
 217
9 Chapter Nine - Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Three cases have been examined to try and gain an understanding of the 
existence of, and inter-relationships between, various factors which might act 
as facilitators or inhibitors for horizontal supply chain collaboration between 
competing firms. These cases have not been established as equal or 
equivalent in the sense that they were not intended to be three pieces of 
parallel work of equal scale and contribution. Rather, the major retailer case 
was the context which was used to develop a theoretical model based on the 
non-application of collaboration in an environment which prior research 
suggested was appropriate and relevant for such collaboration. This model 
was then re-examined against the findings from two further cases in which 
horizontal collaboration has been successfully implemented. The scale of the 
three cases was not balanced in the sense that the majority of time and effort 
was invested in the first case, to try and understand the types of issues which 
might be in play. These issues included attitudes to competition and market 
structure generally, as well as more focused exploration of attitudes to the 
more operational details of supply chains and physical distribution operations. 
It was not the intention of this research to achieve a similar depth of 
understanding about the contexts of non-food retailing or the brewery industry. 
Both these latter industrial contexts were, to a large extent, incidental to the 
more practical task of testing the validity of more general assertions about the 
role of supply chain and logistics strategies in the broader context of 
competitive industry. In other words, the research is about the potential for 
logistics collaboration, not about the retailing or brewing industries. 
Nonetheless, it appears that the relative influence of some of the enabling and 
inhibiting factors to the eventual operationalised outcome is, to some extent, 
context-specific. It is, therefore, useful to summarise some observations about 
the similarities and differences between the three industrial contexts. In the 
chapters examining the data from the second and third cases in detail, key 
points of difference from the original supermarket case were examined under 
the five headings of: 
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- Logistics system characteristics and level of maturity and 
complexity. 
- Market structure. 
- Nature and basis of competition. 
- Ability or willingness to trade off cost against service. 
- Source of environmental threats and ability to control or influence 
these.  
 
In order to draw a more measured set of comparisons across the three cases, 
a continuum of possible parameters can be developed for each of these five 
headings. 
 
This cross-case analysis seeks to identify patterns to explain the relative 
influence of the contextual variables on the supply chain variables, with a view 
to redrawing the original conceptual model. To aid the exploration and 
understanding of these patterns, an attempt is made to map the common 
characteristics of the players in each context, wherever such commonality can 
be identified, against a dimension for that variable. This scaling is not 
numerically based or rooted in any other mathematical relationships, but is 
intended to give some visual representation of the strategic and market 
characteristics of each context relative to the others. Such expression in a 
linear format is clearly something of an over-simplification and a multi-
dimensional framework would be required to capture all the possible 
variations. However, such simplification serves to surface the key 
differentiating factors and their potential influences. 
 
9.1 Logistics system characteristics 
The data from each case was reduced to the following summary observations. 
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Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Mature central 
distribution model, 
with high levels of 
transport integration 
and resource control 
or ownership. “Just in 
time” methodologies 
to underpin availability 
and freshness. 
Some retail-
controlled central 
stockholding but no 
central transport 
structures and all 
transport with multi-
user contractors. 
Availability supported 
by in-store stock. 
Lack of availability 
promotes switching 
or opportunism by 
consumers. 
Single, manufacturer-
controlled stockholding 
echelon, with non-
integrated radial 
transport for final leg 
deliveries. Availability 
supported by stock. 
Combines stock levels 
of small retailers with 
centralised platform of 
major retailers. 
  
Table 17: Summary of the key contextual characteristics of the three cases 
 
Logistics systems can be described on the basis of positioning on the 
following ranges, with evidence generally suggesting a move away from the 
first of each dyad towards the second, representing the increased 
sophistication of the supply chain: 
 
- Direct store delivery to centralised consolidation and distribution. 
- Multiple safety stock locations to stockless cross-docking. 
- Long cycle and response times to more frequent and rapid “just in 
time” deliveries. 
- Complete manufacturer control to complete retailer control. 
 
The order of these four dyads’ development is deliberate: centralisation has 
tended to be followed by stock reduction and reduced cycle times. The degree 
of retailer control over the processes has tended to increase in parallel with 
three phases of development. Therefore, the overall degree of sophistication 
can be described as the extent to which the first three stages of the process 
have been achieved. 
 
Major supermarkets: all three phases in place, with retailer control largely in 
place achieved and thus, in terms of the dyad, highly sophisticated. 
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Tradeteam: centralised, but still with significant stock and longer cycle times 
and only early signs of retail intervention: semi-sophisticated. 
Broadmead: deliveries largely direct to store, with limited examples of 
intermediate stock. There is little or no retailer control over the distribution 
function, which is generally, therefore, unsophisticated. 
 
Figure 25: The relationship between the locus of control and logistics system 
characteristics 
 
9.2 Market structure 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the UK grocery retail market is 
almost unique in terms of its levels of concentration, driven by apparent 
customer preference for the superstore and the weekly shop, as opposed to 
other trading formats and shopping habits favoured in other economies. In 
Europe, only Holland comes close to the levels of concentration achieved in 
the UK, with the “big four” accounting for over three-quarters of the market 
and, as media commentators have increasingly commented, more than one in 
every eight pounds spent in the UK going through the tills of Tesco. Whilst 
there are some variations between the major players in the mix and range 
offered, for example, Sainsbury emphasising the fresh ranges and Asda 
majoring on clothes and non-foods, there is nonetheless a general 
consistency based on the premise that all the major firms do offer a fully 
Logistics 
Systems Direct to store Centralised Stockless Just in time 
Retail control Manufacturer control 
Broadmead Tradeteam Supermarkets 
 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
High levels of 
concentration with a 
small number of 
large and powerful 
players 
Highly fragmented: 
up to 300 retailers in 
the immediate 
market 
High levels of 
concentration, as in 
major retail 
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comprehensive range of groceries, facilitating the consumer preference for a 
weekly one-stop shop.  
 
This concentration is reflected in the brewing industry, largely driven by global 
consolidation and rationalisation, not only in the pursuit of manufacturing 
economies of scale, but also because of the development of global brands.  
The UK’s Campaign for Real Ale might be regarded as one of the more 
successful campaigns of its type in the world, but the remaining regional 
specialist brewers of traditional products still retain only modest market 
shares, with the majors complementing their international lager and long-life 
brands with a presence in the real ale market. Respondents in the second 
case described a market dominated by just four major national players, 
followed by two regional groupings. 
 
The Broadmead shopping centre represents another type of shopping: that of 
the leisure experience, where a multitude of smaller brands and groups 
occupy their own specialist niches, with only the occasional department store 
offering any kind of breadth which might pose a competitive threat to the 
smaller chains.  
 
However, both concentration (numbers of players) or scale (relative size of 
players) are less important than the concept of the number of sub-markets 
involved. Food retailing is a discrete market and, with certain exceptions, one 
firm’s gain in market share is another firm’s loss. Similarly in brewing, demand 
is finite and there is therefore, at one level, a single market. Leisure shopping, 
as in Broadmead, is a more complex mix of smaller markets and it is difficult 
to draw conclusions about how spending in one outlet might affect spending in 
another. 
Figure 26: Differing market structures in the three cases 
Market 
structure 
Discrete fixed market 
with finite switchable 
demand 
Complex mix of 
markets with little 
switching impact 
Supermarkets Tradeteam Broadmead 
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9.3 Basis of competition 
 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Competition targets 
clearly identified and 
competitive stance 
embedded in strategy 
Niche propositions 
replace direct 
competitive strategies 
Competition almost 
exclusively driven by 
brands and marketing 
effort 
 
Retailers, both large and small, and manufacturers generally base their 
marketing proposition on two entirely different premises. For the 
manufacturer, the branding and identity is largely based on the product, whilst 
for the retailer, the store format and identity are the branding, rather than the 
goods offered. There are exceptions: in Marks and Spencer, with its high 
reliance on own-label, the branding of range and store identity are blurred. 
Some manufacturers also operate their own retail outlets, Thorntons for 
example, again blurring the distinction. However, at a general level, the 
distinction between the branding efforts of Tesco and InBev are clear. The 
brewers no longer have any control over their outlets, so the emphasis is 
exclusively on the brand. In summary, the retailers’ proposition is based on 
their infrastructure: where the outlets are, what they contain and how it is set 
before the consumer. 
 
The same principle holds good for the relatively much smaller retailers in 
Broadmead, with an added dimension. Whilst within a given niche, like mobile 
phones, there may be up to a dozen competing firms in a single city centre, 
there are dozens of other niches and although consumer spending is 
ultimately finite, the respondents in the third case gave no sense that 
cosmetics firms where competing with footwear outlets or home furnishings 
with clothing. This places these smaller outlets somewhere between the two 
poles described above. The format branding and the product branding tend to 
be much closer together: Lush cosmetics and Tie Rack are two good 
examples of this, with the distinction between the store branding and the 
product much harder to discern: promotion of one implies promotion of the 
other.  
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Figure 27: Different sources of brand strength in the three cases 
 
9.4 Cost or service drivers 
 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Clear trade-off between 
cost and service, 
determined by strategic 
market positioning 
Better service 
apparently available at 
no additional cost 
Assuming that basic cost 
parity achieved, service 
is prioritised to minimise 
switching 
 
 
It is more difficult to distinguish between the contexts in terms of the 
positioning on the “traditional” Porter strategy trade-off between cost / price 
and service. However, if the responses are considered individually, rather 
than grouped by case, different positions can be noted. For example among 
the major retailers, Somerfield and Marks & Spencer both commented that 
service would, on occasions, be compromised in order to keep costs down, 
whereas Sainbury and Asda required that the trade-of be much more actively 
managed to optimise cost and service as far as possible. However, whilst the 
major retailers, therefore, could be regarded as split between an orientation 
towards service and cost, in all cases there was a recognition that an active 
trade-off position between cost and service was desirable as part of the 
strategic and operational offering.  
 
On the other hand, the retailers in the Broadmead example were all more 
oriented towards service rather than cost, over which they generally did not 
have much control. The fact that the collaborative initiative improved service 
was welcomed even if the long-term cost implications were not fully 
understood.  
Nature of 
competition 
Brand strength derived 
from the outlets / 
infrastructure 
Brand strength 
based on products 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
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In the brewery case, service was perceived as essential to avoid switching, 
and little mention was made of the need to improve or control costs. Although 
it is not suggested, therefore, that costs are not an important determinant of 
brewery operations, there were significantly more references to the need to 
maintain service levels.  
 
Figure 28: Differences in attitudes to service and cost across the three cases 
 
9.5 External influences 
 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Fears over anti-
competitive perceptions 
in the media and in 
government impede 
collaboration. Possible 
resource shortages 
encourage protectivism. 
Presence of brokers to 
facilitate shared solution. 
Threat to overall market 
size posed by new out-
of-town development. 
Legislative pressures led 
to divestment of 
activities. Strong 
contractor presence. 
 
A number of separate contextual issues are dealt with under this single 
heading, including shortages of potential resources, unfavourable media 
coverage, legislation limiting commercial activity and damage to the market-
place. There is also an important sub-text in the extent to which the external 
influence is critical or not, either on the basis that it can be controlled or, on 
the basis that it comes from beyond the immediate competition and is thus 
“outside the marketplace”, it is not important because it will potentially impact 
on all competitors equally. 
 
The major retailers perceive the major significant threats to (or opportunities 
for) their operations as coming from their direct competitors, rather than from 
Cost vs 
service 
Actively trade-off 
cost and service 
Service is more 
important than cost 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
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outside. So whilst some concerns were expressed about the potential for 
damage to their image and credibility arising from possible anti-competitive 
collaborations or the operational difficulties which might result from resource 
shortages, there was little reference to perceived threats from the outside 
environment. In a market with such high levels of concentration it is perhaps 
not surprising that the major players should have some self-belief and 
confidence in their ability to control external events, to some extent at least. 
 
At the other extreme, the Broadmead retailers felt themselves to be under 
pressure not just from green environmental concerns generally, but also from 
the specific possibility that the market for town centre shopping in Bristol 
would be adversely affected by the opening of a new out-of-town centre and 
that there was, therefore, a need to be more efficient and to be seen to be 
joining in efforts to promote a sustainable solution for the city centre. 
 
Tradeteam was set up as a reaction to the vertical dis-aggregation of the 
supply chain, following legislation to separate manufacture of beer from the 
ownership and management of retail outlets. In both the Tradeteam and 
Broadmead examples, the external environment was seen as posing 
something of a threat to continued business operations, whereas the major 
food retailers perceived the threat as coming from the internal market, with the 
external environment potentially offering opportunities for protectionism and 
differentiation. 
Figure 29: Perceptions of the environment as threat or opportunity 
9.6 The overall influence of context 
 
This analysis does not seek to try and attach some objective units of measure 
to these suggested contextual dimensions. Instead, the intention is simply to 
Environmental 
effects 
Environment 
perceived as 
opportunity 
Environment 
perceived as threat
Supermarkets Tradeteam Broadmead 
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try and map the three cases along the dimensions relative to each other in 
order to try and develop a reference framework in which the relative 
importance of, and inter-dependence between, the enablers / inhibitors to 
potential collaboration can be discussed and explored in more detail. No scale 
is therefore set against the following summary table which sets out the 
approximate contextual profile of the three cases, but which distils the 
complex issues in play in each of the contexts down to a few words for ease 
of comparison in the analysis of variables.  
 
 Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Logistics system 
maturity 
High Low Medium 
Market prone to 
switching 
High Low High 
Basis of 
branding 
Outlet Mixed Product 
Importance of 
service 
Negotiable Medium High 
Threat from 
environment 
Low High Medium 
 
 
Table 18: Supply chain variables as either enablers or inhibitors to collaboration 
 
Seven possible variables were proposed as potential enablers / inhibitors in 
the conceptual framework developed at the start of this research. These were 
set out as a code table at the start of the major retailer case study, including 
possible examples of their manifestation in the case examples. 
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Category Code Description 
Impact on customers Distance – 1.1 DIST Physical distance from 
head office or “Distance” 
of activity up supply 
chain 
 Cost / service – 1.2 
SERV 
Extent to which costs 
are compromised to 
satisfy store / customer 
demands 
Quality Perceived quality of 
logistics system relative 
to competitors – 2. 0 
QUAL 
Extent to which a firm 
perceives itself to be 
better / worse than the 
competition in terms of 
cost and / or service.  
Potential for equal gain 
or loss arising from 
collaboration. 
Strength Perceived market 
strength relative to 
competitors – 3.0 
STREN 
Attack / defence 
positions in respect to 
named competitors and 
growth targets 
Importance of PD Extent to which PD 
systems contribute to 
competitiveness – 4.0 
VALU 
Extent to which PD is 
regarded as integral to 
the customer offering 
and differentiated from 
competition 
Make or buy Use of contractors – 5.0 
CONT 
Use of “white trucks” 
and other technologies 
to pursue integration 
synergies 
Environmental Legislative or social 
pressures to reduce 
environmental impact or 
other external pressures 
– 6.0 ENV 
Degree of perceived 
threat from empty 
running, road tolling, 
curfews, resource 
shortages, market 
forces 
 
 
Table 19: Original tentative data coding table 
 
Three case studies have been carried out, two in contexts where forms of 
horizontal logistics collaboration have been implemented and one where it has 
not, in spite of evidence to suggest that this would be a logical outcome. In 
trying to understand the differences between the contexts and situations, it 
would appear that what might be a facilitator under one set of circumstances 
might become an inhibitor under another set. Alternatively, a variable that 
 228
might play an important role as an enabler or inhibitor in one context might 
have a very trivial role, or no influence at all, in another context.  
 
The data from each case has been distilled and analysed to provide insight 
into the relative roles and importance of the variables in each of the cases. 
This evidence can now be collated to bring a comparative contextual analysis 
to bear. This is summarised as a table of key cross-case data drawn from all 
cases, supermarkets (S), Broadmead (B) and Tradeteam (T). The data has 
been classified as to whether it suggests an enabling or blocking role in each 
context. A blank cell in the table indicates that there were no significant 
references to this variable in the data from a particular case. The points listed 
are not the enablers or inhibitors as such, but rather provide an indication of 
whether horizontal collaboration is more or less likely in the context of each of 
the key data codes.  
 
As with the contextual dimensions proposed above, the classification of any 
data as enabler or inhibitor is arbitrary in most cases. Generally, items 
classified as enablers cannot be turned into inhibitors simply by not being 
present or being present in a relatively small scale. On the other hand, items 
identified as inhibitors could be reclassified as enablers if they were either not 
present at all or present in some different scale. So whereas distance of a 
supply chain from the end customer might be an enabler, closeness to the 
customer is not necessarily an inhibitor. On the other hand, late deliveries 
might be an inhibitor whereas on-time deliveries could be an enabler.  
 
  Enabler Inhibitor 
DIST (S) Does it really matter in 
Dover? 
We wouldn’t want another 
retailer-liveried vehicle 
delivering to a store because the 
public would see that.  
 (B) People can see it and think 
“well, at least they’re doing 
something” 
 
 (T) everything is down to brand 
strength, it’s not controlled 
by distribution. 
Everything else is very much a 
back office thing. 
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SERV (S) The real cost is, at the store, 
not in the logistics end. 
Service is absolutely paramount. 
OK, cost is important, probably 
70% service and 30% cost.  
 (B) As long as I receive my stock 
….at the right time, that’s all 
that bothers me 
Neither of them breaks even at 
the moment. 
 (T) They want…all of that lot 
consolidated for them into 
one supply chain solution. 
They thought it might have an 
impact on the level of service to 
the end point. 
QUAL (S) You’ve got to make sure that 
whatever you’re giving, 
you’re getting.  
We’d prefer to just have one 
network of our own, both 
primary and secondary, and 
work internally to try and make it 
as efficient as possible.  
 (B) Because of the relative size 
of these retailers, they all 
gain an equal benefit. 
It would be fair to say that they 
are smaller operations and not 
particularly sophisticated. 
 (T) The old distribution system) 
was not any kind of 
competitive advantage. 
It provides as good a service as 
the competition. 
STREN (S) The whole idea of not 
sharing resource with other 
people goes against the 
grain of “every day low cost”. 
Do you think we’ll ever work with 
another food retailer? The 
answer’s “no” because we’re 
trying to cripple them all.  
 (B) Small retailers generally do 
things when they see other 
people doing them. 
As long as the stock gets here 
on time and it’s not damaged, 
then I don’t really have any 
issues with competition. 
 (T) The small producers get an 
easier route to market. It’s 
not about competing on 
distribution, but much more 
about “what are we selling 
versus what they are 
selling?” 
There is more resistance from 
the bigger businesses, because 
they believe they have less 
synergy to gain than the smaller 
ones. 
VALU (S) You can invest a lot of time 
in making a step-change, but 
the competition will catch up. 
It’s of huge competitive 
advantage, every aspect of 
logistics. 
 (B) The deliveries are making 
more time to do what they 
want to do, which is selling 
things. 
The best fits come where you 
have got less sophisticated 
supply chains. 
 (T) We never viewed distribution 
as any kind of differentiator 
in this market. 
Distribution is viewed just as a 
service that is required. 
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CONT (S) I want my contractors to 
work with other retailers. 
We painted the vehicles white 
and now we get the revenue. 
 (B) It’s so far adrift from our core 
business. 
Anyone can carry things: 
anyone can deliver everything. 
 (T) The core business is about 
producing and selling 
brands, so let’s get into bed 
with a distribution 
professional 
Giving up your logistics at that 
stage was seen as being just 
too radical. 
ENV (S) We have changed: we have 
been knocked off course by 
the events of last year. 
Not long ago, we were very 
protective: we wouldn’t let 
anybody into our sites. 
 (B) The sort of ethics that we 
had behind the company 
Improve air quality, reduce the 
transport impacts and also 
conflict between vehicles 
 (T) Doing something different 
with the supply chain was a 
response to a changing 
market. 
 
 
Table 20: Examples of influencing variables as enablers or inhibitors for collaboration 
 
9.7 Distance 
 
The concept of distance of a supply chain activity from the end customer was 
mentioned in some of the very first interviews in the major retailer case study, 
as well as already being recognised as a concept in the literature (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000). Generally, the concept was used to describe upstream 
activities, far removed from the sight of the customer, including unitisation 
equipment or transport and transhipment activities which did not involve the 
final delivery leg to the High Street store. Several respondents in the 
supermarket case study, however, also made reference to remoteness in 
terms of physical distance from the firm’s head office: out of sight, out of mind, 
as it were. It was suggested that things could be done differently as the 
geographical extremes of the distribution network from how they might be 
done in London or the other cities.  
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However, although this was a recurrent theme in the major retailer data, it did 
not figure at all as an issue in the Broadmead case study and was only an 
incidental consideration in Tradeteam. Physical distance was clearly not an 
issue at Broadmead, as all of the chains were participating in the collaboration 
with the full knowledge of their head offices, which, in the case of Mastershoe, 
was only a few miles away anyway. Supply chain distance was obviously also 
not relevant at all at Broadmead, as the very simple manufacturer-led supply 
chains did not have any significant upstream stages, and the collaboration 
was taking place very close to the final customer. Similarly with Tradeteam, 
the final delivery leg was part of the collaboration and thus, in theory, highly 
visible to the customer. The main issue here appears to be that distance is 
only important in highly developed and sophisticated supply chains, as 
discussed in the section on contextual issues above.  
 
Distance, both physical and theoretical, appeared to be an issue for the major 
retailers but less so for smaller retailers and the brewers. By definition, 
distance along a supply chain can only exist in developed chains which 
contain multiple echelons, so the data on this variable can be combined with 
the contextual note on supply chain development to form the proposition that 
greater distance, or remoteness from the customer, can be an enabler to 
collaboration (and shorter distance an inhibitor) in sophisticated supply chains, 
but has less or no influence in simpler systems. 
Figure 30: Distance from the consumer and from head office control is an enabler for 
collaboration 
 
 
Logistics 
Systems 
Direct to store Centralised Stockless Just in time 
Retail control Manufacturer control
Broadmead Tradeteam Supermarkets 
Positive influence 
of DISTance on 
collaboration 
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9.8 Service 
 
The possible trade-off between logistics system costs and service levels to 
stores emerged from analysis of the data from the major retailer case study, 
albeit more markedly from the stronger players amongst the major firms. Asda 
place particular emphasis on store service, even where this meant that 
transport resources were sub-optimised. Among the weaker players, 
Somerfield and, perhaps surprisingly, Marks & Spencer acknowledged that 
stores might not always get the service they wanted in order to try and drive 
out costs and raise efficiencies.  
 
Service levels were also held to be important in the Broadmead and 
Tradeteam cases, but appeared to be much less negotiable or variable. For 
the smaller retailers in Broadmead, service obviously had the potential to 
impact significantly on store performance, but the retailers were not generally 
able to influence it unduly and were certainly not in a position to make positive 
steps towards actively trading of cost and service. The fact that the 
collaboration in urban transhipment generally appeared to have delivered 
service improvements was welcome, but came as a largely unexpected 
benefit. When asked if this improvement was likely to be worth an increase in 
costs when the City Council support for the project finished, most 
acknowledged that this decision would rest with their head offices and would, 
therefore, be effectively out of their control.  
 
The Tradeteam case had strong parallels with major retailers in the sense that 
service levels were seen as a necessary defence against customers switching 
supplier or outlet. However, there was no suggestion that service could be 
traded against cost, as was the case with at least of the some, major retailers. 
Reference was made to parity cost levels being established and thereafter, 
customer service was one of the key drivers for the continuing operation. In 
the contextual notes, the contrast was made against environments in which 
service can be traded against cost as opposed to those where service is non-
negotiable. Whilst it is not argued that cost is more important than service to 
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major retailers, it is a more significant consideration than in the other two 
contexts. The fact that collaboration has occurred in these two contexts would 
support the proposition that such collaborations are more likely to take place 
in situations where service, rather than service balanced against cost, is a key 
driver of logistics strategy decisions.  
Figure 31: Greater emphasis on service over cost is an enabler for collaboration 
 
9.9 Quality 
 
This is the first of the seven variables for which there appears to be a common 
set of attitudes and perceptions across all three cases, even though these 
cases clearly represent logistics systems of very different levels of 
sophistication and thus perceived quality. The variable under examination, 
however, was how a firm measured or perceived the quality of its systems 
relative to those of its competitors, so relative quality compared to other 
markets or sectors is not relevant. The main point which was identified in all 
three cases was the relative amount of investment and return in the 
collaboration relative to that of its partners. In two of the three cases, there 
was a perception that the all participants needed to have parity of inputs and 
outputs in order for the collaboration to work. In the Tradeteam case, where it 
was noted that smaller regional players were being allowed to participate in 
the scheme, to which they would contribute relatively less than the bigger 
players and stand to gain more, the smaller regional players were not 
perceived as direct competitors, and there was an argument that the presence 
of these “specialist” providers complemented the offering of the major firms 
and this improved the overall market proposition.  
 
Cost vs 
service 
Actively trade-off 
cost and service 
Service is more 
important than cost 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
Positive influence of 
SERVice on 
collaboration 
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Another point emerging from the major retailer data and subsequently 
supported in the Tradeteam case is that logistics innovations are easy to 
copy. Thus, a firm might gain temporary competitive advantage from some 
improvement in its supply chain systems but this is eroded over time. 
Eventually, all possible internal optimisation has been achieved and it is 
necessary either to accept that no further benefit is achievable or, 
alternatively, to look outside for synergies with other, possibly competing, 
firms.  
These two value-related issues (acceptance that developmental gains are 
short-term only and that parity of investment and return are required) appear 
to be enablers in all situations and are thus not context-specific. 
 
9.10 Strength 
 
The trade-off between service and cost / price, which is rooted in traditional 
Porter-type models of competitive strategy, is referred to above in evaluating 
the role of attitudes to service as an enabler to collaboration. Later and more 
complex competitive models include that of co-opetition, which is based on 
the notion that collaborating competitors can enlarge the overall size of the 
market “cake”, rather than fighting over their relative shares of a fixed cake. 
This issue comes through strongly in two of the cases. The major retailers, 
operating in a highly price-competitive and saturated market place tended to 
use very aggressive, almost military language in their discussions. The market 
was described as a battlefield and competition as bloody and fatal. This is not 
the language of co-opetition: in supermarket retailing, one company’s gain is 
another’s loss. The inherent paradox of this was recognised by the most 
apparently aggressive player, Asda, who could understand the cost 
advantages of collaboration, which would have been consistent with their 
overall commercial strategy, but could not see past the immediate hostility to 
their competitors to unlock these benefits. 
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In contrast, the participants in Tradeteam talked of the need to develop as 
broad an offering as possible to the market-place, actively joining the products 
of different firms together to ensure that customers would not feel the need to 
switch suppliers.  
 
In Broadmead, the “growing the cake” argument can be reinterpreted in the 
light of both the threat to the market overall arising from the new nearby out-
of-town development, and also by the expected pressures from local and 
national government on getting private transport, and thus suppliers and 
customers, out of the city centre. Because of the specialised niche nature of 
most of these firms, strength relative to the other firms operating in the area 
was simply not an issue.  
 
From the point of view of case context, therefore, both market structure and 
the nature of competition are relevant considerations. The food retail market is 
fairly finite in total size, although evidence suggests that the substantial 
growth may be possible in non-food areas, albeit at the expense of other 
specialised retailers from markets which were traditionally viewed as separate 
from grocery. In this sense, the major grocers’ market can still be seen as a 
“fixed cake” game. The brewery market is still developing and changing and 
the shape of the cake has yet to be finally determined. In Broadmead, there 
are no absolute limits to the size of the market and firms are not trading off 
each other in terms of market share. Competition in food retailing is 
essentially about the branding of the store, including its location and range. 
These inter-related matters can be summarised as infrastructure, and the 
systems with which the infrastructure is serviced. In the Tradeteam case, 
competition is about brands and not about the way in which those brands are 
delivered, or necessarily to where. The shops in Broadmead sit somewhere 
between these two extremes.  
 
Perceptions of relative strength, therefore, will be an inhibitor to collaboration 
in “fixed cake” environments and will matter much less in growing or growable 
markets. Perceptions of strength will also be an inhibitor in contexts where the 
infrastructure and systems, rather than the products, are the differentiator.  
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Figure 32: Perceived relative strength is an inhibitor to collaboration 
 
9.11 Value  
 
Perceptions of the contribution made to competitive strategy by logistics 
systems varied in across the three cases. Because of the scale of their total 
operations, all of the retailers believed that their systems were still capable of 
being improved and that, at the leading edge, each improvement might offer 
some sort of competitive advantage. If retailing is considered as an offering 
based on infrastructure, as discussed in the context of the nature of 
competition, then the perception that logistics systems are an integral part of 
the proposition is understandable if not defensible. The smaller retailers, 
however, with their unsophisticated supply chains over which they perceived 
themselves as having little control, did not see any commercial advantage in 
logistics system, which could be compromised through collaboration.  
 
The Tradeteam data appears to support the contention that competitive 
advantage only arises ideas in logistics are essentially easy to copy, 
competitors will sooner or later all end up with similar systems. Having 
accepted this thinking, therefore, it is argued that competitors might as well 
pool their system as quickly as possible in order to concentrate on the real 
area of competition and, as discussed above, look at ways to grow the 
collective “cake”, or at least protect it from external threats. 
Market 
structure 
Discrete fixed market 
with finite switchable 
demand 
Complex mix of 
markets with little 
switching impact 
Supermarkets Tradeteam Broadmead 
Negative influence of 
STRENgth on 
collaboration 
Nature of 
competition 
Brand strength derived 
from the outlets / 
infrastructure 
Brand strength 
based on products 
Supermarkets Broadmead Tradeteam 
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This variation in attitudes to the value contribution of logistics are, like the 
distance variable, consistent with the context variable of supply chain 
development and sophistication, but in the opposite sense that movement 
towards sophistication will tend to increase the likelihood that perceived value 
will block collaborations. Greater value is attached to sophisticated supply 
chains by their owners, which has the tendency to act as an inhibitor to 
collaboration. On the other hand, the lower value attached by their owners to 
less sophisticated supply chains will tend to enable collaborations. 
Figure 33: Perceived logistics competitive value is an inhibitor to collaboration 
 
9.12 Contractors 
 
Third party logistics contractors were present and being actively used in all 
three contexts. Obviously, in the Broadmead and Tradeteam cases, a third 
party contractor exclusively provided the supply chain activity which formed 
the basis of the collaboration. As discussed in the analysis and evaluation of 
the development of retail logistics systems in chapter one, contractors have 
formed part of the systems mix since the 1960’s. There are various reasons 
for this, including defensive tactics against industrial action, availability of 
capital and requisite skills, all bound up in the recognised rationale of 
transaction cost economics. Given that the active presence of contractors in 
the major retailer context has not led to collaborations of the types seen in the 
other contexts can, other than perhaps in arms length closed book shared 
user operations,  can to some extent be explained by the degree of control 
exercised over the contractor by the retailers. Amongst the Broadmead 
Logistics 
Systems Direct to store Centralised Stockless Just in time 
Retail control Manufacturer control 
Broadmead Tradeteam Supermarkets 
Negative influence 
of VALUe on 
collaboration 
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respondents, there was no sense of having, or even wanting, any strong or 
direct control over supply chain activities. Delivery of goods to the stores was 
seen very much as a “black box” activity: a range of suppliers can offer the 
service and they are all more or less as good or as bad as each other as each 
other at providing it.  
 
The brewers’ key rationale was about key competence: their strategy is based 
on competition through brands and the activities required to support this are 
best bought in from the relevant expert providers. However, a degree of 
control is exerted by the manufacturers and, certainly, in the first instance a 
joint venture was implemented, partly to deal with internal political issues but 
also to ensure that the service levels required were delivered operationally. 
As seen with other variables above, the major supermarket retailers 
demonstrate a desire to control their supply chains very closely and therefore 
control any contractors operating therein. This includes not only issues of 
detail, such as livery, but also the ways in which operations might be 
integrated. Specific reference was made to the fact that it was desirable for 
contractors to work with a number of retailers, as this would deliver arms 
length closed book savings, which might be described as covert or inactive 
collaboration. The contextual analysis seems to suggest that, whilst the 
presence of contractors enables collaboration, the desire to control the 
detailed operations of those contractors is an inhibitor to collaboration. In this 
instance, the originally proposed definition of the variable (the mere presence 
of contractors) needs further qualification on the basis of the data: the salient 
issue is the degree to which contractors can be, or actually are, controlled by 
the contracting party.  
 
Figure 34: Desire for control over third parties is an inhibitor to collaboration 
Control of 
Contractors 
Hands off approach, 
leaving arrangements 
to the market 
Close control of 
operations and costs 
Broadmead Tradeteam Supermarkets 
Negative influence of
CONTrol of 
contractors on 
collaboration 
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9.13 External Environmental Factors 
 
The environmental variable is closely aligned to the whole external context, as 
discussed at the start of this chapter. At one extreme of the range of attitudes 
to environmental pressures are the major retailers, who see all the significant 
threats to their operations as being internal to their own market, rather than 
from the external environment. This is not to say that the supermarkets do not 
have strategies and policies to deal with environmental issues in the sense of 
sustainability of operations or impact of their activities on the environment 
(using the word in its more familiar sense). There are also legislative effects 
arising from these latter points, requiring, for example, the supermarkets to 
recycle waste packaging and reduce their emissions and consumption of non-
renewable resources. However, all of these external influences are likely to 
have a similar impact on all players evenly, and therefore are not perceived as 
a competitive or operational threat per se. An adequate response to all of 
these matters can be developed and managed, with the more significant 
source of external threat perceived (currently) as coming from the competition. 
Arguably, this may change in the future. The current ground-swell of media 
opinion over the allegedly excessive market share of the majors and the 
possible abuse of power which may result, may grow into a shift in public 
opinion which Government may eventually have to respond to with further 
legislation. 
 
In the brewing industry, such legislation has already been enacted and 
therefore a real external event has, to a large extent, been instrumental in 
promoting collaboration. Similarly, the Broadmead retailers shared two 
perceived common threats: traffic congestion in city centres (and possible 
local government over-reaction to it affecting their operations) and the loss of 
trade to an out-of-town shopping centre. In both cases, significant threats and 
the related opportunities, were perceived as coming truly from outside the 
nearby competitive environment and very much from the outside world. The 
external environment cannot effectively be controlled by these players and 
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these external effects therefore are seen to act as facilitators of inter-firm co-
operation. 
 
The extent to which business threats sit outside the market and cannot be 
easily controlled can, therefore, be a positive influence on collaboration. 
 
Figure 35: Perceived inability to manage the environment is an enabler for 
collaboration 
 
9.14 Relationships between the variables 
 
Based on this analysis, the inter-relationships of the seven key model 
variables can be summarised: 
 
 Enabler Blocker 
DISTance Distance from consumer in 
complex supply chains 
Closeness to consumer in 
complex supply chains 
SERVice 
tradeoff 
Service-led ethos Service traded off against 
cost 
QUALity Parity of gain / loss Imbalance of gain / loss 
STRENgth Product based competition 
in a flexible market 
Outlet based competition in 
a finite, switchable market 
VALUe Unsophisticated supply 
chains under manufacturer 
control 
Sophisticated supply chains 
under retail control 
CONTrol of 
contractors 
Hands off approach, 
controlled by the market 
Policy of close control of 
operations and costs 
ENVironment Key threats outside market 
and cannot be controlled 
Key threats within market 
and environment can be 
managed 
 
 
Table 21: The role of seven model variables as enablers or inhibitors to collaboration 
Influence of 
environment 
Key threats are from 
the market: the outside 
world can be managed 
Key threats are beyond 
the market and cannot 
be controlled 
Supermarkets Tradeteam Broadmead 
Positive influence of 
ENVironmental 
factors on 
collaboration 
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9.15 Conclusions from the cross-case analysis 
 
It is self-evident that examples of horizontal supply chain collaboration 
between competing firms exist, just as the opportunity for such a collaboration 
appears not to have been taken in a context where history and current trends 
suggest that it should. The examples of application and non-application have 
been juxtaposed in an attempt to test the validity of a model for collaboration, 
based on a series of supply chain and contextual variables which might act as 
enablers or inhibitors under certain circumstances. This research was 
intended to be grounded in a single context then tested and critiqued in the 
light of experience from two other contexts. When the data from the three 
contexts is aggregated, it appears to suggest that the positive or negative 
effect of each of the supply chain variables can be seen to have a correlation 
with a contextual variable in all but one case. This two dimensional 
relationship between supply chain variables (distance, quality etcetera) and 
contextual variables (market structure, nature of competition) is an 
enhancement to the original model which has emerged as the research has 
progressed. The research suggests that the original model is still, of itself, 
robust and meaningful, but further dimensions will need to be developed in 
order to make the model more predictive. 
 
- An increase in distance or remoteness of a supply chain activity 
from the arena of end competition (the final consumer) has a 
positive effect in the model, but obviously only in contexts where 
such distance can exist, specifically in more complex supply chains.  
- The nature of the market-place has an impact on the service 
variable, service considerations more likely to influence 
collaboration in markets where high service levels might actually 
increase the overall market. 
- Perceptions of relative quality of supply chains influence 
collaboration to the extent that they allow judgments on parity of 
investment and gain from collaborations to be made. Such 
perceived parity has a positive effect. 
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- Perceptions of competitive strength are a potentially negative 
influence in markets where the overall size is finite and thus gains 
are only made by encouraging switching. Relative strength is also a 
negative influence in markets where the differentiator is the outlet or 
infrastructure, rather than product branding. 
- The value attached to a supply chain can be negative influence, 
particularly in more sophisticated chains which have tended to be 
controlled by the retailers 
- The extent to which the supply chain owner is driven by wanting to 
have detailed control of operations and costs influences the extent 
to which the active presence of third party contractors in the market 
is a positive influence on collaboration. 
- Attitudes to the environment and, specifically, whether strategic 
threats are deemed to come from within the market itself or from the 
outside world, apparently influence the extent to which the 
environment enables collaboration. 
 
The original conceptual framework was used to set seven supply chain 
variables in a framework of potential influences on collaborations, as set out in 
figure 9 in chapter one.  
 
This original model was developed after the first case to try and incorporate 
the existence of general contextual variables, together with a sense of scale, 
progress along which would seem to facilitate collaboration. The refinement 
was expressed as movement along the dimensions towards the centre of a 
series of concentric circles, as set out in figure 23 in chapter six. 
 
A third representation can now be developed to combine the logistics system 
variables discussed and analysed with the contextual variables, influencing 
the positive or nature of the initial variables, which have emerged from the 
research. This representation takes the original seven model variables and 
adds to them as follows: 
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- The original ENVironmental variable is now split into the contextual 
variables NATURE, which considers the extent to which a firm can 
influence the external environment and SOURCE, which considers 
whether the key environmental threats come from within the 
immediate competitive market or beyond it. This allows for the 
contextual variable of external influences to be integrated. 
- Three of the contextual variables are summarized as the nature of 
COMPetition within a market, the extent to which a firm takes a 
HANDS on or off approach to the close control of its contractors and 
the extent to which supply chains in a market have matured over 
TIME 
- The fifth contextual variable – that of customer orientation in terms 
of service and cost – is included within the original SERVICE 
variable. 
 
Thus the seven logistics system and five contextual variables are now 
combined into a single table of eleven potential variables. These are set out in 
table 22, with the original and new variables grouped. The ability of each 
variable to act as either facilitator or inhibitor is explained in each cell. For 
example, the effect of service is positive on collaboration in contexts where 
service is prioritised over cost. However, contexts where cost is more 
important than service tend not to encourage collaboration. 
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 Encourage Discourage 
9.15.1.1 Original Variables 
SERVice Prioritise service over 
cost 
Trade off service for 
cost 
DISTance Remote from customer Near to customer 
STRENgth Equal to or weaker than 
competition 
Stronger than 
competition 
QUALity Equal to or poorer than 
competition 
Better than competition 
VALUe  Perception on added 
value 
CONTractors Active presence  
9.15.1.2 New Variables 
COMPetition nature Competition by product 
brand 
Competition by fascia 
brand 
ENVironmental threat 
NATURE 
Cannot be influenced or 
controlled 
Can be influenced or 
controlled 
ENV threat SOURce External to the market Within the market 
HANDS off / on Cede close control Retail operational 
control 
TIME Simple manufacturer 
systems 
Complex retailer 
systems 
 
Table 22: Revised table of the variables based on the cross-case analysis 
 
The dimensions of these have been made consistent so that, for nine of them, 
their positive or negative influences on collaboration can be set out. The 
remaining two are not “balanced”, in the sense that one can act as an inhibitor 
but not a enabler, and the other can act as an enabler, but not an inhibitor. An 
alternative representation of the same relationships is given in figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Revised model of the relative influence of internal and external factors on 
collaboration  
Weaker than or 
equal to competitors
Stronger than 
competitors 
STRENGTH 
Poorer than or equal 
to competitors 
Better than 
competitors 
QUALITY 
Trade off service 
against cost 
Service paramount SERVICE 
Activity near to 
consumer 
Activity remote from 
consumer 
DISTANCE 
No perception of 
logistics added value 
Perception of value 
added by logistics 
VALUE 
No contractor presence 
in the market 
Contractors active in 
the market 
CONTRACTORS
Based on product 
branding 
Based on infrastructure 
branding 
COMPETITION
Cannot be controlled Can be controlled NATURE OF 
ENVIRONMENT
Within the 
competitive market 
External to the 
market 
SOURCE OF 
THREATS
Delegate control Retain close 
operational control 
CONTROL 
Immature, simple 
logistics systems 
Developed, sophisticated 
logistics systems 
TIME 
Encourage 
collaboration
Discourage 
collaboration 
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9.16 Validity of the model and analysis 
 
Based on the data collected in this research, it is not possible to draw robust 
conclusions about the relative strength of influence of these variables within 
the model. This point will be discussed in the context of the limitations of the 
research and its findings and possible further specific research on this point 
will be proposed. 
 
The design of this research included an analysis of the available methods and 
tools available, before concluding that a case-based approach would be used. 
The subsequent analysis of the data collected, with the patterns which have 
emerged as a result of this, has sought to substantiate that the selected 
variables accurately reflect the phenomenon under consideration, and that 
there is a validity to the overall construct of the research, as described by Yin. 
These quantum, relative influence and possible inter-dependence of these 
variables have then been considered in relation to the variability of contexts 
under consideration in order to try and posit causal relationships. Specifically, 
the presence (or absence) and scale of contextual variables have been used 
to try and explain the role of model variables as either enabler or inhibitor for 
collaborative operations, in order to try and address the need for internal 
validity within the research. It was not the intention that this model, and the 
research designed to test and enhance it, would be significantly generalisable. 
The phenomenon under consideration is very context-specific: the physical 
supply chains of retail organisations and it the explanatory model proposed is 
believed to be generalisable to the whole of this context. The extent to which 
consideration of this context alone puts limitations on the research, and how 
this issue might be dealt with, are considered shortly.  
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10 Summary and conclusions 
 
Before drawing together and summarising the findings from each of the three 
case studies and trying to draw conclusions from them, this section begins 
with a review of the research process, including design and methods used. 
The findings can then be set in the context of the original review of the 
literature and resulting hypotheses to see how closely the end results match 
expectations, and what contribution this research makes to the existing body 
of work in the fields of retail logistics and supply chain management. The 
process concludes with lessons learnt during the project, together with 
analysis of the possible limitations of the research and issues which this might 
raise for further research. 
 
10.1 Summary of the Project 
 
The original research interest was driven by observation of UK grocery 
logistics, an area of operations described by various authors as being 
amongst the most efficient and innovative in the world. However, it was noted 
that all good ideas in logistics and distribution are fundamentally very easy to 
copy and, therefore, whilst some competitive advantage might be gleaned 
from such innovations in the very short term, in the longer run, competitors 
catch up and a set of best practices will tend to be universally applied by all 
players. This logic tends to suggest, therefore, that logistics systems offer no 
competitive advantage in the longer term and are therefore a suitable area of 
operations for collaborative working between competitors.  
 
The key trends which characterised the development of the UK food retailing 
market, and the logistics systems supporting it, were concentration of market 
power into a handful of large firms, centralisation of infrastructures and the 
development of rapid cycle times and stockless “just in time” distribution. The 
next stage of the evolutionary process appears to be the migration of the 
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Efficient Consumer Response ethos across the Atlantic from the USA. Based 
on the notion of collaborative effort between competitors in areas of shared 
interest to serve the customer better and thus try and grow the market overall, 
some commentators noted that physical distribution, and transport in 
particular, might form such an area of mutual interest for UK retailers. 
Furthermore, the active presence of third party contractors in the UK market 
might provide a way to overcome organisational resistance and inertia in the 
pursuit of such co-operation.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics was proposed as a framework to explain how 
contractors might enable collaboration, with recent models on the nature of 
competitive strategies, principally co-opetition, offered as an explanation of 
how shared operations might exist in competitive environments. This 
proposition was supported by findings from research on upstream supply 
chain activities in a number of different industry sectors in Sweden. Beyond 
this Swedish research, both an initial contextual review and then a more 
systematic review of the literature found that not only were there few 
examples of horizontal collaboration in practise, but also that very little more 
had been written on the subject following the pioneering work of Whiteoak and 
Fernie. This point was confirmed in an interview with Phil Whiteoak, 
conducted towards the end of the research process. He spoke of two attempts 
to instigate collaborations of the kind proposed by himself and John Fernie, 
using third party contractors to facilitate the process and provide the 
necessary IT. Both foundered for pragmatic reasons: one became simply too 
complicated technically and the other was over-shadowed by efforts across 
the industry to cope with the predicted technical problems associated with the 
new millennium: the so-called Y2K “bug”. Whiteoak also offered the view that 
transport managers still tended to be too conservative to support such a 
change. He also expressed frustration at the extent to which retailers still 
appeared to want to control every single element of their own supply chains, 
as evidenced by factory gate pricing, rather than relinquishing control to allow 
the market to come up with more efficient shared solutions.  
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The original analysis of the literature and observations in the food retailing 
context were summarised in the three propositions, that distribution does not 
contribute to competitive advantage, its contribution is time and context 
specific and that, therefore, pooling might have an overall operational and 
commercial benefit. This suggested four gaps in knowledge, in terms of  
(i) enablers and inhibitors 
(ii) prerequisites 
(iii) measurement of benefits and  
(iv) the potential role of third parties.  
Six hypotheses were set out to try and explain these gaps and develop a 
framework to explain where and how horizontal inter-firm collaborations might 
take place: 
 
10.1.1.1 Enablers and inhibitors 
1.  Logistics collaboration between competitors is influenced by factors that 
either facilitate or obstruct co-opetition.  
 
10.1.1.2 Prerequisites 
2. Collaboration is more likely in the presence of external factors, such as 
resource shortages, legislation or social and environmental pressures.  
 
3. Collaboration is more likely once a firm has exhausted all opportunities for 
internal optimisation within its own logistics systems.  
 
4. The inclination to collaboration is influenced by the extent to which firms 
perceive they are in competition with potential collaborators.  
 
10.1.1.3 Measurement of benefits 
5. Collaboration is more likely where costs and benefits are clearly 
measurable and performance measures can be agreed.  
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10.1.1.4 Potential role of third parties 
6. Active and intentional collaboration is more likely to take place when 
brokered by a third party, either operationally or in order to apportion costs 
and benefits.  
 
These six hypotheses might be joined together into the two related questions: 
in the face of logic to support its existence, why do horizontal logistics 
collaborations not take place, and how might such collaborations be facilitated 
or blocked? A number of alternative research strategies were critiqued, with 
the conclusion that such “how” and “why” questions are generally best 
addressed using case-based methods. In this particular context, it was 
proposed that case research would provide a rich and thick picture of the 
organisational, commercial and strategic factors in play because of its 
suitability for the consideration of a complex, holistic situation, such as a 
complete supply chain or inter-firm relationship in a real life setting. 
 
The UK grocery retail market was selected as the first case, not only because 
of its highly developed logistics systems and the establishment of a 
collaborative paradigm in the guise of ECR as discussed above, but also 
because of opportunistic considerations associated with access. Senior 
management contacts were initially identified with three of the top five 
supermarkets and, later, with two more. Interviews were conducted with these 
individuals and then, as some of the key issues and influencing factors began 
to be surfaced, some of the respondents were brought together for a joint 
discussion on the subject. All of the material collected was sent back to the 
respondents for review and, if necessary, veto or censorship, although this 
was not taken up. The data was manually analysed, using data and pattern 
codes developed as part of the case study protocol.  
 
Seven separate dimensions or supply chain variables emerged from the 
analysis of the first case, some of which appeared to be more significant than 
the others in their roles as potential inhibitors or facilitators of collaborative 
effort. The initial conclusions of this first case were published in 2002.  
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The research programme was then suspended for three years, for personal 
and professional reasons. It was restarted by revisiting some of the original 
retail respondents and by identifying some new contacts, with a view to seeing 
if the retail context had changed significantly. These updated contacts 
confirmed it had not, but a review of the literature from the intervening period 
suggested that phenomena of interest were starting to occur in other contexts. 
Therefore, the model for potential horizontal collaboration which had been 
refined after the major retailer case was tested in two further contexts, where 
actual collaboration appeared to be taking place. Contacts were identified 
from the media, who in turn identified further contacts.  
 
Both of the two examples of collaboration initiatives, at Broadmead shopping 
centre in Bristol and the Tradeteam brewery distribution operation, brought 
new dimensions to the seven proposed supply chain variables. Specifically, 
additional value was added to the proposed model in that both cases 
suggested contextual variables which affected not only the relative importance 
of the variables but also whether individual variables might have a positive or 
negative effect on the potential collaboration under certain circumstances. A 
case-based approach was selected to try and understand how and why 
certain phenomena were or were not occurring in selected logistics contexts. 
The three cases have not negated any of the propositions contained within 
the original framework and model but have, instead, built on each other to 
create a fuller possible explanation of the factors and issues influencing 
possible collaborations. The extent to which this model is still limited in its 
potential application is discussed later.  
 
 
The literature review concluded that very little had been written about the 
potential for, and application of, horizontal logistics collaborations, particularly 
in specific industry contexts where historical trends suggested they might 
logically take place. The research was, therefore, exploratory in nature and 
was not intended to provide a robust and widely generalisable conclusion. 
Because of the contexts under consideration, large numbers of inter-
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connecting cases supported by a great volume of interview data, were not 
available. Instead, the research design concentrated on depth of data in the 
major retailer case in the first instance, with the initial tentative conclusions 
then tested in two other contexts. Because of the relatively small number of 
cases and respondents, this research is prone to the pitfalls of case-based 
work as described by Yin: that it lacks rigour, that it is limited in scope and that 
it can take too long and become too large to be of value.  
 
In order to address these potential weaknesses, it should be noted that: 
 
- The proposed constructs were discussed with the respondents 
during their development and the conclusions were fed back to the 
respondents for comment as they were developed.  
- The causal relationships between the variables and the contexts 
were developed as the second and third cases brought deeper 
insight to the first case. 
- The model, constructs and variables were intended to be context-
specific and thus only generalisable to a wider environment on the 
basis of further research.  
- Care has been taken to archive all data collected, including tape 
recordings, full transcripts, interview notes and other material 
collected during the course of the research, together with diary 
notes. This provides an audit trail into the way in which the data has 
been built up as the framework for the model has developed. 
 
Finally, to repeat a point made in the section on methodological design and 
considerations, this research was intended to be exploratory from the start. 
This research and its conclusions are intended to be set out as a tentative 
proposition which might yet grow into something more substantial and 
significant through further research by others.  
 
 253
10.2 Summary Findings 
 
The initial proposition for this project was that horizontal collaboration in 
logistics between competing firms was a logical step in the evolutionary 
process that had seen supply chain management develop from earlier 
initiatives in physical distribution, and then logistics. This development was 
further under-pinned by the fact that, given the short term nature of logistics 
competitive advantage, logistics could be removed from the field of 
competitive strategy. It was proposed, therefore, that a set of factors could be 
described which would explain the circumstances under which such 
collaborations would, or would not, take place. 
 
The data from the first case suggested seven variables which might offer such 
an explanation. These seven logistics variables were then enhanced with five 
environmental variables which would explain their relative strength and 
direction of influence. 
 
The first hypothesis was that logistics collaboration between competitors is 
influenced by factors that either facilitate or obstruct co-opetition. The first two 
of these potential factors emerged from the literature and were reinforced by 
the case data. The distance of a supply chain activity from the end consumer 
was identified as being of significance in the research conducted into 
collaborations in the Swedish brewing and lining industries by Bengtsson and 
Kock, with the specific conclusion that some lower-level activities relating to 
empty beer kegs could be shared between competitors. The potential role of 
contractors as the “glue” in an ECR-enabled collaborative network was 
discussed by both Fernie and Whiteoak. These first two variables were then 
complemented by a further five which emerged from evaluation of the initial 
data in the major retailer case, and subsequently confirmed and developed in 
further conversations with those respondents. These can by summarised as 
organisational perceptions of their own worth and the worth and contribution 
of their logistics capability, when compared to other competing firms. This 
worth is expressed as the relative competitive strength or aggression, the 
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extent to which the service offering is compromised by costs, the extent to 
which logistics is perceived as adding to competitiveness and the extent to 
which threats and opportunities arising from the external environment can be 
controlled.  
 
For this hypothesis to be proved, it is not necessary to establish an absolute 
causal link between each of these variables and an observed outcome, nor to 
attach some objective and measurable value scale to each variable. The 
research sought to try and describe the kinds of environment in which 
collaboration might or might not take place. The data shows a recognition of 
these factors and that their consideration is a topic of “live” debate among 
senior managers in these contexts. The hypothesis could be said to be proven 
by the fact that these posited variables can be used to explain the differences 
between actual implementations (Broadmead and Tradeteam) and the non-
implementation in food retailing. For example, food retailing tends to be more 
cost-driven, with more sophisticated supply chains and a relatively fixed 
competitive environment, in which one player’s gain is another’s loss. The 
food retail market is characterised by aggression between players and by a 
general desire to control all matters of detail. 
 
In fact, the research suggests it is possible to go further and not only establish 
the existence of these factors, but also to bring into consideration some 
evaluation of the contextual environment and use this to determine the scale 
and positive and negative impact of each variable. Again, the variables 
suggested have been drawn from an analysis of the data as well as reflection 
on the context. These contextual, or explanatory, variables have a resonance 
with the logistics and organisational variables. For example, notions on the 
attitudes towards competition by a retail firm are bound up in the competitive 
structure of the market place. Similarly, attitudes to the value of a logistics 
system will be bound up in the logistics structures inherent in a particular 
market. In summary, seven logistics system and five contextual variables 
have been identified which will exert an influence to facilitate or inhibit 
collaboration. In their short-hand form, the potential relationships between 
these influencing factors can be summarised in a table. 
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  Logistics system variables 
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Threat from 
environment 
       
 
Table 23: Potential relationships between influencing factors 
 
An alternative perspective is that these variables can be combined into a 
single array of eleven inter-acting variables, as described in chapter nine.   
 
The second hypothesis, that collaboration is more likely in the presence of 
external factors, such as resource shortages, legislation or social and 
environmental pressures, was a sub-set of the first hypothesis. Having 
established the existence of the factors influencing collaboration, 
consideration is then given to which of these factors are outside the 
organisation. Although reference was made to numerous potential external 
influences, such as driver shortages, fuel prices, road tolling and other 
legislative restrictions on road transport, none of the respondents in any of the 
cases ascribed high level of concern to any of them. The general response 
was that, given a reasonably level playing field, all parties would have to deal 
with these issues on a common basis. However, one of the contextual 
variables which emerged was the extent to which firms believed they could 
exert some kind of control over the external environment. At the more 
aggressive end of the range in this respect were some of the major retailers, 
who suggested that their interest in environmental matters was largely limited 
to controlling public perceptions of their actions and intentions through the 
media. At the other extreme were small retailers, who perceived threats 
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coming from new outlets, and the brewers, who had determined to restructure 
their industry in response to legislative developments.  
 
The data, therefore, supports the existence of general factors which might 
inhibit or facilitate collaboration, but does not appear to support the contention 
that the presence or absence of any particular external environmental factors 
will make collaboration any more or less likely. What appears to be of 
significance is the extent to which the external environment overall is 
perceived as important and the extent to which the firm believes it can control 
it.  
 
That said, it is still possible that the external issues perceived so far have 
simply not been significant enough to overcome other organisational or 
competitive barriers and lead to defensive collaborations in response. For 
example, fuel prices were seen as a major public and commercial concern in 
2001 and might have been expected to prompt a rush of initiatives to share 
transport resources in order to minimise empty running and achieve maximum 
fuel usage. In fact, it appears that the public have got used to the idea of high 
fuel prices, not only for their own vehicles, but also in the impact that raw 
material costs might have on the prices of consumer goods on the shelves. 
Similarly, the shortage of new drivers entering the industry was seen as being 
potentially very significant three or four years ago, with some sources talking 
about national shortages of more than 80,000 drivers. However, following the 
accession of Eastern European countries to the EC, there has been an influx 
of immigrant drivers to the market and it seems that the issue is now less 
important, for the time being at least. So, if the second hypothesis is 
unproven, this may just be because the industry sectors under investigation 
have yet to suffer an environmental impact of sufficient size to merit a change 
in behaviour or thinking. 
 
The third hypothesis, that collaboration is more likely once a firm has 
exhausted all opportunities for internal optimisation within its own logistics 
systems, refers to the concept of logistics only contributing to competitive 
advantage at the leading edge of development and change. As noted in the 
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early stages of this work, logistics innovations are generally easy to copy and 
thus tend to be universally adopted once proven by the early adopters. 
Examples from recent decades include the move to centralised distribution, 
the implementation of multi-temperature composite warehouses, store picking 
“by line” on receipt and increases in cycle times based on just-in-time order 
and delivery. Some of these initiatives were facilitated by technology and thus 
can be seen as ideas whose time had come. Interestingly, within the context 
of food retailing, it has not always been the same players who have been the 
innovators. For example, as discussed earlier, Sainsbury were among the first 
to move to centralised warehousing, but among the last to introduce 
composite depots. Some firms have tended not to be the innovators, but have 
chosen instead to watch and wait for best practise to emerge: Asda were the 
last of the major retailers to embrace centralised distribution, for example, and 
were thus able to jump more or less straight to the composite, stockless 
model. 
 
The evaluation of this hypothesis has become wrapped up in the 
consideration of logistics system sophistication as a contextual or 
environmental variable. As discussed above, the relative sophistication of 
supply chains appears to be a defining characteristic of some market sectors. 
In order to compete in major food retailing, it is necessary to invest in 
centralised systems and infrastructure, whereas in smaller outlet general 
leisure retailing, this is significantly less important. With the competitive 
offering in food retailing having been built on range, availability and cost, there 
has been constant pressure on systems innovation. This process has not yet 
been exhausted, and there are still initiatives in hand in, for example, primary 
transport integration, factory gate pricing, electronic track and trace and 
paperless trading. Whilst these initiatives are being rolled out by some, and 
then perhaps all, of the players, then there is arguably as much to gain in 
efficiency by concentrating on internal developments, rather than facing up to 
the organisational difficulties of collaborating with competitors.  
 
The third hypothesis appears to be supported by the data. The major retailers 
still appear to be pursuing opportunities for enhancing their own systems, 
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whereas in those sectors where the systems are less sophisticated, firms are 
less able to look for internal opportunities and therefore, perhaps, more 
disposed to look favourably on external opportunities. The major retailers did 
not believe that they had exhausted all potential for generating their own cost 
savings and efficiency improvements. On the other hand, the Broadmead 
retailers recognised that they had little or no control over their supply chains 
and could not, therefore, deliver efficiency improvements in their own right. 
The major brewers recognised that the pursuit of purely internal efficiency 
gains might actually get in the way of what their market was looking for, in 
terms of a full service drawing a number of competing suppliers together. 
 
The fourth hypothesis stated that the inclination to collaboration is influenced 
by the extent to which firms perceive they are in competition with potential 
collaborators. This was one of the strongest themes to emerge from the food 
retailing case, with all the language of aggression and war coming through 
strongly and frequently. This was developed into two specific variables within 
the coding of the data: the extent to which firms perceived their competitive 
strength, and the quality of their logistics systems relative to their nearest 
competitors. The relative strength of influence and positive or negative effect 
of these variables was in turn described as being influenced by the overall 
structure of the specific market context and the prevalent sophistication of the 
logistics systems in that sector. In language borrowed from some of the more 
recent theories on competitive strategies, specifically co-opetition, the main 
influencing factor for the importance of competition to potential collaboration 
appears to the “fixed pie” argument. Proponents of co-opetition describe 
traditional competitive models, from Porter onwards, as being all about firms 
fighting for their respective share of a fixed pie, or finite market. One of the 
key arguments under-pinning co-opetition is that such collaborative efforts can 
actually grow the size of the market overall, to the benefit of all players 
therein. 
 
In this sense, the food retail market is seen very much as a fixed pie, with one 
firm’s gain representing another firm’s loss. This tends to encourage war-like 
language and the resulting atmosphere of aggression is clearly not conducive 
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to collaboration. On the other hand, the Broadmead retailers by and large did 
not see themselves as competitors. Whilst there may be some examples of 
direct competition between stores, money spent in one store in Broadmead 
cannot be easily or directly correlated with a pound not spent in another store. 
Indeed, the actual collaboration at Broadmead was cited as part of a range of 
measures to try and deal with the threat posed by a nearby out-of-town 
shopping centre. This could be viewed as, if not actually growing the 
competitive pie, at least collectively trying to avoid it being eaten by someone 
else. 
 
Some of the elements of the relationships between the brewers in the 
Tradeteam case were even more complex. As part of the full-range ethos, 
which meant that each supplier has to offer potential customers a complete 
selection of available brands and products, even where these are 
manufactured by competitors. In practise, this meant that Coors were holding 
stock of InBev products and vice versa, to the extent that Tradeteam were 
trying to broker talks about joint, shared stock, albeit to limited effect. The 
brewers were clear that competition was based on the brands, not the 
infrastructures and systems. 
 
The findings support the notion that there is more than one view of what 
constitutes competition within a given market. The originally posited logistics 
variable dealing with aggression or relative strength has therefore linked with 
a contextual variable on the nature and structure of competition within a given 
market. The data shows how some firms might be considered competitors 
when others are not and, in general, supports the hypothesis that 
collaboration is more likely between firms who do not perceive a direct 
competitive threat. 
 
The fifth hypothesis, that collaboration is more likely where costs and benefits 
are clearly measurable and performance measures can be agreed, was based 
on the notion that some inter-firm benchmarking of costs and operational 
quality would emerge early in the research, allowing objective comparisons to 
be made between competing supply chains. An attempt was made in the early 
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stages of the research to attempt to model average distribution costs for the 
major food retailers, based on statistical information already in the public 
domain and estimates of key performance indicators. The results, which were 
discussed earlier, were then shared with some of the early respondents in an 
attempt to validate them and try and develop some non-contentious inter-firm 
comparisons. However, it became clear very early in the food retailer case 
that this information was regarded as highly sensitive and would not, 
therefore, be able to be shared in any form as part of this project. The food 
retailers clearly demonstrated that their costs are closely measured and 
managed and that benefits accruing from change would thus be measurable, 
but this did not make inter-firm collaboration any more likely to happen. 
 
On the other hand, in the relatively unsophisticated supply chains of the 
smaller general retailers in Bristol, there was little visibility of, or close control 
of, logistics costs at store level and this did not appear to be either enabler or 
inhibitor to the collaborative effort. The whole rationale for the existence of 
Tradeteam was a change in the operating and commercial environment and 
arguably tracking the changes in costs and benefits during these structural 
changes might have been meaningless. In any event, the collaboration was 
underpinned by a perceived need to concentrate on core competences and 
improved market offering, rather than necessarily reducing costs. 
 
The paradox, therefore, appears to be that where costs (and presumably) 
benefits are able to be measured most actively and accurately, collaboration 
has not taken place. Collaborations have, however, been implemented both 
where costs and cannot be measured accurately and where they do not 
appear to be the prime motivator for the collaboration. As such, the hypothesis 
appears not to have been helpful in developing a model for future 
collaborations.  
 
The one point of some relevance in this respect which did emerge from this 
study is the importance attaching to parity of investment into, and return from, 
any possible collaborative effort. It was held to be important that parties to a 
collaboration should generally have as much to gain or lose as the other 
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parties in order for the venture to proceed. This parity clearly implies some 
kind of measure, perhaps in terms of current costs and of future benefits, but 
the point was not developed further. There is no suggestion that, in further 
cases, the need for clear cost measurement, target setting and apportionment 
of benefits might assume greater importance. However, in the three contexts 
studied, no strong influence appears to have been exerted either way by this 
factor.  
 
Finally, the sixth hypothesis suggested that active and intentional 
collaboration is more likely to take place when brokered by a third party, either 
operationally or in order to apportion costs and benefits. The role of 
contractors has already been discussed at length, latterly in the context of it 
being one of the important environmental variables. The potential for further 
logistics collaborations to be facilitated by contractors not only accords with 
the original assertions of Fernie and Whiteoak, which formed part of the 
rationale for this research, but are also now enshrined in some of the strategic 
intentions of Exel. This contractor, having developed a commercial and 
operational model in the general retail and brewing sectors is now seeking 
opportunities to apply it in other market sectors, specifically hotels, leisure and 
catering. At the outset, it was hoped that examples of direct, active 
collaboration between competitors, without the intervention of a third party, 
might be revealed. In the food retailing case, the retailers talked directly about 
the possibility of sharing trains from Spain to import goods and about 
upstream supply chain collaborations, like common format unitisation trays, 
bar codes and EDI standards.  
 
However, the organisational barriers to direct collaboration among food 
retailers appear to be too great to overcome, due to the structure of the 
market and the nature of the competition within it. Whilst these were not 
precisely the kinds of issues considered by Fernie (1999) when he proposed 
the use of third parties, the data shows that some kind of external facilitation is 
likely to be required to stimulate joint working. Fernie points out that, although 
contractors were active in the food retailing sector at the time, there was still a 
predisposition on the part of retailers to retain some or most activities in-
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house, on the basis that they wished to retain close and detailed operational 
control. This desire for control appears to be consistent with the application of 
transaction cost economics arguments to this particular make-or-buy decision: 
there are often significant sunk costs in the assets and skills associated with 
logistics systems and therefore a preference to retain these within the 
organisation. Areas with lower asset-specificity, such as transport operations, 
are more likely to be managed in the open market at arm’s length. 
 
The desire and need to control the external environment has been discussed 
as an important contextual influence, particularly in the food retailer case. This 
sixth hypothesis, therefore, appears to be borne out by the Broadmead and 
Tradeteam cases, where the contractor has been highly active in facilitating 
the collaboration. However, the food retail case suggests that the hypothesis 
needs to be modified to take account of the extent to which the contractor can 
be proactive in bringing ideas and developments to their customers – the 
potential collaborators – or the extent to which they are merely passive 
recipients and enactors of the retailers’ own strategies.  
 
The six original hypotheses were developed into a model framework for 
understanding the potential for collaboration, based on experience drawn from 
the first case. This initial model went through two further iterations during 
subsequent cases to arrive at the model which was presented as part of the 
conclusions of the cross-case analysis. This attempts to show how the relative 
strength and direction (positive or negative) of six company / logistics 
variables will be influenced by six environmental variables, to try and explain 
circumstances under which horizontal collaboration in logistics might take 
place between competing companies. 
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10.3 Limitations and Contribution  
 
The literature on the logistics developments in the context of UK food retailing, 
supported by detailed observations of the operating environment, suggested 
that logistics collaborations between competitors were a logical evolutionary 
phase, as yet only achieved in practise in limited sense. Attempts to explain 
this apparent paradox reveal the following gaps in knowledge, which this 
research attempts to address: 
 
- What are the factors that either facilitate or obstruct horizontal 
collaboration in logistics between competitors? The research has 
concluded with the proposition of a model constructed with six 
“logistics system” variables and six environmental variables, which 
attempt to explain where horizontal collaborations will be both 
appropriate and feasible. 
- What are the prerequisites for successful horizontal collaboration 
across supply chains? This point is also addressed by the proposed 
collaboration model.  
- What are the potential benefits of horizontal collaboration and how 
these might be apportioned? This point has not been drawn out of 
the research, because it was not possible to explore the associated 
benchmarks costs and metrics associated in the sensitive contexts 
under investigation. Again, this might provide a useful area for 
further research in a context where comparative cost and 
performance data between competitors is not regarded with as high 
a degree of sensitivity. 
- What are the potential different types of horizontal collaboration: for 
example, direct collaboration versus indirect participation in 
schemes administered and operated by third parties? The potential 
value of third party providers, acting as brokers, to provide the 
“glue” for further ECR solutions was described by Fernie and is 
supported by the findings here, with a qualification about the extent 
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to which prospective partners might want to retain detailed 
operational control of their contractors acting as a limiting factor to 
collaborations. 
 
This work is context-specific and there was no intention to triangulate any of 
the results in other contexts. Furthermore, in any qualitative research, there is 
clearly the danger of there being a difference between stated and espoused 
attitudes and perceptions, with respondents giving answers either to project a 
desired image or to somehow give the answers they believe the questioner 
wants to hear. This issue, together with that of potential researcher bias, can 
be addressed by repetition of the interview process with a view to searching 
for inconsistencies in response and by triangulation of responses with data 
from other sources. However, the research was intended to be exploratory, in 
that possible insight into the circumstances surrounding logistics 
collaborations was sought, rather than some definitive explanation of how and 
when such collaborations would succeed and with what effect. To that extent, 
the research has been successful in that it has enabled the proposition, 
testing and development of a tentative model to explain why collaborations 
take place in some circumstances and not in others. As such, the intention 
was to develop those themes on the possible contribution of logistics and 
distribution to ECR initiatives in UK food retailing, as discussed by Fernie, 
Whiteoak and others, rather than attempting to provide some new and 
universal over-arching theory to underpin future developments in logistics. 
 
Furthermore, the research only specifically considered the physical 
distribution components of warehousing and transport. It may be that other 
supply chain activities (for example inventory management, procurement, 
reverse logistics or communications systems) may provide equal or more valid 
opportunities for looking at the concept of non-competition. These might all 
provide fruitful areas for further related research. 
 
A further limitation of the research was the relatively small number of cases 
included in the design and, within the cases, the number of contacts identified. 
To a large extent, both limitations are simply effects of the chosen context: in 
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a highly concentrated market, there are now only a small number of 
meaningful players active in UK food retailing and the numbers of contacts 
within the logistics operations of those firms with sufficient authority and 
experience to contribute meaningfully to the research is small. The opportunity 
to pursue “rich and deep” insights into the perceptions and attitudes of those 
firms and respondents revealed useful data for dealing with responses to 
“how” and “why” questions. As a result, widespread sampling across the 
context was not only impossible and, provided that the sample taken actually 
reflects the context, would not necessarily have added any more value.  
 
As previously discussed, it was also not intended to conduct three in-depth 
cases in sequence, of equal size and substance. Having carried out a great 
deal of work in the food retailing context, the subsequent cases were intended 
to start to test the validity and boundaries of the model and theory developed, 
not to start again with new models for new contexts. 
 
As stated earlier, the contribution of this research is not intended to be in the 
areas of supply chain simulation or in reappraisal of retail strategy. Rather, it 
lies in two areas: 
 
- to offer a perspective on competing supply chains that allows for the 
sub-division of chains into elements which contribute to competitive 
advantage and those which do not. 
- to offer an alternative to current thinking on vertical integration 
within supply chains, with horizontal integration explored in its 
place. 
 
Of the six hypotheses set out to explore the gaps in knowledge and 
understanding described at the outset of this research, five appear to have 
had sufficient validity as to have contributed to the development of dimensions 
and variables of a model to explain possible horizontal collaborations. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the research to date, albeit in just three specific 
contexts, a sixth hypothesis has added value to the extent that a clear 
understanding of costs does not, of itself, appear to enable collaboration. 
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This research has, therefore, largely achieved its aims in addressing 
perceived gaps in knowledge on horizontal logistics collaborations. Factors 
that either facilitate or obstruct horizontal collaboration across supply chains 
have been identified and the contextual circumstances which might affect their 
importance and positive or negative influence developed into a model. The 
prerequisites for successful horizontal collaboration across supply chains 
have been explored and included in the proposed model. Whilst it has not 
been possible to quantify the benefits of horizontal collaboration and 
determine how these might be apportioned, the need for parity of investment 
and benefit has been identified. Direct, active collaboration between 
competitors appears to be more difficult to enact than indirect participation in 
schemes administered and operated by third parties. 
 
Finally, it is worth returning not only to the original context and phenomenon of 
interest, but to a specific detail. Having said that the findings are not 
necessarily generalisable to a wider population or other contexts, it should be 
remembered that a key research interest was the lack of implementations of 
horizontal collaborations in the field of food retailing, against the specific 
background of the roll-out of Efficient Consumer Response. ECR has been an 
enabler for developments in common standards and platforms in other areas 
of the supply chain, such as planning and forecasting, demand management 
and upstream supporting technologies such as bar-code formats, electronic 
data interchange (EDI) standards and unitisation equipment, such as pallets 
and plastic crates. The research was grounded in the food retail context with 
firms who are all participants in ECR initiatives to various degrees. The 
findings, therefore, ought to be generalisable back to these contexts: what 
enabling work ideas into new areas, such as transport optimisation, and how 
can this kind of thinking be extended into other food retailing firms who have 
not, as yet, embraced the concept. This research and its findings has the 
potential to make a contribution by being applicable back into both these 
areas. 
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10.4 Opportunities for further research 
 
The discussion around the findings from the data and the conclusions drawn 
from them identified four areas in which the exploratory work under 
consideration here might be enhanced by further research. 
 
Firstly, the initial context, that of food retailing, was carefully and deliberately 
chosen because of its highly developed logistics systems and other vertical 
collaborative activities under the umbrella of Efficient Consumer Response. 
The Broadmead and Tradeteam contexts were selected, to some extent 
opportunistically, as being closely enough related to the first context as to 
allow for some connections and comparisons to made in order to test the 
constructs developed from the first case. This context specificity has allowed 
for full consideration of the relevant issues in positing a model for logistics 
collaboration. An opportunity exists, therefore, to add further value to this 
research by applying the collaboration model to other contexts, either to 
confirm that it is more generalisable, or to develop it further to make it more 
generalisable, either by changing or adding to the variables.  
 
Because of the specific contexts upon which it is based, the research was 
exploratory in nature and the findings and proposed model are, to some 
extent, tentative. As well as allowing for more general applications, testing of 
the model in different contexts, or further examples of similar contexts, will 
allow the research to become less tentative and more robust. It should also be 
remembered that some years have now passed since some of the original 
food retail data was collected, and that it may be worthwhile, therefore, to 
introduce a longitudinal element to the study, to establish whether the 
influences and variable factors within this single context remain the same. If a 
close duplication of results could be achieved in a single context over time, 
this might add significantly to the value of the model.  
 
Thirdly, one of the original intentions of the research was to try and reveal 
some comparative benchmarking data on competing supply chains, to bring 
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an objective element to the contention that parallel supply chains will all tend 
to achieve similar cost and performance standards once best practise has 
been adopted. This was not possible within the framework of the research 
design selected, as the necessary data was viewed as too sensitive to be 
shared by the respondents. The desk research in anticipation of the first case 
provided some useful insights, but any opportunity for further research to 
uncover actual data to the extent that parity of costs and service could be 
confirmed would, again, add value.  
 
Finally, although the general research interest was in competing supply 
chains, the work focused on the narrower spectrum of physical distribution 
activities, specifically warehousing and transport. There is some evidence of 
collaboration in other supply chain activities, such as bar codes and 
communication standards, which would certainly seem to support the 
“distance” argument. The model in its final proposed form is sufficiently 
general as to be able to be tested in the sphere of these other, potentially 
collaborative, supply chain operations.  
 
10.5 A final word 
 
One of the key issues with case study research and therefore a problem 
common to many researchers is that of access to suitable respondents and 
business activities. In this case, it was knowledge of existing contacts and 
close operational familiarity with the context that first raised interest in the 
phenomenon under investigation: to some extent, in other words, access 
came first and the research came later. This situation brings with it issues of 
potential bias, not only in the interpretation of the results and resultant 
conclusion, but also in the design of the research itself. This potential bias 
was recognised from the outset and, therefore, each decision and conclusion 
was challenged thereafter. No apology is made for this closeness to the 
subject matter and, hopefully, the outputs of the research are richer and more 
informative to academics and practitioners in the field as a result. 
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12 Appendix 1 – Results of the systematic 
literature review 
 
12.1.1.1 Application of all search terms  
returned just three papers: 
 
Collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment: a case study in copper 
clad laminate industry. By: Chung, W. W. C.; Leung, S. W. F.. Production 
Planning & Control, Sep2005, Vol. 16 Issue 6, p563-574, 12p 
 
Do Suppliers Benefit from Collaborative Relationships with Large Retailers? 
An Empirical Investigation of Efficient Consumer Response Adoption. By: 
Corsten, Daniel; Kumar, Nirmalya. Journal of Marketing, Jul2005, Vol. 69 
Issue 3, p80-94, 15p 
 
International Comparisons of Supply Chain Management in Grocery Retailing. 
By: Fernie, John. Service Industries Journal, Oct95, Vol. 15 Issue 4, p134-
147, 14p 
 
The separate “logistics collaboration” and “grocery collaboration” 
searches  
yielded a combined total of 11 papers: 
 
Do Suppliers Benefit from Collaborative Relationships with Large Retailers? 
An Empirical Investigation of Efficient Consumer Response Adoption. By: 
Corsten, Daniel; Kumar, Nirmalya. Journal of Marketing, Jul2005, Vol. 69 
Issue 3, p80-94, 15p 
 
Profits in the Pie of the Beholder. By: Corsten, Daniel; Kumar, Nirmalya. 
Harvard Business Review, May2003, Vol. 81 Issue 5, p22-23, 2p 
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Value-adding partnerships and co-opetition models in the grocery industry. 
By: Kotzab, Herbert; Teller, Christoph. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 2003, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p268, 14p 
 
International Comparisons of Supply Chain Management in Grocery Retailing. 
By: Fernie, John. Service Industries Journal, Oct95, Vol. 15 Issue 4, p134-
147, 14p 
 
Grocery Industry Collaboration in the Wake of ECR. By: Frankel, Robert; 
Goldsby, Thomas J.; Whipple, Judith M.. International Journal of Logistics 
Management, 2002, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p57-71, 15p 
 
BENEFITS OF INTERFIRM COORDINATION IN FOOD INDUSTRY SUPPLY 
CHAINS. By: Stank, Theodore; Crum, Michael; Arango, Miren. Journal of 
Business Logistics, 1999, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p21-42, 22p 
 
Hanging Together. By: Hoffmann, William. Journal of Commerce (15307557), 
10/3/2005, Vol. 6 Issue 40, pL-10-L-12, 3p 
 
The Collaboration Network. By: Cuthbertson, Richard; Collet, Francois. 
European Retail Digest, Dec2001 Issue 32, p7, 5p 
 
Enterprise Logistics in the Information Era. By: Greis, Noel P.; Kasarda, John 
D.. California Management Review, Summer97, Vol. 39 Issue 4, p55-78, 24p 
 
Sweeping changes in distribution. By: Heskett, James L.. Harvard Business 
Review, Mar/Apr73, Vol. 51 Issue 2, p123-132, 10p 
 
The Impact of Supply Chain Partnerships on Supplier Performance. By: Duffy, 
Rachel; Fearne, Andrew. International Journal of Logistics Management, 
2004, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p57-71, 15p 
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13 Appendix 2 – Results of systematic 
literature review (2) 
 
13.1.1.1 The second run of the first iteration 
pilot search (Collaboration / Cooperation between competitors in food / 
grocery / ECR), without necessarily containing any reference to Logistics, 
produced 87 references, of which just six were relevant (included in appendix 
1). 
 
15 were discounted, as being solely concerned with vertical integration, or 
collaboration and cooperation across echelons within a single supply chain. 
 
Collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment: a case study in copper 
clad laminate industry. By: Chung, W. W. C.; Leung, S. W. F.. Production 
Planning & Control, Sep2005, Vol. 16 Issue 6, p563-574, 12p 
A Perspective on UK Supermarket Pressures on the Supply Chain. By: Towill, 
Denis R.. European Management Journal, Aug2005, Vol. 23 Issue 4, p426-
438, 13p 
 
Supply Chain Collaboration: Making Sense of the Strategy Continuum. By: 
Holweg, Matthias; Disney, Stephen; Holmström, Jan; Småros, Johanna. 
European Management Journal, Apr2005, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p170-181, 12p 
 
Logistics-production, logistics-marketing and external integration: Their impact 
on performance. By: Gimenez, Cristina; Ventura, Eva. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 2005, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p20-38, 19p 
 
The Kaleidescope Principle: A new view on collaborative CRM. By: 
Messenger, Steve. European Retail Digest, Winter2004 Issue 44, p7-13, 7p 
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Unveiling Enablers and Inhibitors of Collaborative Planning. By: Barratt, Mark. 
International Journal of Logistics Management, 2004, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p73-90, 
18p 
 
Positioning the Role of Collaborative Planning in Grocery Supply Chains. By: 
Barralt, Mark. International Journal of Logistics Management, 2003, Vol. 14 
Issue 2, p53-66, 14p 
 
The Effect of Collaborative Forecasting on Supply Chain Performance. By: 
Olson, John; Adya, Monica. International Journal of Forecasting, Jul2003, Vol. 
19 Issue 3, p543-544, 2p 
 
Implementation hurdles of ECR partnerships--the German food sector as an 
ECR case study. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 
2002, Vol. 30 Issue 7, p354, 7p 
 
A Close Up View of Global Supply Chains. By: Islei, Gerd; Becker, Johannes. 
European Retail Digest, Dec2001 Issue 32, p15, 7p 
 
Internationalisation of The Nordic Grocery Market. By: Gjerset, Anne Bohle. 
European Retail Digest, Dec99 Issue 24, p26, 3p 
 
Collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment. By: Williams, Scott H.. 
Hospital Material Management Quarterly, Nov99, Vol. 21 Issue 2, p44, 8p 
 
Dependency in Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships: The Potential 
Implications of Retail Internationalization for Indigenous Food Manufacturers. 
By: Collins, Alan; Burt, Steve. Journal of Marketing Management, Oct99, Vol. 
15 Issue 7, p673-693, 23p 
 
Marketing strategy. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 1995, Vol. 10 
Issue 4, p17, 1/3p 
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RETAIL INFORMATION SERVICES. European Retail Digest, Spring95 Issue 
6, p65, 7p 
 
13.1.1.2 19 were purely descriptive texts  
on retail history, many dating back to the 1960’s or earlier: 
 
Selling Self-Service and the Supermarket: The Americanisation of Food 
Retailing in Britain, 1945-60. By: Shaw, Gareth; Curth, Louise; Alexander, 
Andrew. Business History, Oct2004, Vol. 46 Issue 4, p568-582, 15p 
 
COLLECTION AND DIVERSION OF FOOD RESIDUALS IN SOUTHWEST 
FLORIDA. By: Jamieson, Cory; White, Jesse; Ozorez-Hampton, Monica; 
Nutter, Jean; Thavarajah, Bernadette. BioCycle, Jul2004, Vol. 45 Issue 7, 
p32-37, 4p 
 
Stocking the Store: Co-operative Retailers in North-East England and 
Systems of Wholesale Supply, circa 1860-77. By: Purvis, Martin. Business 
History, Oct98, Vol. 40 Issue 4, p55-78, 24p 
 
Retail Food Cooperatives: Testing the 'Small Is Beautiful' Hypothesis. By: 
Cotterill, Ronald. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Feb83, Vol. 65 
Issue 1, p125, 6p 
 
Cosmopolitan and Chauvinism in American Retail Trade. By: Hollander, 
Stanley C.. Journal of Retailing, Spring74, Vol. 50 Issue 1, p3, 6p 
 
Consumer Food Buying Cooperatives--A Market Examined. By: Curhan, 
Ronald C.; Wertheim, Edward G.. Journal of Retailing, Winter72/73, Vol. 48 
Issue 4, p28, 12p;  
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RETAIL GROCERY TRADE IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY. By: Blackman, Janet. Business History, Jul67, Vol. 
9 Issue 2, p110, 8p 
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Self-Sufficiency: A Fixation in Corporate Supermarket Chains? By: Stern, 
Louis W.. Journal of Retailing, Spring66, Vol. 42 Issue 1, p18, 9p 
 
The Supermarket--A Study of Size, Profits, and Concentration. By: Markin, 
Rom J.. Journal of Retailing, Winter64/65, Vol. 40 Issue 4, p22, 15p 
 
MORTALITY OF SEATTLE GROCERY WHOLESALERS. By: Still, Richard 
R.. Journal of Marketing, Oct53, Vol. 18 Issue 2, p160, 6p 
 
THE LOS ANGELES WHOLESALE GROCERY STRUCTURE: 1920-1946: A 
CASE STUDY. By: Cassady Jr., Ralph; Jones, Wylie L.. Journal of Marketing, 
Sep49, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p169, 9p 
 
WAGES AND HOURS IN CONSUMERS' COOPERATIVES IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By: Miller, Glenn W.. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Feb41, Vol. 55 Issue 2, p294-305, 12p 
 
Price Stabilization Attempts in the Grocery Trade in California. By: McHenry, 
Lorenzo Alva. Journal of Marketing, Oct37, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p121, 8p 
 
TRENDS IN THE WHOLESALE GROCERY TRADE IN SAN FRANCISCO. 
By: Grether, Ewald T.. Harvard Business Review, Jul30, Vol. 8 Issue 4, p443, 
8p; 
 
COOPERATIVE RETAIL BUYING IN THE DRUG AND GROCERY TRADES 
II. By: White, Wilford L.. Harvard Business Review, Apr29, Vol. 7 Issue 3, 
p301, 11p 
 
COOPERATIVE RETAIL BUYING IN THE DRUG AND GROCERY TRADES. 
By: White, Wilford L.. Harvard Business Review, Oct28, Vol. 7 Issue 1, p59, 
9p 
 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF WHOLESALE TRADE. By: Copeland, Melvin T.. 
Harvard Business Review, Apr28, Vol. 6 Issue 3, p257, 7p 
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CO-OPERATION AMONG RETAIL GROCERS IN PHILADELPHIA. By: 
Patterson, E. M.. American Economic Review, Jun15, Vol. 5 Issue 2, p279, 
13p 
 
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS: Demography and Statistics. American 
Economic Review, Jun11, Vol. 1 Issue 2, p425, 2p 
 
13.1.1.3 39 were purely technical 
either from an IT, marketing, legal or economic perspective: 
 
Retail Price Fixity as a Facilitating Mechanism. By: Richards, Timothy J.; 
Patterson, Paul M.. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Feb2005, 
Vol. 87 Issue 1, p85-102, 18p 
 
Channel collaboration and firm value proposition. By: Tuominen, Maui. 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 2004, Vol. 32 Issue 
4, p178-189, 12p 
 
INFORMATION GAMING IN DEMAND COLLABORATION AND SUPPLY 
CHAIN PERFORMANCE. By: Kefeng Xu; Yan Dong. Journal of Business 
Logistics, 2004, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p121-144, 24p 
 
THE EFFECT OF PRICE PROMOTIONS ON VARIABILITY IN PRODUCT 
CATEGORY SALES. By: Raju, Jagmohan S.. Marketing Science, Summer92, 
Vol. 11 Issue 3, p207, 14p 
 
A forecasting model to evaluate the profitability of price promotions. By: 
Rinne, Heikki; Geurts, Michael. European Journal of Operational Research, 
Feb88 First Issue, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p279-289, 11p 
 
DOUBLE COUPONING: The Prisoner's Dilemma in Food Retailing. By: 
Varadarajan, P. Rajan. Business Forum, Winter86, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p4, 4p 
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Economies of Size and Performance in Preorder Food Cooperatives. By: 
Coflerill, Ronald. Journal of Retailing, Spring81, Vol. 57 Issue 1, p43, 22p 
 
Linking Public Affairs with Corporate Planning. By: Fleming, John E.. 
California Management Review, Winter80, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p35, 9p 
 
Can Ghetto Groceries Price Competitively and Make a Profit? By: Donaldson, 
Loraine; Strangways, Raymond S.. Journal of Business, Jan73, Vol. 46 Issue 
1, p61-65, 5p 
 
Inter-institution cooperation in distance learning. By: Mizell, Al P.; Carl, Diana 
R.. T H E Journal, May94, Vol. 21 Issue 10, p91, 3p 
 
The Other Side of the Coin: The Impact of QWL Programs on the Union as an 
Organization. By: Cohen-Rosenthal, Edward. Labor Studies Journal, 
Winter84, Vol. 8 Issue 3, p229, 15p 
 
Assessing the impact of e-business on supply chain dynamics. By: Disney, 
S.M.; Naim, M.M.; Potter, A.. International Journal of Production Economics, 
May2004, Vol. 89 Issue 2, p109, 10p 
 
Business value of B2B electronic commerce: the critical role of inter-firm 
collaboration. By: Lee, Seung Chang; Pak, Bo Young; Lee, Ho Geun. 
Electronic Commerce Research & Applications, Winter2003, Vol. 2 Issue 4, 
p350, 12p 
 
Retail exchanges: a research agenda. By: Leigh Sparks; Beverly A Wagner. 
Supply Chain Management, 2003, Vol. 8 Issue 3, p201-208, 8p 
 
FORECASTS IMPROVE WITH SCANNER DATA: A SWEDISH GROCERY 
SUPPLIER'S JOURNEY. By: Larsson, Magnus. Journal of Business 
Forecasting Methods & Systems, Winter2002/2003, Vol. 21 Issue 4, p19, 4p 
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E-commerce and firm bargaining power shift in grocery marketing channels: A 
case of wholesalers' structured document exchanges. By: Nakayama, 
Makoto. Journal of Information Technology (Routledge, Ltd.), Sep2000, Vol. 
15 Issue 3, p195-210, 16p 
 
Viewpoint: E-commerce strengthens suppliers' position. By: Loughlin, Peter. 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 1999, Vol. 27 Issue 
2/3, p69, 4p 
 
CoverStory-- Automated News Findings in Marketing. By: Schmitz, John D.; 
Armstrong, Gordon D.; Little, John D.C.. Interfaces, Nov/Dec90, Vol. 20 Issue 
6, p29-38, 10p 
 
Online Shopping: Consumer Protection and Regulation. By: O'Neill, Barbara. 
Consumer Interests Annual, 2001 Issue 47, p1-3, 3p 
 
A FEDERAL CASE. By: Dresner, Marcia. Financial Executive, May/Jun2000, 
Vol. 16 Issue 3, p33-36, 4p 
 
The Right FIT. By: Shihadeh-Gomaa, Anne. Risk Management (00355593), 
Jan98, Vol. 45 Issue 1, p37-43, 6p 
 
Technorisk Who's Responsible? By: Hughes, Maia L.. Risk Management 
(00355593), Nov97, Vol. 44 Issue 11, p20-24, 4p 
 
BROKERS AT THE HELM Navigating the Risk Financing Frontier. By: Zarb, 
Frank G.. Risk Management (00355593), Jul95, Vol. 42 Issue 7, p53-58, 4p 
 
Solutions for Agricultural Co-ops. By: Kehl, Joyce. Risk Management 
(00355593), Jun94, Vol. 41 Issue 6, p33-33, 2/3p 
 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKETING. By: Werner, Ray O.. Journal of 
Marketing, Apr71, Vol. 35 Issue 2 
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How Housewives Form Price Impressions. By: Oxenfeldt, Alfred R.. Journal of 
Advertising Research, Sep68, Vol. 8 Issue 3, p9-17, 9p 
 
PRICE DIFFERENCES FOR IDENTICAL ITEMS IN CHAIN, VOLUNTARY 
GROUP, AND INDEPENDENT GROCERY STORES. By: Oakes, Ralph H.. 
Journal of Marketing, Oct49, Vol. 14 Issue 3, p434, 3p 
 
MERCHANDISING THE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN. By: Moses, Lionel B.. 
Journal of Marketing, Oct44, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p124, 3p 
 
CONDUCTING SALES TESTS. By: Burgoyne Jr., John. Journal of Marketing, 
Oct44, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p158, 2p 
 
PAMPHLET MATERIALS. Journal of Marketing, Jul40, Vol. 5 Issue 1, p83, 7p 
Evaluating Community-based Nutrition Programs: Assessing the Reliability of 
a Survey of Grocery Store Product Displays. By: Cheadle, Allen; Psaty, Bruce; 
Wagner, Edward; Diehr, Paula; Koepsell, Thomas; Curry, Susan; von Korff, 
Michael. American Journal of Public Health, Jun90, Vol. 80 Issue 6, p709, 3p 
 
The Effect of Nutrition P-O-P Signs on Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. By: 
Achabal, Dale D.; McIntyre, Shelby H.; Bell, Cherryl H.; Tucker, Nancy. 
Journal of Retailing, Spring87, Vol. 63 Issue 1, p9, 16p 
 
REGIONAL ROUNDUP. BioCycle, Sep2005, Vol. 46 Issue 9, p18-21, 4p 
 
GROCERY CHAIN PLUGS INTO COMPOSTING. By: Goldstein, Nora. 
BioCycle, Oct2001, Vol. 42 Issue 10, p48, 1/4p 
 
Effects of Service and Communication Initiatives on Retail Grocery 
Consumers' Loyalty. By: Piron, Francis. Singapore Management Review, 
2001 2nd Half, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p45, 16p 
GAME THEORY AND EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING 
COMPETITIVE PROMOTIONS. By: Rao, Ram C.; Arjunji, Ramesh V.; Murthi, 
B. P. S.. Marketing Science, 1995 Part 2 of 2, Vol. 14 Issue 3, pG89, 12p 
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A Comparative Performance Analysis of New Wave Food Cooperatives and 
Private Food Stores. By: Schiferl, Elizabeth A.; Boynton, Robert D.. Journal of 
Consumer Affairs, Winter83, Vol. 17 Issue 2, p336, 20p 
 
Motivation of Food Cooperative Members: Reply to Curhan and Wertheim. By: 
Sommer, Robert; Hohn, William E.; Tyburczy, Jason. Journal of Retailing, 
Winter81, Vol. 57 Issue 4, p114, 4p 
 
A PROFIT STRATEGY FOR THE SMALL GROCER. By: Griffin, Waylon D.. 
Journal of Small Business Management, Jan74, Vol. 12 Issue 1, p47-50, 4p 
 
13.1.1.4 The remainder were from the (non refereed) practitioner 
press 
or were editorials or book reviews: 
 
ROLAND S. VAILE. By: Bliss, Perry; Alderson, Wroe; Grether, E. T.; Jones, 
Fred M.; Frey, Albert W.; Jeuck, John E.; Lyon, Leverett. Journal of Marketing, 
Apr56, Vol. 20 Issue 4, p333, 4p 
 
Competition and Collaboration in European Grocery Retailing. By: Dobson, 
Paul W.. European Retail Digest, Autumn2003 Issue 39, p13-21, 9p 
 
Editorial. By: Cavinato, Joseph L.. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 2004, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p10-11, 2p 
 
European CPFR Insights, facilitated by Accenture, ECR Europe, 2002. By: 
Cuthbertson, Richard. European Retail Digest, Sep2002 Issue 35, p1, 1p 
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14 Appendix 3 
 
14.1.1.1 The final iteration of the search 
sought to identify papers which discussed collaboration and co-opetition in 
logistics, without necessarily containing any references to grocery, food or 
ECR. 85 papers were identified, of which just 7 were relevant to the research 
topic and included, therefore, in appendix 1. 
 
38 were discounted, as being solely concerned with vertical integration, or 
collaboration and cooperation across echelons within a single supply chain. 
 
Collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment: a case study in copper 
clad laminate industry. By: Chung, W. W. C.; Leung, S. W. F.. Production 
Planning & Control, Sep2005, Vol. 16 Issue 6, p563-574, 12p 
 
A new approach for understanding hindrances to collaborative practices in the 
logistics channel. By: Bonet, Dominique; Paché, Gilles. International Journal 
of Retail & Distribution Management, 2005, Vol. 33 Issue 8, p583-596, 14p 
 
An Examination of Collaborative Planning Effectiveness and Supply Chain 
Performance. By: Petersen, Kenneth J.; Ragatz, Gary L.; Monczka, Robert 
M.. Journal of Supply Chain Management: A Global Review of Purchasing & 
Supply, Spring2005, Vol. 41 Issue 2, p14-25, 12p 
 
Ten guiding principles for high-impact SCM. By: Fawcett, Stanley E.; Magnan, 
Gregory M.. Business Horizons, Sep/Oct2004, Vol. 47 Issue 5, p67-74, 8p 
 
Analysis of the relational capital between logistic partners. By: De Oro 
Celestino, Diego Jesus Cuello; Estirado, Luis Miguel Delgado; Olalla, Marta 
Fossas. International Journal of Services Technology & Management, 2004, 
Vol. 5 Issue 5/6, p1-1, 1p 
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A business model for the new economy. By: Walters, David. International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 2004, Vol. 34 Issue 
3/4, p346-357, 12p 
 
Retailer- vs. Vendor-Managed Inventory and Brand Competition. By: Mishra, 
Birendra K.; Raghunathan, Srinivasan. Management Science, Apr2004, Vol. 
50 Issue 4, p445-457, 13p 
 
An advanced agent-based order planning system for dynamic networked 
enterprises. By: Azevedo, Américo L.; Toscano, C&esar; Sousa, Jorge P.; 
Soares, Antonio L.. Production Planning & Control, Mar2004, Vol. 15 Issue 2, 
p133-144, 12p 
 
Organizational identity and network identification: relating within and beyond 
imaginary boundaries. By: Huemer, Lars; Becerra, Manuel; Lunnan, Randi. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, Mar2004, Vol. 20 Issue 1/2, p53-73, 
21p 
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF SUPPLIER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS. By: 
Rinehart, Lloyd M.; Eckert, James A.; Handfield, Robert B.; Page Jr., Thomas 
J.; Atkin, Thomas. Journal of Business Logistics, 2004, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p25-
62, 38p 
 
Understanding supply chain management: critical research and a theoretical 
framework. By: Chen, I. J.; Paulraj, A.. International Journal of Production 
Research, 1/1/2004, Vol. 42 Issue 1, p131-163, 33p 
 
Applying collaborative transportation management models in global third-party 
logistics. By: JC, Tyan; FK, Wang; T, Du. International Journal of Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing, Jun/Jul2003, Vol. 16 Issue 4/5, p283, 9p 
 
Towards a comprehensive SCP-model for analysing strategic 
networks/alliances. By: Klint, Mats B.; Sjöberg, Ulf. International Journal of 
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Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 2003, Vol. 33 Issue 5, p408-
426, 19p 
 
Collaborative networking in a multi-stage industrial channel. By: Fujimoto, 
Hisao. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 
2003, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p229, 7p 
 
A STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE. By: Wisner, Joel D.. Journal of 
Business Logistics, 2003, Vol. 24 Issue 1, p1-26, 26p 
 
Attaining world-class R&D by benchmarking buyer–supplier relationships. By: 
Hurmelinna, Pia; Peltola, Satu; Tuimala, Jarno; Virolainen, Veli-Matti. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 11/1/2002, Vol. 80 Issue 1, 
p39, 9p 
 
The Collaborative Supply Chain. By: Simatupang, Togar M.; Sridharan, R.. 
International Journal of Logistics Management, 2002, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p15-30, 
16p 
 
The rhetoric and reality of supply chain integration. By: Fawcett, Stanley E.; 
Magnan, Gregory M.. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 2002, Vol. 32 Issue 5, p339, 23p 
 
LOGISTICS MANAGERS' LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE. By: Ellinger, Alexander E.; Ellinger, Andrea D.; Keller, Scott 
B.. Journal of Business Logistics, 2002, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p19-37, 19p 
 
Unlocking the Supply Chain to Build Competitive Advantage. By: Walker, 
Brian; Bovet, David; Martha, Joseph. International Journal of Logistics 
Management, 2000, Vol. 11 Issue 2, p1, 8p 
 
From the Editors. By: Douglas M. Lambert; Martin G. Christopher. 
International Journal of Logistics Management, 2000, Vol. 11 Issue 2, pii-ii, 1p 
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THE GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE FIRM: FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION, 
VALUE CHAIN LOGISTICS, GLOBAL MARKETING, AND BUSINESS 
COLLEGE STRATEGIC SUPPORT. By: Anderson, Shirley C.. 
Competitiveness Review, 2000, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p33, 13p 
 
Institute of Management Services Report on Productivity. Management 
Services, May2000, Vol. 44 Issue 5, p29-29, 1/2p 
 
Conflict, Power, and Evolution in the Intermodal Transportation Industry's 
Channel of Distribution. By: Taylor, John C.; Jackson, George C.. 
Transportation Journal, Spring2000, Vol. 39 Issue 3, p5-17, 13p 
 
Marketing/Logistics Integration and Firm Performance. By: Stank, Theodore 
P.; Daugherty, Patrucia J.; Ellinger, Alexander E.. International Journal of 
Logistics Management, 1999, Vol. 10 Issue 1, p11, 14p 
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